There's a large enough market for histories and stories about ultra-rich families and their dysfunctional relationships with each other and those around them. The problem, unfortunately, is contextualizing their stories and drawing in the point of view of the family members themselves when many are no longer of this world. Much of what 'Crazy Rich' tells us is already well known; Extravagance is a relative word and family members will go to war with each other over money, inheritance, trusts, and relationships. In that respect 'Crazy Rich' offers little in terms of originality. The more interesting aspects of the Johnson & Johnson story is the history of the company, the directions various Johnson members took the company, and unfortunately much of that is related through anecdotes with various tangents along the way. Trying to write such a complex history, with all the dimensions and Johnson family members that influenced the course of the company and family itself, is an impossible task. While one can applaud the author for what he's tried to do, in many ways he's raised more questions than he's answered.
Crazy Rich: Power, Scandal, and Tragedy Inside the Johnson & Johnson Dynasty by Jerry Oppenheimer
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The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941: The Red Army's Disastrous Stand against Operation Typhoon by Lev Lopukhovsky
"The Viaz'ma Catastrophe" by Lev Lopukhovsky makes for an important contribution to our overall knowledge of the Eastern Front, specifically the operations that occurred in 1941, and helps to contextualize the dense amount of information that scholars and laymen need to keep in mind when referring to the victories the Germans achieved and the defeats the Soviets suffered through. Although the main concentration is on the Red Army, there are numerous reports and orders from the point of view of the Wehrmacht - thus the reader is presented with two points of view, not just one. Aiding in explaining the events of 1941, and more specifically Operation Typhoon, are the close to two dozen color maps, which go a long way in helping readers keep track of the numerous engagements that were simultaneously unfolding.
For those familiar with David Glantz's style and breadth of coverage, you can expect something similar here. But Glantz's limited ability to incorporate Russian archival research is what sets Lopukhovsky apart. Readers should be prepared for the recounting of numerous units, from both the German and Soviet side, as well as a dense narrative that tries to ascertain and explain how the initial lunge by the Germans during Operation Typhoon proved so successful against a Red Army that had been more or less stable in its positions opposite Army Group Center since the Smolensk encirclement.
Lopukhovsky, whose father, an officer in the 120th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, disappeared around Viaz'ma, set himself the task of finding out not only the circumstances of his father's disappearance but more so how the Germans achieved such a huge victory months after the surprise of their initial invasion had worn off. "Surprise" is often the catch-all term Soviet studies, and many current Russian accounts of the war, use to explain and justify German victories and Soviet defeats and retreats. While "surprise" works on many levels (tactical, operational, strategic, political, etc.) it does not last for months. Thus, in analyzing in minute detail the German beginning of Operation Typhoon and the Soviet reaction, Lopukhovsky offers a more detailed and nuanced explanation for the conditions through which the encirclement at Viaz'ma, and to an extent neighboring Briansk, was created than previous studies have offered. While a large obstacle still remains in the form of still classified Soviet-era files in the archives, which leads to Lopukhovsky having to entertain his own ideas from time to time, the final product in the form of "The Viaz'ma Catastrophe" goes a long way in helping to explain the numerous reasons why the Red Army continually failed to halt German offensives up through October of 1941.
Aside from pointing out the weaknesses of the Red Army on the eve of the war, some of which persisted through 1941 and set the stage for German advances, another aspect Lopukhovsky concentrates on is the constant attempts to break out of the encirclement made by Red Army forces. Whether breaking up into small groups and seeking to infiltrate through weaknesses in the German ring or coalescing into larger groups, made up of the remnants of numerous formations, Red Army forces continually attempted to fulfill their orders to the letter even if it meant desperate, headlong attacks against German forces who enjoyed air superiority and the ability to call on support from artillery and tanks. Although grievous losses were sustained, Soviet forces never missed a chance to undermine the German war effort from the rear by attacking targets of opportunity wherever they might encounter them - in one case, destroying communications equipment from a panzer group's signal regiment.
The last chapter is devoted to the losses sustained by the Red Army not only in 1941 but throughout the war in general. Lopukhovsky shows clear evidence that losses were undercounted or simply not reported at all, an understandable phenomenon when considering the situation many units found themselves in throughout 1941 - encircled and without communication to higher headquarters. Unfortunately, the true figures will never be known due to many reasons, such as double counting of casualties, soldiers and civilians that were counted as prisoners by the Germans who escaped and rejoined Red Army forces, etc. There is no doubt that keeping the number of casualties as they are today walks a fine line between representing Red Army sacrifice and courage while keeping a history of the Soviet war effort so many have become familiar with. To begin to round up those numbers will only raise questions about the competence and abilities of not only the Soviet government, but its commanders and soldiers themselves. This is something today's Russia wants to avoid as it continues to cling to the victory of the Great Patriotic War, with all the sacrifice offered by Soviet soldiers and civilians, as a, if not the, cornerstone of its history and memory today.
Finally, my biggest issue was the length of the main text (450 pages) within this volume. As factually rich as this study is, there were numerous instances when information could have been put into the endnotes so as not clog up the readability of the narrative; this includes both references to numbers of weapons, German and Soviet orders and reports that did not have to be cited in full, and various tangents the author goes off on. Although the aforementioned, and then some, all deserve to be discussed, they bog the reader down and take away from the flow of the overall narrative; being forced to acknowledge so many facts all at once makes for a more difficult than enjoyable reading experience, even for those who are intimately familiar with this time period and the events in question.
For those familiar with David Glantz's style and breadth of coverage, you can expect something similar here. But Glantz's limited ability to incorporate Russian archival research is what sets Lopukhovsky apart. Readers should be prepared for the recounting of numerous units, from both the German and Soviet side, as well as a dense narrative that tries to ascertain and explain how the initial lunge by the Germans during Operation Typhoon proved so successful against a Red Army that had been more or less stable in its positions opposite Army Group Center since the Smolensk encirclement.
Lopukhovsky, whose father, an officer in the 120th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, disappeared around Viaz'ma, set himself the task of finding out not only the circumstances of his father's disappearance but more so how the Germans achieved such a huge victory months after the surprise of their initial invasion had worn off. "Surprise" is often the catch-all term Soviet studies, and many current Russian accounts of the war, use to explain and justify German victories and Soviet defeats and retreats. While "surprise" works on many levels (tactical, operational, strategic, political, etc.) it does not last for months. Thus, in analyzing in minute detail the German beginning of Operation Typhoon and the Soviet reaction, Lopukhovsky offers a more detailed and nuanced explanation for the conditions through which the encirclement at Viaz'ma, and to an extent neighboring Briansk, was created than previous studies have offered. While a large obstacle still remains in the form of still classified Soviet-era files in the archives, which leads to Lopukhovsky having to entertain his own ideas from time to time, the final product in the form of "The Viaz'ma Catastrophe" goes a long way in helping to explain the numerous reasons why the Red Army continually failed to halt German offensives up through October of 1941.
Aside from pointing out the weaknesses of the Red Army on the eve of the war, some of which persisted through 1941 and set the stage for German advances, another aspect Lopukhovsky concentrates on is the constant attempts to break out of the encirclement made by Red Army forces. Whether breaking up into small groups and seeking to infiltrate through weaknesses in the German ring or coalescing into larger groups, made up of the remnants of numerous formations, Red Army forces continually attempted to fulfill their orders to the letter even if it meant desperate, headlong attacks against German forces who enjoyed air superiority and the ability to call on support from artillery and tanks. Although grievous losses were sustained, Soviet forces never missed a chance to undermine the German war effort from the rear by attacking targets of opportunity wherever they might encounter them - in one case, destroying communications equipment from a panzer group's signal regiment.
The last chapter is devoted to the losses sustained by the Red Army not only in 1941 but throughout the war in general. Lopukhovsky shows clear evidence that losses were undercounted or simply not reported at all, an understandable phenomenon when considering the situation many units found themselves in throughout 1941 - encircled and without communication to higher headquarters. Unfortunately, the true figures will never be known due to many reasons, such as double counting of casualties, soldiers and civilians that were counted as prisoners by the Germans who escaped and rejoined Red Army forces, etc. There is no doubt that keeping the number of casualties as they are today walks a fine line between representing Red Army sacrifice and courage while keeping a history of the Soviet war effort so many have become familiar with. To begin to round up those numbers will only raise questions about the competence and abilities of not only the Soviet government, but its commanders and soldiers themselves. This is something today's Russia wants to avoid as it continues to cling to the victory of the Great Patriotic War, with all the sacrifice offered by Soviet soldiers and civilians, as a, if not the, cornerstone of its history and memory today.
Finally, my biggest issue was the length of the main text (450 pages) within this volume. As factually rich as this study is, there were numerous instances when information could have been put into the endnotes so as not clog up the readability of the narrative; this includes both references to numbers of weapons, German and Soviet orders and reports that did not have to be cited in full, and various tangents the author goes off on. Although the aforementioned, and then some, all deserve to be discussed, they bog the reader down and take away from the flow of the overall narrative; being forced to acknowledge so many facts all at once makes for a more difficult than enjoyable reading experience, even for those who are intimately familiar with this time period and the events in question.
