I'm not sure what I was expecting from this volume on a post-war Washington riddled with former military men and spies and current diplomats and newspaper owners and journalists, but what I ended up reading was akin to a gossip column. First, there are entirely too many characters introduced too quickly. It's easy enough to keep the main players in mind: Kennan, the Alsop brothers, and a few others, but the rest become background noise as they're mentioned every now and then with the author taking for granted that the reader should have memorized the index and all the names presented therein. Secondly, relevant context is often missing. Just one example will have to suffice. The author brings up the creation of NATO and that Kennan favored a more limited organization consisting of the US, Britain, and Canada. That's it. Why did Kennan favor such an organization? Why didn't he consider France or West Germany in such an organization? What/who were the other contenders for NATO? Nothing. Three mere sentences on an organization that to this day continues to impact international politics and policies. But what gets almost 2 whole pages of mention? The 'heinous outrage' of a house Joe Alsop created in Georgetown that resulted in a municipal ordinance against such future monstrosities. As a result, it's really hard to believe this is a book written by an academic as it reads like a tabloid full of lurid details about ivy league universities with their student societies and drinking bouts and unadulterated rumors full of inept guesswork and misplaced emotions. Then again, perhaps that's what the US Cold War policy was all about.
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The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington by Gregg Herken
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The Soviet Occupation of Germany: Hunger, Mass Violence and the Struggle for Peace, 1945-1947 by Filip Slaveski
In many ways "The Soviet Occupation of Germany" is a very interesting study into the Red Army's advance into Nazi Germany in 1945 and the ensuing occupation through 1947. The first section of the book tackles the occupation in terms of crimes while the second focuses on food rationing, politics, and the beginnings of the Cold War tension that regularly utilized Germany and Berlin as a battleground.
This is a slim monograph, numbering some 150 pages of text, and that in and of itself should say something. This is a good introduction which offers a lot of interesting analysis but it is far from a definitive study. What Filip Slaveski does well is showcase the multifaceted nature of the Soviet occupation of Germany. When looking at the Red Army, he discusses the numerous confrontations between occupation troops and SVAG (the organization put in charge of keeping order) that occurred, which at times spilled into the streets with brawls, street fights, and gunfire. Considering that often times army command and SVAG command overlapped (as Zhukov held positions in both organizations, as did Katukov), the limits that each organization had to work with become apparent. Officers usually wanted to protect their men from trouble. When some Red Army were caught, be it in the act of rape, robbery, or murder, officers had to consider how far they could go in terms of punishment. Some continued to protect their men as they feared repercussions from the rest of their troops; not looking after one's men when there's no war could lead to a quick end of your duties and life. The limited amount of men initially assigned to SVAG also meant that most mundane instances of crime were not investigated. And, unfortunately, in some instances SVAG men themselves abused Red Army men and the locals under their jurisdiction.
Although crimes continued to occur in occupied East Germany their number was slowly reduced as waves of demobilized Red Army men left for the Soviet Union and SVAG commanders were able to implement sterner measures to keep remaining troops in barracks and under control while out in the countryside or in cities. Additionally, due to the nature of the war itself, many of the crimes being committed could not be assigned to any one party. Slave laborers from the east, concentration camp victims, deserters, and Polish soldiers (among a slew of others) were also concentrated or stayed within the borders of East Germany (under Soviet occupation) and at times terrorized the locals, seeking revenge on a populace they undoubtedly held guilty for their suffering during the war. There were also reports of Germans dressing up in Red Army uniforms and committing crimes (to what extent this is true or a way for Soviet officials to hide their soldiers' guilt is up for debate).
The above discussions, forming parts of the first half of this book, were really the most enlightening for me. In regards to the second half, I was most interested in reading about the interaction(s) between the British and Americans and the Soviets. Slaveski discusses how quickly the Soviets tried to take apart German industry and ship it to the west and details that this was a result of the initial discussions at the Yalta conference that dictated such actions were part of reparations to the Soviet Union and could be done before Germany was once more reunited, at least economically, and machinery/factories were once more needed for production within Germany. Thus the Soviets believed they had until the meeting at Potsdam to secure as much as they could in terms of German industry to ship to the east. The same applied to German forced labor, which American officials believed could be diverted to the east as the dismantling of industry by the Soviets would leave hundreds of thousands without adequate job prospects. Unfortunately, these initial ideas proved hard to sustain as FDR's death led to the Truman administration, which regularly sided with the British against the Soviets and attempted to make previous agreements void by finding or creating loopholes (i.e.when the Soviets asked for already agreed upon military machinery/factories to be shipped from West Germany to the them, the Americans and British would claim they were not solely military and could be used in a peacetime economy, something that was never truly clarified when the agreement(s) were first created about what could/would be shipped to the Soviets as a part of reparations). Thus, as flexible as the Soviet administration could be or tried to be, they were nonetheless a single actor in a play that featured numerous actors with their own interests and ideals. I would say this is an excellent look at the initial Soviet occupation of German and I hope that future historians will continue to explore this topic in more depth and detail.
