The Soviet General Staff Study on Operation Bagration is divided into two parts, preparation and conduct. Similar to the other titles in this General Staff series, this is a text best suited for those intimately familiar with the Eastern Front of the Second World War and those who can often read between the lines of Soviet historical studies. Perhaps a reflection of the time this study was prepared and written in, there is no mention of Stalin but similarly commanders names, be they front, army, corps, or division, are also avoided. The same holds true for the enemy. This makes for a rather faceless exploration of Operation Bagration as readers will mainly be presented with descriptions of unit movements, attacks, counterattacks, defensive operations, etc.
However, those interested in understanding some of the intricacies associated with the planning and implementation of one of the most successful Red Army operations in the Second World War will find this volume quite useful. Specifically the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading. Because of the success of Operation Bagration there is much praise for Soviet forces within the volume but the author(s) were not above pointing out difficulties encountered in the field and inadequacies in tactics, operational art, strategy and supply services in the rear (logistics, medical, etc.).
The "international" implications of Bagration are also alluded to within this volume. There is regular reference to the German movement of forces from other theaters of operation to the Eastern Front to recreate a front where Army Group Center used to exist, making it that much easier for the allies to continue their offensive in the west after the initial D-Day victories had stalled. The tail-end of Operation Bagration is tied up with the Warsaw Uprising. There is a minor mention made of the uprising with some time spent discussing the numerous difficulties Soviet forces encountered attempting to reach the suburbs of Warsaw (specifically, Praga) but too context and too many details are left out. Undoubtedly this was for political reasons and to hide the losses Red Army units sustained as Operation Bagration was running out of steam. While there are numerous tables and mentions of losses sustained by both sides, they are best taken with a grain of salt. But there can be no mistaking the pride that's evident each time the author(s) were able to say Red Army losses were only a fraction of those lost by the enemy. So, for those interested in the details of Bagration, this volume is definitely recommended.
However, those interested in understanding some of the intricacies associated with the planning and implementation of one of the most successful Red Army operations in the Second World War will find this volume quite useful. Specifically the details the author(s) go into when describing initial preparations, tactics utilized by units in the beginning of the offensive, the continuous attempts to adapt to the ever-changing situation as the offensive took shape and commanders soon realized that initial expectations were surpassed by the victories achieved in the field, etc., make for compelling reading. Because of the success of Operation Bagration there is much praise for Soviet forces within the volume but the author(s) were not above pointing out difficulties encountered in the field and inadequacies in tactics, operational art, strategy and supply services in the rear (logistics, medical, etc.).
The "international" implications of Bagration are also alluded to within this volume. There is regular reference to the German movement of forces from other theaters of operation to the Eastern Front to recreate a front where Army Group Center used to exist, making it that much easier for the allies to continue their offensive in the west after the initial D-Day victories had stalled. The tail-end of Operation Bagration is tied up with the Warsaw Uprising. There is a minor mention made of the uprising with some time spent discussing the numerous difficulties Soviet forces encountered attempting to reach the suburbs of Warsaw (specifically, Praga) but too context and too many details are left out. Undoubtedly this was for political reasons and to hide the losses Red Army units sustained as Operation Bagration was running out of steam. While there are numerous tables and mentions of losses sustained by both sides, they are best taken with a grain of salt. But there can be no mistaking the pride that's evident each time the author(s) were able to say Red Army losses were only a fraction of those lost by the enemy. So, for those interested in the details of Bagration, this volume is definitely recommended.