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Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk: The Turning Point of World War II by Dennis Showalter
The book description claims 'Armor and Blood' is 'the definitive account of the greatest tank battle of World War II', unfortunately that's far from accurate. The author himself admits this book offers nothing new or original but is a 'synthesis' of recent literature. As someone who's read their share of literature on the Second World War in general and the Eastern Front in particular, I'm always interested in new analysis and discussions that feature the Eastern Front. Yet 'Armor and Blood' seems a somewhat pointless text to me. A synthesis already assumes that there is no original research or new evidence to present the reading audience. But a synthesis in itself can be a useful tool if crafted from the newest research and offering original analysis. But having read close to a dozen books on the battle of Kursk I simply do not see where that original analysis is, nor did I see much of a narrative crafted from the newest literature available. Instead, what I encountered among the pages of 'Armor and Blood' is another German point-of-view text about the battle of Kursk with some minor mention of the Red Army every few pages. Once more the vaunted SS panzer force loses 3 or so tanks 'written-off' while the Red Army leaves on the field of battle hundreds of T-34s and T-70s and tens of thousands of men, which are readily replaced with the next batch of cannon fodder eager to die for the motherland. Unlike Zamulin's recently translated study of Prokhorovka that provided an enormous amount of new material for the western reader to digest, 'Armor and Blood' is another quickly forgotten regurgitation of all that is already pretty well known by those who've previously read about this battle. In addition, the lack of endnotes and bibliography (as with his previous 'Hitler's Panzers') makes for a less interesting reading experience for those interested to find out where the information presented is coming from.
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The Punishment Imperative by Todd R. Clear and Natasha A. Frost
As someone with a growing interesting in the state of prisons and jails in the United States I was happy to get a chance to read through 'The Punishment Imperative.' Unfortunately, as someone accustomed to reading historical monographs, a study written by criminal justice professionals just did not read as well or as coherently as I hoped. The majority of the book was repetitive and while based on a high volume of sources it did not follow any real chronology or set of themes but rather intertwined subjects and ideas on a regular basis, which at times could be and was confusing to the layman (as I consider myself within this subject matter). For those with a passing interest, I cannot say I'd recommend this monograph on 'The Rise and Failure of Mass Incarceration in America' since I did not find a clear, comprehensive study on such a rise or failure. The reader will have to have a foundation in the laws, policies, personalities, ideas, and events that the authors discuss and go over for the arguments made to resonate, unfortunately I am just not at that level of intimacy with the subject at present.
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The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany's First Great Crisis of World War II by Niklas Zetterling
As I'm reading through 'The Drive on Moscow' I'm somewhat confused as to where this volume actually fits into the history of the Eastern Front. More so, I'm confused about why it was written in the first place. The title speaks for itself; Zetterling and Frankson have decided to put together a volume detailing Germany's first 'great crisis of World War II'. But what separates this volume from a host of others that detail the exact same operations, highlight the same types of memoirs and reminiscences, and reach similar if not altogether the same conclusions? If a reader wants a journalistic account of the battle for Moscow, they can turn to Nagorski's 'The Greatest Battle' (although riddled with weaknesses, mistakes, and omissions, it's an easy enough read). If you're interested in the Soviet point of view, and a more academic work, see Rodric Braithwaite's "Moscow 1941" or 'The Retreat: Hitler's First Defeat' by Michael Jones. And if perhaps the German point of view is more interesting, you can consult the various monographs put out by David Stahel in the last few years.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in this text that separates it from other studies. There is the usual reliance on German general memoirs, sprinkled with a few diaries to give the reader an impression of what the frontline soldiers themselves overcame to reach Moscow. The text contains the same rehashing of the terrible weather the Wehrmacht had to overcome (both mud and then snow), the same logistical difficulties and mediocre Soviet resistance that really did little to nothing until somehow the Germans exhausted themselves with their long distance advances against the rains and snows of the east. Some Cold War era memoirs from the Soviet side make an appearance, with the usual reliance on Konev, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, and a few others that provide absolutely no new or original information on the battle. The Soviet side, for all intents and purposes, still remains a mystery compared to the German side of things (even though some newer Russian studies are utilized). If you've read about the German advance on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), then you've read the majority of this book already. If you're new to the topic, you won't want to start here as the amount of information provided is there for those already familiar with the Eastern Front. For those who are acquainted with the Eastern Front, you'll find little analysis, and no new or original research, but the appendices might prove useful if you're eager for detailed orders of battle and information on losses. So in the end, I'm back to where I started this review; I'm simply confused as to why this volume was written and for whom.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in this text that separates it from other studies. There is the usual reliance on German general memoirs, sprinkled with a few diaries to give the reader an impression of what the frontline soldiers themselves overcame to reach Moscow. The text contains the same rehashing of the terrible weather the Wehrmacht had to overcome (both mud and then snow), the same logistical difficulties and mediocre Soviet resistance that really did little to nothing until somehow the Germans exhausted themselves with their long distance advances against the rains and snows of the east. Some Cold War era memoirs from the Soviet side make an appearance, with the usual reliance on Konev, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, and a few others that provide absolutely no new or original information on the battle. The Soviet side, for all intents and purposes, still remains a mystery compared to the German side of things (even though some newer Russian studies are utilized). If you've read about the German advance on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), then you've read the majority of this book already. If you're new to the topic, you won't want to start here as the amount of information provided is there for those already familiar with the Eastern Front. For those who are acquainted with the Eastern Front, you'll find little analysis, and no new or original research, but the appendices might prove useful if you're eager for detailed orders of battle and information on losses. So in the end, I'm back to where I started this review; I'm simply confused as to why this volume was written and for whom.
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The Siege of Brest 1941: A Legend of Red Army Resistance on the Eastern Front by Rostislav Aliev and Stuart Britton
The fighting for Brest Fortress has acquired a legendary status within the history of the Eastern Front in World War II. Knowledge of the resistance various Red Army units put up was not readily known about until 1942 when a German report was discovered and published in the newspapers. With the victory in 1945 Stalin's demigod status was cemented with the caveat that few to no histories or recollections of the war were allowed to be published, especially discussing 1941. Thus the history of the defense of Brest fortress was put off until after Stalin's death and even then it was filled with what the author of this work calls myths.
'The Siege of Brest 1941' gives a brief but very revealing account of the first minutes, hours, and days of the war from both the Soviet and German point of view, relying on German and Soviet recollections, documents, and unit histories (the last mainly for the German side). The majority of the work concentrates on the German 45th division with limited discussion of surrounding or higher up units, and the Soviet concentration is, comparably, on the units specifically located within the confines of the fortress.
Aliev lays out a very dense and detailed history of the numerous engagements within the fortress by Soviet NKVD border guards, rifle regiments, anti-tank units, and a host of other formations that were caught by surprise on June 22, 1941, as the Germans crossed the Soviet border and unleashed Operation Barbarossa. Considering the surprise the Germans achieved, the amount of resistance offered by the Soviets is quite astonishing, even though the majority lasted only for the first three days, as they inflicted hundreds of casualties on the German 45th infantry division and held up their advance into the Soviet interior. Red Army and border forces were often left without any adequate leadership as many officers were outside the fortress either taking the Sunday (June 22) off to relax, were on training exercises or participating in any number of other activities.
Soviet resistance was thus diluted and disorganized. Within hours of the invasion Aliev describes how resistance stiffened in some sectors, while in others men and women ran to escape the confines of the fortress as they were overcome by shock and panic. German advances into the fortress were met with success until Soviet resistance was able to overcome the initial chaos. What followed was a German retreat with a few German units even becoming encircled by the Red Army within the fortress. As hours turned to days, German artillery took a toll on the defenders, as did a lack of water. Many units began to contemplate breaking out and often it was painful to read about the numerous escape attempts. On the night of June 22, many were able to get away as the Germans were only just setting up a cordon. As more time passed, especially by the second and third day, practically all breakout attempts resulted in death or prisoner of war status. The last large group of defenders (several hundred men) surrendered at the end of June but isolated incidents of sabotage, shootings, and escapes from the fortress continued into August.
Overall, Aliev has produced a very interesting and detailed account of the siege of Brest Fortress and Stuart Britton has done an excellent job with this translation. Maps offered in the first pages are very well done with a lot of highlighted locations and points of interest laid out for the reader. My biggest complaint is the minute number of endnotes, and the complete lack of a bibliography and an index. This greatly takes away from the reading experience for me and limits the usefulness of this text in terms of reference.
'The Siege of Brest 1941' gives a brief but very revealing account of the first minutes, hours, and days of the war from both the Soviet and German point of view, relying on German and Soviet recollections, documents, and unit histories (the last mainly for the German side). The majority of the work concentrates on the German 45th division with limited discussion of surrounding or higher up units, and the Soviet concentration is, comparably, on the units specifically located within the confines of the fortress.
Aliev lays out a very dense and detailed history of the numerous engagements within the fortress by Soviet NKVD border guards, rifle regiments, anti-tank units, and a host of other formations that were caught by surprise on June 22, 1941, as the Germans crossed the Soviet border and unleashed Operation Barbarossa. Considering the surprise the Germans achieved, the amount of resistance offered by the Soviets is quite astonishing, even though the majority lasted only for the first three days, as they inflicted hundreds of casualties on the German 45th infantry division and held up their advance into the Soviet interior. Red Army and border forces were often left without any adequate leadership as many officers were outside the fortress either taking the Sunday (June 22) off to relax, were on training exercises or participating in any number of other activities.
Soviet resistance was thus diluted and disorganized. Within hours of the invasion Aliev describes how resistance stiffened in some sectors, while in others men and women ran to escape the confines of the fortress as they were overcome by shock and panic. German advances into the fortress were met with success until Soviet resistance was able to overcome the initial chaos. What followed was a German retreat with a few German units even becoming encircled by the Red Army within the fortress. As hours turned to days, German artillery took a toll on the defenders, as did a lack of water. Many units began to contemplate breaking out and often it was painful to read about the numerous escape attempts. On the night of June 22, many were able to get away as the Germans were only just setting up a cordon. As more time passed, especially by the second and third day, practically all breakout attempts resulted in death or prisoner of war status. The last large group of defenders (several hundred men) surrendered at the end of June but isolated incidents of sabotage, shootings, and escapes from the fortress continued into August.