This is a slim monograph, numbering some 150 pages of text, and that in and of itself should say something. This is a good introduction which offers a lot of interesting analysis but it is far from a definitive study. What Filip Slaveski does well is showcase the multifaceted nature of the Soviet occupation of Germany. When looking at the Red Army, he discusses the numerous confrontations between occupation troops and SVAG (the organization put in charge of keeping order) that occurred, which at times spilled into the streets with brawls, street fights, and gunfire. Considering that often times army command and SVAG command overlapped (as Zhukov held positions in both organizations, as did Katukov), the limits that each organization had to work with become apparent. Officers usually wanted to protect their men from trouble. When some Red Army were caught, be it in the act of rape, robbery, or murder, officers had to consider how far they could go in terms of punishment. Some continued to protect their men as they feared repercussions from the rest of their troops; not looking after one's men when there's no war could lead to a quick end of your duties and life. The limited amount of men initially assigned to SVAG also meant that most mundane instances of crime were not investigated. And, unfortunately, in some instances SVAG men themselves abused Red Army men and the locals under their jurisdiction.
Although crimes continued to occur in occupied East Germany their number was slowly reduced as waves of demobilized Red Army men left for the Soviet Union and SVAG commanders were able to implement sterner measures to keep remaining troops in barracks and under control while out in the countryside or in cities. Additionally, due to the nature of the war itself, many of the crimes being committed could not be assigned to any one party. Slave laborers from the east, concentration camp victims, deserters, and Polish soldiers (among a slew of others) were also concentrated or stayed within the borders of East Germany (under Soviet occupation) and at times terrorized the locals, seeking revenge on a populace they undoubtedly held guilty for their suffering during the war. There were also reports of Germans dressing up in Red Army uniforms and committing crimes (to what extent this is true or a way for Soviet officials to hide their soldiers' guilt is up for debate).
The above discussions, forming parts of the first half of this book, were really the most enlightening for me. In regards to the second half, I was most interested in reading about the interaction(s) between the British and Americans and the Soviets. Slaveski discusses how quickly the Soviets tried to take apart German industry and ship it to the west and details that this was a result of the initial discussions at the Yalta conference that dictated such actions were part of reparations to the Soviet Union and could be done before Germany was once more reunited, at least economically, and machinery/factories were once more needed for production within Germany. Thus the Soviets believed they had until the meeting at Potsdam to secure as much as they could in terms of German industry to ship to the east. The same applied to German forced labor, which American officials believed could be diverted to the east as the dismantling of industry by the Soviets would leave hundreds of thousands without adequate job prospects. Unfortunately, these initial ideas proved hard to sustain as FDR's death led to the Truman administration, which regularly sided with the British against the Soviets and attempted to make previous agreements void by finding or creating loopholes (i.e.when the Soviets asked for already agreed upon military machinery/factories to be shipped from West Germany to the them, the Americans and British would claim they were not solely military and could be used in a peacetime economy, something that was never truly clarified when the agreement(s) were first created about what could/would be shipped to the Soviets as a part of reparations). Thus, as flexible as the Soviet administration could be or tried to be, they were nonetheless a single actor in a play that featured numerous actors with their own interests and ideals. I would say this is an excellent look at the initial Soviet occupation of German and I hope that future historians will continue to explore this topic in more depth and detail.
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Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great War by Paul Jankowski
Many of the reviews on amazon for this book seem to have missed the forest for the trees. Most were expecting a detailed history of the battle of Verdun. That is, as per the usual military history of a single, significant battle, a rather limited history leading up to the battle should have been presented, and then the battle itself detailed, studied, and analyzed, followed up by its impact on the war and the lessons derived from it to this day.