Overall, Aliev has produced a very interesting and detailed account of the siege of Brest Fortress and Stuart Britton has done an excellent job with this translation. Maps offered in the first pages are very well done with a lot of highlighted locations and points of interest laid out for the reader. My biggest complaint is the minute number of endnotes, and the complete lack of a bibliography and an index. This greatly takes away from the reading experience for me and limits the usefulness of this text in terms of reference.
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand Lives!: A World without World War I Hardcover by Richard Ned Lebow
I'm usually very wary of counterfactuals. Often they're done by amateurs with little understanding of how variables can and cannot be altered. But if an academic can change a few minor events and keep in mind the actions of all participants, while simultaneously offering alternatives, at the very least a new, richer context can be created for understanding why what did happen was allowed to occur. In this case, Richard Ned Lebow's second chapter, 'Preventing World War I', is full of interesting ideas on why, contrary to many historians and specialists, without the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, war might in fact have been avoided rather than begun over any number of other incidents that were sure to push the heads of empires into doing something irreversible and calamitous.
One of Lebow's cornerstone arguments is that 1914 was a year where an event like the assassination of the Archduke could and did begin a conflagration of events that led all he powers to eventually enter a World War. There were events leading up to 1914 that also brought either two or more of Europe's great powers into conflict, but they were continually resolved. Yet 1914 proved an important year because German generals were wary of Russian rearmament and railway construction, which meant that any advance into France would mean a quicker Russian response and perhaps the loss of Prussia. Thus 1914 was argued as Germany's best and, at the time, only real opportunity to make good on her threats/promises rather than back-down, as Russia had to do a few years previously with a Balkan Crisis.
After the first few chapters the author goes on a series of predictions about a future world that are really little more than fantasies made up of whimsical day dreams and nightmares. The amount of variables that one would need to keep in mind and control to move even a few years past 1914, keeping in mind that WWI has not broken out, is simply impossible. The only other real utility that I can see within the pages of this text, aside from the above mentioned ideas on the beginning and eve of WWI, are how much WWI and WWII influenced society and how radically different society was and could have been if not for these gigantic conflagrations.
One of Lebow's cornerstone arguments is that 1914 was a year where an event like the assassination of the Archduke could and did begin a conflagration of events that led all he powers to eventually enter a World War. There were events leading up to 1914 that also brought either two or more of Europe's great powers into conflict, but they were continually resolved. Yet 1914 proved an important year because German generals were wary of Russian rearmament and railway construction, which meant that any advance into France would mean a quicker Russian response and perhaps the loss of Prussia. Thus 1914 was argued as Germany's best and, at the time, only real opportunity to make good on her threats/promises rather than back-down, as Russia had to do a few years previously with a Balkan Crisis.
After the first few chapters the author goes on a series of predictions about a future world that are really little more than fantasies made up of whimsical day dreams and nightmares. The amount of variables that one would need to keep in mind and control to move even a few years past 1914, keeping in mind that WWI has not broken out, is simply impossible. The only other real utility that I can see within the pages of this text, aside from the above mentioned ideas on the beginning and eve of WWI, are how much WWI and WWII influenced society and how radically different society was and could have been if not for these gigantic conflagrations.
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The Rzhev Slaughterhouse: The Red Army's Forgotten 15-month Campaign against Army Group Center, 1942-1943 by Svetlana Gerasimova and Stuart Britton
Svetlana Gerasimova's work on the battles in and around Rzhev is not a typical military history text. For those interested in detailed accounts involving commanders and the multiple battles and engagements that involved fronts, armies, corps, divisions, etc., I would recommend David Glantz's "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat". Gerasimova, however, has produced a slim volume that goes over many of the operations undertaken by the Red Army in and around the Rzhev salient, which also highlights the numerous issues Soviet/Russian and western historians face when attempting to research and write about certain battles/campaigns of the Great Patriotic War.
There continue to be numerous 'white' or 'blank' spots in the history of the Great Patriotic war even half a century after its end. Myths and legends have taken the place of objective studies. Soviet historians were the mercy of the administration they served, under Stalin producing little to nothing, under Khrushchev endorsing his anti-Stalinist cult of personality narrative, and under Brezhnev cementing what came to be known as the 'Cult of the Great Patriotic War'. Throughout those administrations the history of the war served a purpose and it continues to serve one today under Putin's regime. With limited access to archives for Russian researchers, not to speak of the limits placed on foreign academics, the best Gerasimova could produce is a narrative that relies on numerous sources, many of which continue to draw on Soviet era productions that are suspect by many.
Even so, while the accounts of the battles and engagements themselves offer less detail than many familiar with the Eastern Front might be comfortable with, there are numerous passages that offer new, original, and a somewhat objective look at how the Red Army performed throughout 1942 and 1943, and what Soviet commanders considered their weaknesses and strengths. One of the more interesting discussions had to do with the variable of weather and how it affected operations in the summer of 1942. As one example, the initial success of the 30th army, a breakthrough on a front of 9 kilometers to a depth of 6-7, came to naught when the army's formations became bogged down in the mud in the area of Polunino, north of Rzhev. The offensive ground to a halt, showcasing that the Red Army suffered from the elements just as much as the Germans.
Surprisingly, many of the errors committed by troops during the summer of 1942, including lack of forces to develop tactical success, lack of signals equipment, lack of communication between infantry, tank, artillery, and air units, lack of reconnaissance, and a host of other issues continued into 1943. This lack of communication forced Red Army commanders to keep their units in densely-packed formations, which made German artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that much more effective and deadly. Follow-up units were also kept close to the first echelon for fear they would miss their chance to exploit a breakthrough. Units were also continually sent into head-on attacks against German positions by commanders too afraid to risk any type of initiative; at one point a unit spent 20 days attacking Polunino, attempting to capture it from the north, and when a new commander was appointed, the village was captured after a fierce three hour engagement that featured an attack from the north and south.
The fighting in the Rzhev area featured some of the most intense and deadly engagements that bleed the Wehrmacht's Army Group Center and cost lives of hundreds of thousands of Red Army men. German divisions were constantly redirected or sent from all over Europe to help shore up the frontline before Moscow. Operations were cancelled and others weakened due to the losses the Germans sustained. One example presented is the poor performance of Model's 9th Army during the Kursk offensive. The fighting around Rzhev had numerous repercussions but the debate about whether the real aim of the offensives the Red Army undertook was to keep Army Group Center occupied while operations like Uranus unfolded around Stalingrad or whether in fact Zhukov and Stalin's first and foremost aim was the encirclement and destruction of the Rzhev bulge remains a contested issue. Gerasimova doesn't offer a definitive answer but the information presented makes it obvious that there are still many questions that historians cannot adequately answer without relevant access to Soviet era archives.
There continue to be numerous 'white' or 'blank' spots in the history of the Great Patriotic war even half a century after its end. Myths and legends have taken the place of objective studies. Soviet historians were the mercy of the administration they served, under Stalin producing little to nothing, under Khrushchev endorsing his anti-Stalinist cult of personality narrative, and under Brezhnev cementing what came to be known as the 'Cult of the Great Patriotic War'. Throughout those administrations the history of the war served a purpose and it continues to serve one today under Putin's regime. With limited access to archives for Russian researchers, not to speak of the limits placed on foreign academics, the best Gerasimova could produce is a narrative that relies on numerous sources, many of which continue to draw on Soviet era productions that are suspect by many.
Even so, while the accounts of the battles and engagements themselves offer less detail than many familiar with the Eastern Front might be comfortable with, there are numerous passages that offer new, original, and a somewhat objective look at how the Red Army performed throughout 1942 and 1943, and what Soviet commanders considered their weaknesses and strengths. One of the more interesting discussions had to do with the variable of weather and how it affected operations in the summer of 1942. As one example, the initial success of the 30th army, a breakthrough on a front of 9 kilometers to a depth of 6-7, came to naught when the army's formations became bogged down in the mud in the area of Polunino, north of Rzhev. The offensive ground to a halt, showcasing that the Red Army suffered from the elements just as much as the Germans.
Surprisingly, many of the errors committed by troops during the summer of 1942, including lack of forces to develop tactical success, lack of signals equipment, lack of communication between infantry, tank, artillery, and air units, lack of reconnaissance, and a host of other issues continued into 1943. This lack of communication forced Red Army commanders to keep their units in densely-packed formations, which made German artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that much more effective and deadly. Follow-up units were also kept close to the first echelon for fear they would miss their chance to exploit a breakthrough. Units were also continually sent into head-on attacks against German positions by commanders too afraid to risk any type of initiative; at one point a unit spent 20 days attacking Polunino, attempting to capture it from the north, and when a new commander was appointed, the village was captured after a fierce three hour engagement that featured an attack from the north and south.
The fighting in the Rzhev area featured some of the most intense and deadly engagements that bleed the Wehrmacht's Army Group Center and cost lives of hundreds of thousands of Red Army men. German divisions were constantly redirected or sent from all over Europe to help shore up the frontline before Moscow. Operations were cancelled and others weakened due to the losses the Germans sustained. One example presented is the poor performance of Model's 9th Army during the Kursk offensive. The fighting around Rzhev had numerous repercussions but the debate about whether the real aim of the offensives the Red Army undertook was to keep Army Group Center occupied while operations like Uranus unfolded around Stalingrad or whether in fact Zhukov and Stalin's first and foremost aim was the encirclement and destruction of the Rzhev bulge remains a contested issue. Gerasimova doesn't offer a definitive answer but the information presented makes it obvious that there are still many questions that historians cannot adequately answer without relevant access to Soviet era archives.
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Red Army Tank Commander: At War in a T-34 on the Eastern Front by Vasiliy Bryukhov
I was somewhat surprised by the candor and openness that the author divulged of his experiences on the front during the Great Patriotic War. The majority of the text takes place from the Battle of Kursk until the war's end. The author was almost always on the frontlines and the amount of engagements he describes can be counted in the dozens. The writing style can be bland and tedious at times, and more than once I found myself having to reread passages numerous times to understand what was happening. This book will not always keep your attention, but nonetheless there are various stories, anecdotes, and events that are worth reading about every so often throughout the entirety of the text.
The author mainly served in T-34 tanks and in a command capacity, first a platoon and then a company, throughout the war. Unlike many accounts from 1941 and 1942, the author's tank brigade regularly inflicted major damage to the enemy, be they German, Romanian, or Hungarian units, as Red Army forces found themselves outside Soviet territory and liberating parts of Eastern Europe from the Wehrmacht. While some of the events recounted would look suspicious if superimposed on the initial period of the war, by 1943 the Red Army was no longer mainly launching head-on attacks but regularly looking to the flanks and rear to dislodge the enemy, encircle, and annihilate him. Although there are instances of officers issuing ignorant orders that cost many men their lives, they are nowhere comparable to the scale of destruction and devastation that 1941 and 1942 witnessed.
I was somewhat surprised by the candor and openness that the author divulged of his experiences on the front during the Great Patriotic War. The majority of the text takes place from the Battle of Kursk until the war's end. The author was almost always on the frontlines and the amount of engagements he describes can be counted in the dozens. The writing style can be bland and tedious at times, and more than once I found myself having to reread passages numerous times to understand what was happening. This book will not always keep your attention, but nonetheless there are various stories, anecdotes, and events that are worth reading about every so often throughout the entirety of the text.
The author mainly served in T-34 tanks and in a command capacity, first a platoon and then a company, throughout the war. Unlike many accounts from 1941 and 1942, the author's tank brigade regularly inflicted major damage to the enemy, be they German, Romanian, or Hungarian units, as Red Army forces found themselves outside Soviet territory and liberating parts of Eastern Europe from the Wehrmacht. While some of the events recounted would look suspicious if superimposed on the initial period of the war, by 1943 the Red Army was no longer mainly launching head-on attacks but regularly looking to the flanks and rear to dislodge the enemy, encircle, and annihilate him. Although there are instances of officers issuing ignorant orders that cost many men their lives, they are nowhere comparable to the scale of destruction and devastation that 1941 and 1942 witnessed.
Some of the more interesting events discussed are an attempted rape and the repercussions for the Red Army men involved (a penal battalion for one and an execution for the other), the creation of blocking detachments in 1944 from soldiers of the author's brigade and how they were able to stop unauthorized retreats, how enemy firing positions were flushed out, atrocities committed against Red Army nurses, and the consistent demands made of tank units in the latter part of the war (constant days of advances and combat with units taking casualties that reduce them from hundreds to mere dozens). While the writing style does detract from the readability of these recollections, as with every memoir, there are stories recounted that make the book a worthwhile investment..
The author mainly served in T-34 tanks and in a command capacity, first a platoon and then a company, throughout the war. Unlike many accounts from 1941 and 1942, the author's tank brigade regularly inflicted major damage to the enemy, be they German, Romanian, or Hungarian units, as Red Army forces found themselves outside Soviet territory and liberating parts of Eastern Europe from the Wehrmacht. While some of the events recounted would look suspicious if superimposed on the initial period of the war, by 1943 the Red Army was no longer mainly launching head-on attacks but regularly looking to the flanks and rear to dislodge the enemy, encircle, and annihilate him. Although there are instances of officers issuing ignorant orders that cost many men their lives, they are nowhere comparable to the scale of destruction and devastation that 1941 and 1942 witnessed.
I was somewhat surprised by the candor and openness that the author divulged of his experiences on the front during the Great Patriotic War. The majority of the text takes place from the Battle of Kursk until the war's end. The author was almost always on the frontlines and the amount of engagements he describes can be counted in the dozens. The writing style can be bland and tedious at times, and more than once I found myself having to reread passages numerous times to understand what was happening. This book will not always keep your attention, but nonetheless there are various stories, anecdotes, and events that are worth reading about every so often throughout the entirety of the text.
The author mainly served in T-34 tanks and in a command capacity, first a platoon and then a company, throughout the war. Unlike many accounts from 1941 and 1942, the author's tank brigade regularly inflicted major damage to the enemy, be they German, Romanian, or Hungarian units, as Red Army forces found themselves outside Soviet territory and liberating parts of Eastern Europe from the Wehrmacht. While some of the events recounted would look suspicious if superimposed on the initial period of the war, by 1943 the Red Army was no longer mainly launching head-on attacks but regularly looking to the flanks and rear to dislodge the enemy, encircle, and annihilate him. Although there are instances of officers issuing ignorant orders that cost many men their lives, they are nowhere comparable to the scale of destruction and devastation that 1941 and 1942 witnessed.
Some of the more interesting events discussed are an attempted rape and the repercussions for the Red Army men involved (a penal battalion for one and an execution for the other), the creation of blocking detachments in 1944 from soldiers of the author's brigade and how they were able to stop unauthorized retreats, how enemy firing positions were flushed out, atrocities committed against Red Army nurses, and the consistent demands made of tank units in the latter part of the war (constant days of advances and combat with units taking casualties that reduce them from hundreds to mere dozens). While the writing style does detract from the readability of these recollections, as with every memoir, there are stories recounted that make the book a worthwhile investment..
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Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II by Prit Buttar
Prit Buttar has done an excellent job on concentrating his and the reader's attention on an area that's often ignored or simply glossed over in the greater histories of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. The Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia never played a central role in the Second World War but each has an interesting history that's worth acknowledging and discussing. "Between Giants" features a dozen chapters mainly in chronological order that begin by looking at the history of the Baltic states and their interactions with their neighbors in all four directions. Following that is an in-depth look at the diplomatic history of each state on the eve of the war and the various political and diplomatic maneuvers that were involved as all three tried to toe a line that wouldn't upset either Germany or the Soviet Union. To date, in all my readings on the Eastern Front of the Second World War, and the Second World War in general (numbering in the hundreds of books), this is the most interesting and enlightening look at the actions of these states in both the inter-war period and the beginning of the Second World War (1939-1941).
The next chapter looks at the initial invasion of the Soviet Union and German actions to occupy all three Baltic states. The actions of both sides, that is the Wehrmacht and Red Army, are well enough described, but there is a noticeable strength in the presentation of the German and Baltic side compared to that of the Soviet Union/Red Army. Additionally, since the author is not an academic, in this chapter (and a few of those that follow) there are unneeded tangents with the author offering what-if scenarios about what could have been if only the Germans acted in one way or another. Personally, I'm more interested in what happened and why, rather than how the Germans could have been flawless in their pursuit of conquest and genocide on the Eastern Front. The Holocaust and occupation of the Baltics, as well as the local movements (both political and military) are covered before the final chapters conclude with further descriptions and discussions of the military actions that took place in 1944-1945. Overall this is an excellent text that focuses on an oft-neglected area of operations on the Eastern Front.
The weaknesses that I noticed include, as mentioned above, the descriptions and analysis of the Red Army/Soviet Union were at times lacking, there was that tendency to drift into 'what-if' scenarios that took away from the context of the Second World War and the Eastern Front and really served little to no purpose, the sections on military actions were quite dry (and this coming from someone who is happy to become engrossed in David Glantz's operational level studies) and there every now and then time periods/the chronology were mixed up or tangents taken into various topics that served little purpose in regards to the main theme of the book (the battles for the Baltics). Otherwise, this is an excellent text that those interested in the Eastern Front and the Third Reich should definitely add to their library.
The next chapter looks at the initial invasion of the Soviet Union and German actions to occupy all three Baltic states. The actions of both sides, that is the Wehrmacht and Red Army, are well enough described, but there is a noticeable strength in the presentation of the German and Baltic side compared to that of the Soviet Union/Red Army. Additionally, since the author is not an academic, in this chapter (and a few of those that follow) there are unneeded tangents with the author offering what-if scenarios about what could have been if only the Germans acted in one way or another. Personally, I'm more interested in what happened and why, rather than how the Germans could have been flawless in their pursuit of conquest and genocide on the Eastern Front. The Holocaust and occupation of the Baltics, as well as the local movements (both political and military) are covered before the final chapters conclude with further descriptions and discussions of the military actions that took place in 1944-1945. Overall this is an excellent text that focuses on an oft-neglected area of operations on the Eastern Front.
The weaknesses that I noticed include, as mentioned above, the descriptions and analysis of the Red Army/Soviet Union were at times lacking, there was that tendency to drift into 'what-if' scenarios that took away from the context of the Second World War and the Eastern Front and really served little to no purpose, the sections on military actions were quite dry (and this coming from someone who is happy to become engrossed in David Glantz's operational level studies) and there every now and then time periods/the chronology were mixed up or tangents taken into various topics that served little purpose in regards to the main theme of the book (the battles for the Baltics). Otherwise, this is an excellent text that those interested in the Eastern Front and the Third Reich should definitely add to their library.