However, Jankowski has presented a rather different version of a history of Verdun. That is, he's created a history of the 'idea' that the Battle of Verdun represented during the war, immediately after, and up to the present. The author offers no linear narrative going through the beginning, middle, and end of this battle since in reality no such plans existed. Chapters jump around in regards to time, place, events, etc. The battle, in some sense, evolved on its own and the chaos that followed had to be put into a narrative of its own by those reporting on it and post-war histories and memoirs. The creation of that story, the memory/memories of Verdun, is what Jankowski is tracking, in some sense, and expanding on the myths that the battle left in its wake.
Thus, the ever changing narrative about why the battle began, what both sides wanted to achieve through their offensive (the Germans) at Verdun, and their tenacious defense (French) of an area that for all intents and purposes contained no real significance for either party is the core of this monograph. If the Germans had gained ground it would not have resulted in the war of movement that they were aiming for, and if the French had retreated, another city would have fallen to the Germans with no real change to the overall war effort. And yet this deadly embrace, mainly between the Germans and French, lasted for close to ten months. With this text, you can track the various ideas that each side went through when trying to explain what was happening around Verdun to those back home as they tried to put a logical spin on why tens of thousands of soldiers were becoming casualties on a daily basis - there had to be a reason!
So for those interested in a detailed history of the Battle of Verdun, you'd best look elsewhere. For those who are interested in understanding how a battle with no real significance, aside from casualties sustained and inflicted, became one of the foundations of the history of the First World War, this is the book for you.
However, Jankowski has presented a rather different version of a history of Verdun. That is, he's created a history of the 'idea' that the Battle of Verdun represented during the war, immediately after, and up to the present. The author offers no linear narrative going through the beginning, middle, and end of this battle since in reality no such plans existed. Chapters jump around in regards to time, place, events, etc. The battle, in some sense, evolved on its own and the chaos that followed had to be put into a narrative of its own by those reporting on it and post-war histories and memoirs. The creation of that story, the memory/memories of Verdun, is what Jankowski is tracking, in some sense, and expanding on the myths that the battle left in its wake.
Thus, the ever changing narrative about why the battle began, what both sides wanted to achieve through their offensive (the Germans) at Verdun, and their tenacious defense (French) of an area that for all intents and purposes contained no real significance for either party is the core of this monograph. If the Germans had gained ground it would not have resulted in the war of movement that they were aiming for, and if the French had retreated, another city would have fallen to the Germans with no real change to the overall war effort. And yet this deadly embrace, mainly between the Germans and French, lasted for close to ten months. With this text, you can track the various ideas that each side went through when trying to explain what was happening around Verdun to those back home as they tried to put a logical spin on why tens of thousands of soldiers were becoming casualties on a daily basis - there had to be a reason!
So for those interested in a detailed history of the Battle of Verdun, you'd best look elsewhere. For those who are interested in understanding how a battle with no real significance, aside from casualties sustained and inflicted, became one of the foundations of the history of the First World War, this is the book for you.
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Stalin: Volume I: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 by Stephen Kotkin
In 'Stalin', historian Stephen Kotkin tries his best to balance a biography of Stalin with the environment Stalin found himself living in. Kotkin details the politics of the Russian Empire and her neighbor, the newly created Germany under Bismarck, as well as the industrialization (including the rise and popularity of socialist and Marxist thought) and Russificiation that Georgia and the Russian Empire in general underwent. All would play important roles in how a young Stalin was raised and educated and how he formed his worldview. In general, Kotkin uses Stalin as a tool to showcase a world and environment that existed at the time and helped craft the man Stalin would become in the future. Simultaneously he describes and analyzes the people and events that affected Stalin's youth and adolescence and slowly positioned him for a future no one could have predicted was on the horizon. Due to the above, much of this volume does not solely focus on Stalin but on the personalities he interacted with (Lenin, Trotsky, Miliukov, Martov, etc.) or those important enough to alter the direction of European politics (Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Witte, Nicholas II, etc.).
I think the title 'Stalin' is a misnomer here since a significant portion of this work focuses on many other topics/subjects and often enough Stalin is nowhere to be found. In many ways the large swath of territory covered is useful and even needed in understanding how Stalin's life unfolded and how it fit into the greater pattern of European history. But, unfortunately, that also makes this first volume a bit less interesting for me personally as we only see Stalin's evolution through 1928. My understanding is that the following volumes will have a lot more concentration on Stalin. Yet understanding the historical events Stalin lived through and witnessed will undoubtedly help explain his later actions and reasoning as head of the Soviet Union. Through Stalin's eyes I hope future volumes will showcase the actions of a man who lived through much and made those experiences part of his core.