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The Eternal Nazi: From Mauthausen to Cairo, the Relentless Pursuit of SS Doctor Aribert Heim by Nicholas Kulish
I'm sure on some level the authors wanted this piece to read like a 'detective novel', introducing new characters, setting up discoveries and leaving off chapters with 'cliff hangers'; unfortunately the end result is wholly lacking. The real story here is not about the hunt for the 'Eternal Nazi' but about the obstacles 'Nazi hunters' faced within West Germany and parts of the rest of the world. At times, those tasked with bringing Nazi war criminals to justice (be they self-appointed or assigned by a higher up) relied on information that came from a pool of rumors, false reports, and even uncorroborated witness testimony of those who were already dead. Thus, Aribert Heim was originally misnamed (known by his brother's name) and given an incorrect place of birth, making it that much harder to track and find him. Additionally, in the early post-war years, West Germany and in part Austria, had little interest in pursuing or harshly punishing Nazi War criminals who numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Escape networks were set up for former Nazis and members of the SS; many changed their names and escaped Europe while others simply switched one master for another and began to infiltrate the West German government and various public institutions. It was in their interest to forget the Nazi years and those working to remember and seek justice for what happened were continually looked at with contempt for trudging up the past. SS Doctor Aribert Heim was one of those lucky enough to be overlooked and then given a chance to escape to Egypt, where he lived a good enough lifestyle being sustained by his family's income from rents. There's nothing really 'gritty' or 'mysterious' about a war criminal living a rather mundane everyday existence with family visits. Thus the book falls flat on suspense, which combined with weak writing and needless concentration on literary descriptions made this book a chore rather than an experience or a thrill to see how the 'story' would end.
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Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying by Sönke Neitzel
Like many others, I was expecting something wholly different from the description offered of this text. It seems there were a few main points the authors decided to concentrate on and then used various bits of the evidence at their disposal to support and reinforce their ideas. What I, and many others it seems, expected was a candid look at the thoughts, opinions, and ideas of German soldiers: what they thought of their enemies, of the war, their commanding officers, orders they were forced to carry out, etc. Yet that hardly features in the sound bites the authors chose to concentrate on. Instead, it appears the authors believe the Wehrmacht has already been proven to have been an instrument of genocide and their interests are showcasing how the Wehrmacht was also a rather banal military instrument in the hands of the Third Reich. Specifically, that the attitudes of the soldiers within the Wehrmacht were created by their experiences in the First World War and the environment that they grew up in (Weimar Germany and the beginning of the Third Reich), which regularly featured violence and death on the streets and in the news.
Thus, there is a rather pointless concentration on the mundane experiences of soldiers, highlighting that the Wehrmacht was in many ways similar to the German Army in the First World War, the armies they faced in the Second World War, and even the armies and soldiers of the Vietnam era and today's veterans of the Iraq and Afghan wars. For some this is perhaps a worthwhile read, and in some ways it is a step in contextualizing the fact that some actions of the Wehrmacht can be and have been replicated throughout the past half-century in conflicts like Vietnam and the recent wars the United States (and many other countries) has participated in. Soldiers do take liberties with the power they've been given and the forces that they represent and are supported by. But, then again, the US featured a rather large and outspoken anti-war movement and many turned on US soldiers and what they stood for (during the Vietnam era). The same cannot be said for the Nazi Germany era. Thus, in some ways, this book misses the forest for the trees. Concentrating on just the soldiers and the Wehrmacht is useful and helpful in understanding their thoughts and interactions (with the enemy and each other), but it wholly omits the numerous organizations soldiers also had to interact with that were not represented by the Wehrmacht. Personally, however, I am more interested in understanding how much German soldiers knew of what was going on outside the confines of the 'front line', their views and attitudes toward the future Hitler was building with their services to the Third Reich, and whether any exhibited some type of opposition and remorse for what they, or the Wehrmacht in general, had done. Those issues, unfortunately, are hardly covered or contextualized in any meaningful way.
Thus, there is a rather pointless concentration on the mundane experiences of soldiers, highlighting that the Wehrmacht was in many ways similar to the German Army in the First World War, the armies they faced in the Second World War, and even the armies and soldiers of the Vietnam era and today's veterans of the Iraq and Afghan wars. For some this is perhaps a worthwhile read, and in some ways it is a step in contextualizing the fact that some actions of the Wehrmacht can be and have been replicated throughout the past half-century in conflicts like Vietnam and the recent wars the United States (and many other countries) has participated in. Soldiers do take liberties with the power they've been given and the forces that they represent and are supported by. But, then again, the US featured a rather large and outspoken anti-war movement and many turned on US soldiers and what they stood for (during the Vietnam era). The same cannot be said for the Nazi Germany era. Thus, in some ways, this book misses the forest for the trees. Concentrating on just the soldiers and the Wehrmacht is useful and helpful in understanding their thoughts and interactions (with the enemy and each other), but it wholly omits the numerous organizations soldiers also had to interact with that were not represented by the Wehrmacht. Personally, however, I am more interested in understanding how much German soldiers knew of what was going on outside the confines of the 'front line', their views and attitudes toward the future Hitler was building with their services to the Third Reich, and whether any exhibited some type of opposition and remorse for what they, or the Wehrmacht in general, had done. Those issues, unfortunately, are hardly covered or contextualized in any meaningful way.
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Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin by Ben Judah
Ben Judah has done an impressive job in showcasing his travels and interviews throughout Russia. Recent events with Ukraine and the Crimea have done much to put Russia in the center of western media. What has become evident is that the budget cuts and lack of funding for academic research into Eastern Europe has led to a dearth of knowledge about Russia and Putin's administration. The end result is a glut of news anchors dithering about, trying to decipher what it all means, all the while forgetting any type of journalistic integrity and commencing to scream at the top of their lungs that the end of the world is nigh.
These journalists, and many others, would do well to read Ben Judah's discussion about how Vladimir Putin has created a country that has both impressed and depressed many of Russia's citizens within the span of the last fifteen years. The embarrassment that was the Yeltsin administration saw Russia turn to the west for help with her transition to 'capitalism' with the end result being a fall off an economic precipice that left many regretting the end of the Soviet Union while billions were stolen and sent into overseas bank accounts as a few lucky future oligarchs were able to game the system for their own needs. Those same oligarchs helped retain Yeltsin's presidency in 1996 and thought they could control his successor with as much ease. Unfortunately Putin was playing a different game than the perpetually drunk Yeltsin.
With Putin's ascension to power much began to change. He first went after the main source of information for the population, television stations/channels, and forced two former oligarchs out of the country after their channels featured attacks against his administration. With power over television programming in the hands of the Kremlin, Putin's PR campaign could truly begin. His next major target was Khodorkovsky as he retained control of one of the major companies within Russia. Khodorkovsky reaped his rewards in the 1990s like all the other oligarchs, through any means necessary. In the early 2000s he decided that Russian oil and Russian companies in general were worth more than many outside Russia had valued them and he began to overhaul his operations, utilizing western techniques in not only the actual drilling and exploration of/for oil, but in how he managed his company's finances (focusing somewhat on transparency). This gave the impression that this was a company that seemed bent on fighting corruption rather than partaking in it, but in all fairness this was done to boost the image and profits of Yukos as much as it was Khodorkovsky trying to make amends (perhaps) for what he'd done in the 1990s. He began to donate to political organizations (including Putin's party) and gave money to the public for schools/education, etc. Unfortunately, getting involved in politics is exactly what Putin had warned the oligarchs against after he had come to power. Being warned numerous times wasn't enough for Khodorkovsky. He continued to pursue his interests and eventually that resulted in charges being filed against him and his company. He would sit in jail until 2014 while Putin reaped the benefits of the company he had revamped and built up in the form of taxes on oil, which Putin and his associates would use to enrich themselves and make life somewhat more comfortable for the rest of the Russian state.
Pensions would be funded and raised, as would salaries. For Russians coming out of the 1990s, where the murder rate was one of the highest in the world and workers often failed to be paid for months at a time, having regular salaries and a leader presented through his PR campaign as bent on fighting corruption meant Putin's popular continued to rise during his first two terms in office. But all the gains made in moving against the oligarchs and providing minor, yet useful and badly needed, benefits to the Russian population soon wore off as Medvedev came and went while Putin stayed either in the back or foreground. Todays Russian billionaires and major political figures within Russia owe their position(s) to Putin. They've created a new segment of the population that controls the majority of Russia's wealth and power and have begun to put their children into future positions that will continue their 'legacies'.
In response, opposition movements have begun but have yet to find a voice that speaks to the entire country, or at least the majority of the voters. Many are unhappy with the continued abuse and corruption that's become a common feature of their lives, including the fact that Moscow is akin to Paris and New York, a microcosm that is not representative of the rest of the nation yet contains much of its wealth and intelligentsia. From the former battleground of Chechnya to the Far East, corruption, abuse, apathy, and neglect are readily evident in every city and region. There's a bitter feeling, whether true or not, that Russia is falling into the hands of 'immigrants', be they from China or the central asian republics (Chechens are included here as well). Russia hardly produces anything aside from natural resources and those will not last forever; oil production is already projected to fall by over 100 million barrels per day in the next few years unless tens of billions are invested in new wells and drilling techniques. Thus in many ways the 'stability' that Putin has created in Russia is a fragile one that's currently being tested on the international arena with the 'Crimean Crisis'. Nothing lasts forever, but the question that's becoming more evident is will Russia revert to the days of the 1990s without Putin and his 'entourage' or continue to move in a general, albeit all too slow, direction of 'democracy' and 'capitalism'?