Although Kotkin has worked in numerous archives, both in the US and Russia, he himself states that he sometimes went through primary source material based on secondary readings. Thus it's a bit difficult to separate original research from what's already available (although not necessarily in English as Kotkin utilizes sources in German, Russian, etc.). While this might not be the most original biographical look at Stalin, it certainly is, at the very least, an impressive synthesis of available literature incorporated into an interesting narrative of the world Stalin found himself inhabiting. In many ways the events described and analyzed by Kotkin deserve, and in some instances, already have, multi-volume works written about them (WWI, the Russian Revolution (February and October), etc. But Kotkin's work has a readability many others will lack and while at times depth of analysis might be missing (or in some cases depth in general considering the amount of information covered), this first volume is still in many ways essential reading for those interested in Stalin, the late Russian Empire, the Russian Revolution and the creation/formation of what became the Soviet Union.
Some of the highlights for me were the descriptions of Stalin's role in the October Revolution and the way in which the Bolsheviks were able to seize power. The utter chaos following the February Revolution and the inability of Kerensky and the Provisional Government to get anything worthwhile accomplished inevitably led to the eventual storming of the Winter Palace in a bloodless coup. The ensuing attempts by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, at times working in tandem with the other parties (Mensheviks, Right and Left SRs, etc.) to end the war and bring about some type of peace with Germany and stability on the homefront, are described in detail as is the half-hearted attempt by the Left SRs in their assassination of the German ambassador to force Germany to renew hostilities with Russia - post-Brest-Litovsk - and discredit the Bolsheviks. Kotkin covers numerous events and personalities that are usually left out of popular histories and are reserved for academic monographs. Yet, as previously mentioned, while some coverage lacks the depth certain events deserve, that is also in part due to the impact they had or will have on the future role Stalin assumes. Thus the First World War, which Stalin never participated in, is wholly overshadowed by the February and October Revolutions, where Stalin began to play a greater role in the Bolshevik hierarchy. In effect, the events Kotkin has chosen to highlight and concentrate on were picked for their future impact on Stalin and the Soviet Union. Without a doubt this is a highly recommended volume for all the reasons mentioned above.
I think the title 'Stalin' is a misnomer here since a significant portion of this work focuses on many other topics/subjects and often enough Stalin is nowhere to be found. In many ways the large swath of territory covered is useful and even needed in understanding how Stalin's life unfolded and how it fit into the greater pattern of European history. But, unfortunately, that also makes this first volume a bit less interesting for me personally as we only see Stalin's evolution through 1928. My understanding is that the following volumes will have a lot more concentration on Stalin. Yet understanding the historical events Stalin lived through and witnessed will undoubtedly help explain his later actions and reasoning as head of the Soviet Union. Through Stalin's eyes I hope future volumes will showcase the actions of a man who lived through much and made those experiences part of his core.
Although Kotkin has worked in numerous archives, both in the US and Russia, he himself states that he sometimes went through primary source material based on secondary readings. Thus it's a bit difficult to separate original research from what's already available (although not necessarily in English as Kotkin utilizes sources in German, Russian, etc.). While this might not be the most original biographical look at Stalin, it certainly is, at the very least, an impressive synthesis of available literature incorporated into an interesting narrative of the world Stalin found himself inhabiting. In many ways the events described and analyzed by Kotkin deserve, and in some instances, already have, multi-volume works written about them (WWI, the Russian Revolution (February and October), etc. But Kotkin's work has a readability many others will lack and while at times depth of analysis might be missing (or in some cases depth in general considering the amount of information covered), this first volume is still in many ways essential reading for those interested in Stalin, the late Russian Empire, the Russian Revolution and the creation/formation of what became the Soviet Union.