These journalists, and many others, would do well to read Ben Judah's discussion about how Vladimir Putin has created a country that has both impressed and depressed many of Russia's citizens within the span of the last fifteen years. The embarrassment that was the Yeltsin administration saw Russia turn to the west for help with her transition to 'capitalism' with the end result being a fall off an economic precipice that left many regretting the end of the Soviet Union while billions were stolen and sent into overseas bank accounts as a few lucky future oligarchs were able to game the system for their own needs. Those same oligarchs helped retain Yeltsin's presidency in 1996 and thought they could control his successor with as much ease. Unfortunately Putin was playing a different game than the perpetually drunk Yeltsin.
With Putin's ascension to power much began to change. He first went after the main source of information for the population, television stations/channels, and forced two former oligarchs out of the country after their channels featured attacks against his administration. With power over television programming in the hands of the Kremlin, Putin's PR campaign could truly begin. His next major target was Khodorkovsky as he retained control of one of the major companies within Russia. Khodorkovsky reaped his rewards in the 1990s like all the other oligarchs, through any means necessary. In the early 2000s he decided that Russian oil and Russian companies in general were worth more than many outside Russia had valued them and he began to overhaul his operations, utilizing western techniques in not only the actual drilling and exploration of/for oil, but in how he managed his company's finances (focusing somewhat on transparency). This gave the impression that this was a company that seemed bent on fighting corruption rather than partaking in it, but in all fairness this was done to boost the image and profits of Yukos as much as it was Khodorkovsky trying to make amends (perhaps) for what he'd done in the 1990s. He began to donate to political organizations (including Putin's party) and gave money to the public for schools/education, etc. Unfortunately, getting involved in politics is exactly what Putin had warned the oligarchs against after he had come to power. Being warned numerous times wasn't enough for Khodorkovsky. He continued to pursue his interests and eventually that resulted in charges being filed against him and his company. He would sit in jail until 2014 while Putin reaped the benefits of the company he had revamped and built up in the form of taxes on oil, which Putin and his associates would use to enrich themselves and make life somewhat more comfortable for the rest of the Russian state.
Pensions would be funded and raised, as would salaries. For Russians coming out of the 1990s, where the murder rate was one of the highest in the world and workers often failed to be paid for months at a time, having regular salaries and a leader presented through his PR campaign as bent on fighting corruption meant Putin's popular continued to rise during his first two terms in office. But all the gains made in moving against the oligarchs and providing minor, yet useful and badly needed, benefits to the Russian population soon wore off as Medvedev came and went while Putin stayed either in the back or foreground. Todays Russian billionaires and major political figures within Russia owe their position(s) to Putin. They've created a new segment of the population that controls the majority of Russia's wealth and power and have begun to put their children into future positions that will continue their 'legacies'.
In response, opposition movements have begun but have yet to find a voice that speaks to the entire country, or at least the majority of the voters. Many are unhappy with the continued abuse and corruption that's become a common feature of their lives, including the fact that Moscow is akin to Paris and New York, a microcosm that is not representative of the rest of the nation yet contains much of its wealth and intelligentsia. From the former battleground of Chechnya to the Far East, corruption, abuse, apathy, and neglect are readily evident in every city and region. There's a bitter feeling, whether true or not, that Russia is falling into the hands of 'immigrants', be they from China or the central asian republics (Chechens are included here as well). Russia hardly produces anything aside from natural resources and those will not last forever; oil production is already projected to fall by over 100 million barrels per day in the next few years unless tens of billions are invested in new wells and drilling techniques. Thus in many ways the 'stability' that Putin has created in Russia is a fragile one that's currently being tested on the international arena with the 'Crimean Crisis'. Nothing lasts forever, but the question that's becoming more evident is will Russia revert to the days of the 1990s without Putin and his 'entourage' or continue to move in a general, albeit all too slow, direction of 'democracy' and 'capitalism'?
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Red Fortress: History and Illusion in the Kremlin by Catherine Merridale
Catherine Merridale's 'Red Fortress' reads like a mediocre attempt at pop history. Unlike some historians who score a win with their rehashing of well known ideas, facts, and histories that's made accessible to a public eager for scraps of information historians find mundane and banal, 'Red Fortress' seems to be a failure on both counts. Merridale provides just enough information to make this text a chore for the average reader while avoiding any type of original conclusions or arguments. The usual suspects have their fair share of space devoted to them (Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, etc.) and while the Kremlin continually features as either the main 'player' or in the background of the narrative, it does so to the detriment of the story being told. Like those top-down histories that concentrate on kings and queens, politicians and diplomats, military commanders and revolutionaries, 'Red Fortress' ignores the periphery to concentrate on the center and adds little to nothing to the history of Russia while managing to omit much that made Russia what it was and is. As an introduction to Russian history this is a mediocre effort and unfortunately I can't imagine it being a useful fit for any other role.
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The Deserters: A Hidden History of World War II by Charles Glass
'The Deserters' is an insightful foray into a subject that many historians and researchers of the Second World War gloss over or never even deem worthy enough to address. The First World War has a more interesting history of desertion as most, if not all armies, witnessed droves of soldiers either desert en masse or attempt to 'strike' at one point or another. But when workers strike businesses lose money and workers lose their pay, when soldiers strike (or desert) wars cannot be fought, less so won, thus presenting a serious challenge to governments and military institutions.
While there are numerous weaknesses in 'The Deserters', I felt focusing the reader's attention on deserters and deconstructing the usual representation of the Second World War in 'Good = allies' and 'Bad = axis' binaries, made this a worthwhile read. Such a simplistic portray of the 'greatest generation' does little to better our understanding of the environment war breeds, including the inevitable bureaucracy that comes along with any large military institution. Thus, a concentration on soldiers and the circumstances that led them to eventually desert - including the events that led to breaking points in their ability to cope with being on the front lines - helps the reader understand that not all 'deserters' are the same and shouldn't be lumped under the usual idea of someone who betrayed their comrades and simply walked, or ran, toward the rear. Although such situations did occur, at other times the circumstances were much less dramatic as psychological breaks, rather than cowardice, suddenly took away a soldier's ability to fight.
The above is really the best part of this volume. The weaknesses, however, include a writing style that reads more journalistic than academic (and since the author is a journalist that shouldn't be a surprise). Although such a writing style helps with readability, it is a reflection of the fact that this isn't an academic text and thus at times the analysis is rather superficial. The author can point out instances of desertion, quote from memoirs and interviews, but such evidence is limited, anecdotal, and doesn't really advance any argument(s). So, while, as mentioned above, this is a good starting point for a discussion about desertion, especially within the confines of the allies during the Second World War, this text raises more questions than it answers.
While there are numerous weaknesses in 'The Deserters', I felt focusing the reader's attention on deserters and deconstructing the usual representation of the Second World War in 'Good = allies' and 'Bad = axis' binaries, made this a worthwhile read. Such a simplistic portray of the 'greatest generation' does little to better our understanding of the environment war breeds, including the inevitable bureaucracy that comes along with any large military institution. Thus, a concentration on soldiers and the circumstances that led them to eventually desert - including the events that led to breaking points in their ability to cope with being on the front lines - helps the reader understand that not all 'deserters' are the same and shouldn't be lumped under the usual idea of someone who betrayed their comrades and simply walked, or ran, toward the rear. Although such situations did occur, at other times the circumstances were much less dramatic as psychological breaks, rather than cowardice, suddenly took away a soldier's ability to fight.
The above is really the best part of this volume. The weaknesses, however, include a writing style that reads more journalistic than academic (and since the author is a journalist that shouldn't be a surprise). Although such a writing style helps with readability, it is a reflection of the fact that this isn't an academic text and thus at times the analysis is rather superficial. The author can point out instances of desertion, quote from memoirs and interviews, but such evidence is limited, anecdotal, and doesn't really advance any argument(s). So, while, as mentioned above, this is a good starting point for a discussion about desertion, especially within the confines of the allies during the Second World War, this text raises more questions than it answers.
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Rommel - A Reappraisal by Ian Beckett
The post-WWII period saw a plethora of reputations become set in stone in both axis and allied states. Since then, and through today, we are witnessing renewed interest and the questioning of those reputations. Be it Patton, Montgomery, DeGaulle, Zhukov, Manstein or Rommel, each has had numerous biographies written about them, questioning their abilities, actions and contributions to the war effort. In this case, Rommel is a figure that is somewhat of an exception. Rommel is the only general to garner the kind of notoriety that he enjoyed in both Germany and Great Britain, being known as the Desert Fox. This label served numerous purposes for the British, who were able to continually point to the demigod of the desert and his abilities as the reason for continued reverses and defeats, rather than their own inabilities and weaknesses. In truth, much of the image both Germans and the British became familiar with were a result of propaganda efforts on both sides that started during the war and continued apace in the after-war period.
This edited volume presents half a dozen chapters examining various events throughout Rommel's career, putting them into context and attempting a more objective look at a controversial figure. The more interesting chapters, in my opinion, encompass Rommel's role in the defeat of France in the summer of 1940 and his experiences in North Africa, which cemented his 'credentials' and reputation. I can't say this is an original volume as the research presented has been covered in other sources/monographs. But bringing together numerous secondary and primary sources to go through Rommel's entire career is helpful in attempting to understand how his reputation was not only built through deeds but also crafted by the Third Reich's propaganda machine.
There is no doubt that Rommel was a glory hound; no other German general was as well known or had their picture taken as often as Rommel. He was a favorite of Hitler's, which resulted in his eventual assignment to North Africa. But before that campaign was underway, Rommel was able to prove his abilities during the German invasion of France. Unfortunately, the chapter covering Rommel's role is somewhat weakened as there is no comparison to the abilities and achievements of the other German divisions and commanders, thus leaving the narrative of the 7th Panzer Division's performance in something of a vacuum. There is a brief mention of the 5th Panzer Division and the numerous ways in which what some consider Rommel's innovative ideas and tactics are shown to have really been a regular part of German doctrine and warfare. Thus while Rommel's 'ghost division' (labeled as such not only because the allies had no idea where he would show up next but also because the Germans could only guess as well) achieved much success against the French, those feats have to be put into context with, for instance, his failure to properly document his encounter with the British at Arras, where his exaggeration about the forces he faced caused further German formations to veer off course and attempt to come to his aid. Furthermore, Rommel regularly ignored orders from his superiors, his use of tank formations in the vanguard allowed for ambushes and attacks on his force's flanks, which resulted in preventable losses. Additionally, a direct result of being a glory hound meant that he regularly flaunted the achievements of his division while denying credit to his peers, once even denying support to one division fighting against the 1st French armored division.
Although the chapter on Rommel's role in the defeat of France attempts to be somewhat objective, the two chapters on his actions in North Africa seem less balanced. There is a lot of admiration for his victories but his failures, while mentioned, appear to be glossed over rather than emphasized to give a more objective look at his abilities. The bottom line with North Africa seems to be an insufficient force of German and Italian troops that Rommel was able to concentrate in enough strength to garner a few notable victories in the midst of regular defeats and setbacks until his logistical tail simply could not keep up with his needs. Considering that by the end of the campaign German and Italian units were regularly relying on captured allied supplies, perhaps Rommel should have been asking Churchill for supplies rather than Hitler. Somehow the idea that a few more divisions would have made a difference seems a dream, at best, considering the difficulties the Germans and Italians had supplying the limited forces they already had in North Africa.
In the postwar period authors like Liddell Hart helped Rommel's overall reputation with their publications. This served another purpose in that it helped to rehabilitate West Germany in the eyes of the west. Rommel became the face of a Germany that was hidden and perverted by the Nazis. Authors like Desmond Young concentrated on Rommel's involvement in the July bomb plot against Hitler and attempted to show that Rommel, while a German general, was not truly a part of the system Hitler created (Rommels potential role in the July plot is addressed in a separate chapter within this edited volume). Overall, for those interested in a condensed introductory 'reappraisal' that's based on a variety of readily accessible literature, this is a good starting point for looking at the Rommel 'legend' and attempting to contextualize his abilities and strengths with his weaknesses and the myths that were built around him during the war and after.
This edited volume presents half a dozen chapters examining various events throughout Rommel's career, putting them into context and attempting a more objective look at a controversial figure. The more interesting chapters, in my opinion, encompass Rommel's role in the defeat of France in the summer of 1940 and his experiences in North Africa, which cemented his 'credentials' and reputation. I can't say this is an original volume as the research presented has been covered in other sources/monographs. But bringing together numerous secondary and primary sources to go through Rommel's entire career is helpful in attempting to understand how his reputation was not only built through deeds but also crafted by the Third Reich's propaganda machine.
There is no doubt that Rommel was a glory hound; no other German general was as well known or had their picture taken as often as Rommel. He was a favorite of Hitler's, which resulted in his eventual assignment to North Africa. But before that campaign was underway, Rommel was able to prove his abilities during the German invasion of France. Unfortunately, the chapter covering Rommel's role is somewhat weakened as there is no comparison to the abilities and achievements of the other German divisions and commanders, thus leaving the narrative of the 7th Panzer Division's performance in something of a vacuum. There is a brief mention of the 5th Panzer Division and the numerous ways in which what some consider Rommel's innovative ideas and tactics are shown to have really been a regular part of German doctrine and warfare. Thus while Rommel's 'ghost division' (labeled as such not only because the allies had no idea where he would show up next but also because the Germans could only guess as well) achieved much success against the French, those feats have to be put into context with, for instance, his failure to properly document his encounter with the British at Arras, where his exaggeration about the forces he faced caused further German formations to veer off course and attempt to come to his aid. Furthermore, Rommel regularly ignored orders from his superiors, his use of tank formations in the vanguard allowed for ambushes and attacks on his force's flanks, which resulted in preventable losses. Additionally, a direct result of being a glory hound meant that he regularly flaunted the achievements of his division while denying credit to his peers, once even denying support to one division fighting against the 1st French armored division.
Although the chapter on Rommel's role in the defeat of France attempts to be somewhat objective, the two chapters on his actions in North Africa seem less balanced. There is a lot of admiration for his victories but his failures, while mentioned, appear to be glossed over rather than emphasized to give a more objective look at his abilities. The bottom line with North Africa seems to be an insufficient force of German and Italian troops that Rommel was able to concentrate in enough strength to garner a few notable victories in the midst of regular defeats and setbacks until his logistical tail simply could not keep up with his needs. Considering that by the end of the campaign German and Italian units were regularly relying on captured allied supplies, perhaps Rommel should have been asking Churchill for supplies rather than Hitler. Somehow the idea that a few more divisions would have made a difference seems a dream, at best, considering the difficulties the Germans and Italians had supplying the limited forces they already had in North Africa.
In the postwar period authors like Liddell Hart helped Rommel's overall reputation with their publications. This served another purpose in that it helped to rehabilitate West Germany in the eyes of the west. Rommel became the face of a Germany that was hidden and perverted by the Nazis. Authors like Desmond Young concentrated on Rommel's involvement in the July bomb plot against Hitler and attempted to show that Rommel, while a German general, was not truly a part of the system Hitler created (Rommels potential role in the July plot is addressed in a separate chapter within this edited volume). Overall, for those interested in a condensed introductory 'reappraisal' that's based on a variety of readily accessible literature, this is a good starting point for looking at the Rommel 'legend' and attempting to contextualize his abilities and strengths with his weaknesses and the myths that were built around him during the war and after.
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Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt by Robert Forczyk
In general I have mixed feelings about "Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942". I welcome any new or original look at the Eastern Front, either from the perspective of an academic or non-academic, but both contain their fair share of weaknesses and strengths and the same is true for this volume. Here, Robert Forczyk attempts to show and explain how Germany's armored forces achieved success on the Eastern Front throughout the campaigns of 1941 and 1942. Simultaneously there is also a concentration on the 'evolution' of the Red Army's use of their tank park and the mistakes made in 1942, lessons learned, and eventual achievements in 1942. This is a useful way of looking at the Eastern Front as it concentrates on a foundational tool that both sides relied on when planning the majority of their operations. The weakness here, however, is that much of the rest of the narrative of the Eastern Front is left out. This means that any operation that doesn't heavily rely on the use of tanks and assault guns is left out, which omits an inordinate amount of context, even if the concentration is solely on the first two years of the war.
In terms of original research, the majority of the information presented is readily available in other volumes (much of it in English). There are numerous examples showcased that bring to light the inadequacies, weaknesses and strengths of both sides (the author doesn't have an issue with highlighting the successes or failures of either Red Army or German units). One has to give credit to the author for attempting to 'level the playing field' in terms of myths that have been built up around Germany's armored forces and her commanders. Be it Manstein or Raus, and even Zhukov or Rokossovsky, alternative opinions are presented that put their actions in a more critical light and help bring context to a time period and series of events that have usually been presented on the basis of self-serving memoirs or recollections. But that's really where the strengths of this volume end.
The weaknesses are many and range from the trivial/detailed to more analytical. In terms of the information presented, I was a bit surprised that there was no mention of Nikolai Popel's raid in 1941, which exhibited quite well what some Red Army units were able to achieve when a capable officer was put in charge. There is also an omission of addressing Zhukov's claim of how much more could have been done if Stalin did not take away critically needed forces from his front during the Moscow Counter-Offensive and instead decided to launch an offensive along the entire Eastern Front. German forces were in a desperate position, and additional units concentrated against Army Group Center could have made a tremendous difference in the short and long-run. Additionally, in discussing Operation Mars, the author seems unaware of Geoffrey Jukes's work ("Stalingrad to Kursk: Triumph of the Red Army"), which puts what happened there in asomewhat new perspective. In terms of original research, the majority of the information presented is readily available in other volumes (much of it in English). There are numerous examples showcased that bring to light the inadequacies, weaknesses and strengths of both sides (the author doesn't have an issue with highlighting the successes or failures of either Red Army or German units). One has to give credit to the author for attempting to 'level the playing field' in terms of myths that have been built up around Germany's armored forces and her commanders. Be it Manstein or Raus, and even Zhukov or Rokossovsky, alternative opinions are presented that put their actions in a more critical light and help bring context to a time period and series of events that have usually been presented on the basis of self-serving memoirs or recollections. But that's really where the strengths of this volume end.
There is a consistent attempt to highlight the various losses on both sides in terms of tank forces and, to a lesser extent, troop casualties. Although such information is valuable, the problem is that every so often the ratios the author presents are meaningless without adequate analysis, which at times is missing. For instance, on pg. 54 there is a comparison between Army Group Center's tank losses compared to those of Pavlov, commander of the Western Front, during the first few weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union. The ratio given is a '16-1 exchange ratio of 130 German tanks for well over 2,000 Soviet tanks...' For an author who does acknowledge the numerous reasons for why Red Army tanks were lost (malfunction, lost in swamps, in need of repair, abandoned due to fuel/ammunition shortages, etc.), presenting such a generalized figure becomes meaningless.