Some of the highlights for me were the descriptions of Stalin's role in the October Revolution and the way in which the Bolsheviks were able to seize power. The utter chaos following the February Revolution and the inability of Kerensky and the Provisional Government to get anything worthwhile accomplished inevitably led to the eventual storming of the Winter Palace in a bloodless coup. The ensuing attempts by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, at times working in tandem with the other parties (Mensheviks, Right and Left SRs, etc.) to end the war and bring about some type of peace with Germany and stability on the homefront, are described in detail as is the half-hearted attempt by the Left SRs in their assassination of the German ambassador to force Germany to renew hostilities with Russia - post-Brest-Litovsk - and discredit the Bolsheviks. Kotkin covers numerous events and personalities that are usually left out of popular histories and are reserved for academic monographs. Yet, as previously mentioned, while some coverage lacks the depth certain events deserve, that is also in part due to the impact they had or will have on the future role Stalin assumes. Thus the First World War, which Stalin never participated in, is wholly overshadowed by the February and October Revolutions, where Stalin began to play a greater role in the Bolshevik hierarchy. In effect, the events Kotkin has chosen to highlight and concentrate on were picked for their future impact on Stalin and the Soviet Union. Without a doubt this is a highly recommended volume for all the reasons mentioned above.
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Generalissimo Stalin: The Myth of Stalin as a Great Military Strategist by Boris Gorbachevsky
Boris Gorbachevsky's "Generalissimo Stalin" offers a bit of a mixed bag for readers. The author, a veteran who went through the war and wrote his memoirs (translated under the title "Through the Maelstrom"), presents a rather polemical text for the reader. The best parts of the book, for me, among the 300+ pages are the author's personal experiences, as well as the various interactions he had with veterans and survivors of the war. Much of the narrative revolves around the battles for Rzhev, where the author fought, and where to this day there are still many questions left unanswered about the numerous operations that took place from 1941-1942 and the losses sustained by the Red Army. The author relates interesting anecdotes, reminiscences, and recollections that make for a valuable addition to literature on the Eastern Front and the Soviet Union. Then, there are stories that seem more apocryphal than true, but in the end I lean toward believing them as accurate since having read on the Second World War for over a decade I stopped being surprised and impressed with the amount of suffering, heroism, stupidity, and ignorance that was displayed by millions of men and women on a daily basis.
One of the more interesting chapters deals with Aleksandr Korneichuk's play "The Front." This was written in August of 1942 and served as a warning to those of the "old guard", veterans from the Civil War, that the modern requirements of this war needed young, energetic commanders to take the reigns. The play served as a validation of Stalin's scapegoating and shifted the blame for the defeats of 1941 and early 1942 onto the shoulders of commanders and away from Stalin himself. The chapters that deal with the Yalta Conference lean on conjecture more than factual data and there are various generalizations made that have become a cornerstone of propaganda against Stalin and the Soviet state of the time, whether deserved or not.
As mentioned, the volume is written as a polemical work, and in most cases, it's arguing against the memory of Stalin and the Great Patriotic War that was crafted during the war itself and in the post-war period and remains, in many ways, evident even today. Some of the other subjects covered are the last days of the war and the Battle for Berlin, the meeting on the Elbe between US and Soviet forces, the uprising in Prague by the 1st Division of Vlasov's Army, and the allied contribution to the war. Often the author engages in mock conversations with the reader, including the introduction of rhetorical questions. This style will be familiar to those who've read Russian volumes on the Stalinist period, which fuses history, reminiscences, hypotheticals, etc., together. In some ways Gorbachevsky himself is guilty of propagating Soviet era myths in that he consistently ridicules the narrative developed under Stalin's leadership and after, but himself praises the exceptional environment Red Army soldiers found themselves in and were able to overcome. He falls into the trope that says the Red Army and Soviet population won the war in spite of Stalin rather than thanks to him. This idea was developed under Khrushchev, who did his best to place all blame on Stalin's shoulders and focus more on the party and people for the Soviet victory in the war. Additionally, after explaining how weak western knowledge is in regards to the Eastern Front, mainly based on German recollections due to the limits the Soviets placed on what could be written about the war, the author then goes on to quote and lean on German sources to support many of his points.
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Marshal of Victory: The Autobiography of General Georgy Zhukov by Georgy Zhukov, Geoffrey Roberts
Those interested in a semi-censored look at the Great Patriotic War through the eyes of one of the leading commanders to come out of the Red Army would do well to invest in Zhukov's memoirs, which are presented here with an introduction by Geoffrey Roberts. Roberts has written numerous works on the Soviet Union and in part on the Second World War and does an excellent job detailing an introduction to this second edition of Zhukov's memoirs. Additionally, two 'essays' are included following the two volumes of Zhukov's memoirs detailing his thoughts on Stalin and events 'After the Death of Stalin.'