There is also something of a 'fetish' when it comes to German ranks, unit names, and weapons. Everything has to be in its original German, but for the Soviet side only the ranks remain in their 'original', and even that doesn't always follow as at times 'polkovnik' is replaced with 'colonel'. I found this extremely pointless and a waste of space and time for the reader. This, combined with a few instances of the author pontificating on what either the Soviet or German side should have done, instead of concentrating on what was done, reminds me in general of German war memoirs (Manstein being the best example), where more time is spent on saying what could have been done if only Hitler didn't interfere. This also speaks to the vocabulary utilized for both sides. Whereas the German side is regularly lauded for their abilities and awash in superlatives ("The German operational handling of their armour during the Second Battle of Kharkov was superb..", pg. 188), when the Red Army achieves some success in 1941 it's either 'amazing' to see said success or 'surprising'.
Finally, there are two authors that Forczyk takes issue with, specifically, David Glantz and David Stahel. Unfortunately, when the author attempts to contradict either Glantz or Stahel he never truly presents enough evidence to support his position. And considering the research someone like Glantz or Stahel has undertaken (the former with Soviet sources and archival material and the latter with German archival material), a volume that mainly relies on secondary literature is somewhat suspect when so easily opposing the views/research/conclusions of established figures such as Glantz or Stahel. I'd only recommend it to those with something of an intimate knowledge of the Eastern Front.
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A Tale of Two Soldiers: The Unexpected Friendship between a WWII American Jewish Sniper and a German Military Pilot by Max Gendelman
"A Tale of Two Soldiers" is a slim volume detailing the friendship that grew out of a chance encounter between an Jewish American prisoner of war and a German Luftwaffe pilot. The Second World War period takes up about 70 pages total, with the introduction and author's childhood taking up an initial 30 pages, and the continued friendship between the two the final 100 pages. So for those expecting a lot of information on the war itself, you might be somewhat disappointed. The author's recollections seem to be filled with great detail when it comes to his friendship with Karl rather than the actions he was involved in during the war itself or his time as a prisoner of war (and I encountered one minor mistake when Karl discussed how his father survived 'the Battle of Stalingrad in WWI', an impossible feat as 'Stalingrad' didn't exist in WWI nor were German soldiers, during WWI, anywhere near the city that was eventually renamed Stalingrad). In part, the latter is unfortunately the fault of whomever stole the notes he kept of his experiences while he was enjoying Paris after the end of the war.
To say that Max Gendelman lived an interesting life would be to do a disservice to what he went through and experienced. He became a sniper in the United States Army and briefly served in the post D-Day invasion of France. By December of 1944 he found himself in the 99th Infantry Division standing in the way of Hitler's last major offensive in the west, what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. The initial chaos and confusion resulted in massive casualties to US forces standing in the way of three German armies and Max was forced to retreat, along with tens of thousands of others. After a few days of trying to avoid the Germans and watching new friends and strangers perish before his eyes, he was finally taken prisoner by the Germans while seeking shelter with a few other American stragglers. His time in German POW camps offers an interesting view to the dynamic that existed for an American Jew who was trying to hide his identity. His encounter with Russian prisoners of war and their selfless action of offering their sole meal of the day to newly arrived starving American POWs was a touching example of the comradery that existed in some instances. Eventually, Max encounters Karl and a friendship that would last a lifetime develops. Although Max previously tried twice to escape his confinement, it was only with Karl and another prisoner that they finally succeed in escaping and joining up with American forces just as the war was drawing to a close.
The rest of the volume deals with how both established their respective lives and families in the United States, the trials and tribulations, as well as achievements, both faced and accomplished, as well as the sacrifices they made and their regrets. But through it all their friendship continued to flourish and remain as committed and strong as ever - a bond formed in war and sustained through the hardships of peace.
To say that Max Gendelman lived an interesting life would be to do a disservice to what he went through and experienced. He became a sniper in the United States Army and briefly served in the post D-Day invasion of France. By December of 1944 he found himself in the 99th Infantry Division standing in the way of Hitler's last major offensive in the west, what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. The initial chaos and confusion resulted in massive casualties to US forces standing in the way of three German armies and Max was forced to retreat, along with tens of thousands of others. After a few days of trying to avoid the Germans and watching new friends and strangers perish before his eyes, he was finally taken prisoner by the Germans while seeking shelter with a few other American stragglers. His time in German POW camps offers an interesting view to the dynamic that existed for an American Jew who was trying to hide his identity. His encounter with Russian prisoners of war and their selfless action of offering their sole meal of the day to newly arrived starving American POWs was a touching example of the comradery that existed in some instances. Eventually, Max encounters Karl and a friendship that would last a lifetime develops. Although Max previously tried twice to escape his confinement, it was only with Karl and another prisoner that they finally succeed in escaping and joining up with American forces just as the war was drawing to a close.
The rest of the volume deals with how both established their respective lives and families in the United States, the trials and tribulations, as well as achievements, both faced and accomplished, as well as the sacrifices they made and their regrets. But through it all their friendship continued to flourish and remain as committed and strong as ever - a bond formed in war and sustained through the hardships of peace.
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The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union by Serhii Plokhy
In "The Last Empire" Serhii Polokhy aims to tell the story of the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the last six months of 1991. The major players here are Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Bush, Kravchuk, and with limited appearances by Nazarbayev. The narrative presented ere is well constructed and tackles many interesting developments and events during the main six months the author has decided to concentrate on.
The main points the author continually stresses are that the Cold War was not won by the United States, as proclaimed by Bush sr. and those that came after him, but was ended through with a mutual agreement from both the Soviets and Americans at least two years prior to the collapse of the USSR. Bush, in fact, tried to keep Gorbachev in power as he felt he could deal with him and those around him in regards to progress on limiting nuclear arms, as well as dealing with various international issues (Afghanistan, Cuba, Israel-Palestine). This false idea of an American 'victory', according to the author, has gone far in undermining future American efforts on the international arena. In effect, Plokhy links the Wolfowitz Doctrine that came out as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union to the eventual invasion of Iraq, in 2003, in a preventive war on the part of the United States. A bit of a stretch, but there are still links that came be made in regards to how flawed developments and memory of the collapse of the USSR has led to incorrect policy decisions on the part of US administrations.
Coming back to the USSR, the author being an expert on the nationalities issue, stresses the role of Kravchuk and Ukraine in the development of the collapse, at times too heavily and shows something of a bias in that direction. Not to get mired in the details, suffice it to say that this is an in-depth study that goes a long way in trying to explain how the collapse of the Soviet Union came about as quickly as it did, but in many ways it is still a stepping stone on the way to a definitive study. My biggest complaint would be that there is little explanation offered or evidence examined in regards to how the populations of the various republics discussed felt about the Soviet Union and the ensuing end of the USSR. While it's important to keep in mind that the decision to end the existence of the Soviet Union was made by three men (the heads of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and forced onto a fourth (Gorbachev), Plokhy continually claims that this was a popular decision support from the ground up. And while referendums are taken, votes are cast, minds are quickly changed in a 180 degree fashion in a matter of weeks or months, the main emphasis here remains on the 'great men' and not the 'grass roots' level. That 'from the bottom' approach is missing here, and hopefully future studies will be able to fill that important and sorely needed blank spot.
The main points the author continually stresses are that the Cold War was not won by the United States, as proclaimed by Bush sr. and those that came after him, but was ended through with a mutual agreement from both the Soviets and Americans at least two years prior to the collapse of the USSR. Bush, in fact, tried to keep Gorbachev in power as he felt he could deal with him and those around him in regards to progress on limiting nuclear arms, as well as dealing with various international issues (Afghanistan, Cuba, Israel-Palestine). This false idea of an American 'victory', according to the author, has gone far in undermining future American efforts on the international arena. In effect, Plokhy links the Wolfowitz Doctrine that came out as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union to the eventual invasion of Iraq, in 2003, in a preventive war on the part of the United States. A bit of a stretch, but there are still links that came be made in regards to how flawed developments and memory of the collapse of the USSR has led to incorrect policy decisions on the part of US administrations.
Coming back to the USSR, the author being an expert on the nationalities issue, stresses the role of Kravchuk and Ukraine in the development of the collapse, at times too heavily and shows something of a bias in that direction. Not to get mired in the details, suffice it to say that this is an in-depth study that goes a long way in trying to explain how the collapse of the Soviet Union came about as quickly as it did, but in many ways it is still a stepping stone on the way to a definitive study. My biggest complaint would be that there is little explanation offered or evidence examined in regards to how the populations of the various republics discussed felt about the Soviet Union and the ensuing end of the USSR. While it's important to keep in mind that the decision to end the existence of the Soviet Union was made by three men (the heads of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus) and forced onto a fourth (Gorbachev), Plokhy continually claims that this was a popular decision support from the ground up. And while referendums are taken, votes are cast, minds are quickly changed in a 180 degree fashion in a matter of weeks or months, the main emphasis here remains on the 'great men' and not the 'grass roots' level. That 'from the bottom' approach is missing here, and hopefully future studies will be able to fill that important and sorely needed blank spot.
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A History of War in 100 Battles by Richard Overy
Richard Overy has previously put out some decent monographs, so I'm not sure why he decided on this project. To be perfectly honest, if you're new to history in general, or military history more specifically, you will find a lot of interesting events, personalities, and battles discussed from the past 2000+ years. The problem, as with all such attempts, is that there is no justice done to any of these battles, personalities, or events in the few pages devoted to each of the battles discussed. Serious historians, academics, students of history, and those familiar with military history specifically can readily skip this brief romp through 100 battles. There is nothing new, original, or worthwhile to find amidst these pages. Each 'chapter' reads like a high school essay with in-depth context and analysis replaced by the equivalent of modern news channel sound bites.
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