Zhukov's attempts to publish his memoirs met with many obstacles, first was his demotion under Stalin and the entire freeze around publications on the war while Stalin lived, which was followed by his eventual ousting by Khrushchev as well. It was only in the late 1960s, two decades after the end of the Second World War, that Zhukov's censored memoirs were published. Soon after another edition was released, and that second edition what has been translated here (originally done in the 1980s). To date there are over a dozen editions of Zhukov's memoirs in Russian with various censored sections being included each time a new edition is released. I would have greatly appreciated if the newest, or one of the latter editions, was re-translated with additions highlighted or italicized (as it was done in Russian). While Roberts explains in his introduction that much of what was cut out was done so with Zhukov's authorization, due to repetition or needless description, it would still have been beneficial to see a full translation of something western readers have been denied thus far.
As for the two volumes presented here, they are an excellent addition to any WWII library. Undoubtedly you'll encounter more than enough Soviet-era propaganda, but nonetheless, the insights presented here are worth wading through Zhukov's appeals to party and state on a regular basis. Whatever you might think of Zhukov as a man, he more than proved himself as a competent commander and was on the 'front lines' in most of the major operations conducted by the Red Army throughout the entirety of the Great Patriotic War.
Zhukov's attempts to publish his memoirs met with many obstacles, first was his demotion under Stalin and the entire freeze around publications on the war while Stalin lived, which was followed by his eventual ousting by Khrushchev as well. It was only in the late 1960s, two decades after the end of the Second World War, that Zhukov's censored memoirs were published. Soon after another edition was released, and that second edition what has been translated here (originally done in the 1980s). To date there are over a dozen editions of Zhukov's memoirs in Russian with various censored sections being included each time a new edition is released. I would have greatly appreciated if the newest, or one of the latter editions, was re-translated with additions highlighted or italicized (as it was done in Russian). While Roberts explains in his introduction that much of what was cut out was done so with Zhukov's authorization, due to repetition or needless description, it would still have been beneficial to see a full translation of something western readers have been denied thus far.
As for the two volumes presented here, they are an excellent addition to any WWII library. Undoubtedly you'll encounter more than enough Soviet-era propaganda, but nonetheless, the insights presented here are worth wading through Zhukov's appeals to party and state on a regular basis. Whatever you might think of Zhukov as a man, he more than proved himself as a competent commander and was on the 'front lines' in most of the major operations conducted by the Red Army throughout the entirety of the Great Patriotic War.
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A German General on the Eastern Front: The Letters and Diaries of Gotthard Heinrici 1941-1942 by Johanne Hurter
I have regularly come across Heinrici's name when reading on the Eastern Front and I know he is considered one of the better commanders to come out of the Wehrmacht (where today pretty much every German commander is considered a genius compared to their allied counterparts). What drew me to this volume was that the majority of the text was based on his letters and diary entries. While there might have been some self-censorship going on, these sources would undoubtedly be more telling than his memoirs or reminiscences about the war. Initially I was a bit surprised and skeptical at the brevity of the text, only some 146 pages, including about 60 pages that serve as an introduction to the text, written by Johanne Hurter, who originally unearthed this rich source material. But I'm happy to say that this is a valuable and important source of information for those interested in better understanding the Wehrmacht's situation throughout 1941 and early 1942.
Those interested mainly in combat, tactics, and operational art will be somewhat disappointed. There is little talk here of minute details about battles, attacks, defensive actions, orders, etc. This text is made up of diary entries and letters written to the General's family/wife, thus they mainly relay Heinrici's hopes, despair, and reflections on the various situations he and his corps/army found themselves in. Hurter's introduction is well written, concise, and draws the reader's attention to the more important bits of information readers will come across. Much of what you'll find here has to do with Heinrici's thoughts on the Red Army soldier, Soviet partisans, Soviet citizens in occupied territory, Jews and their treatment, as well as his descriptions of life in the occupied territories of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.
Some of the more interesting discussions and information came in the form of a diary entry on 30 April 1941, when Heinrici comments on the fact that 'it has been raining incessantly for two weeks' as he's located in Sidelce. Unfortunately there are no other comments on the weather leading up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, but this does hint at the fact that an earlier, mid-May, invasion of the USSR would have been impossible due to the extra long rainy season of spring 1941. This is something Heinrici himself readily forgets about or doesn't even consider when in later entries he talks about all the time lost due to the Balkan campaign and what difference those few weeks might have made on the road to Moscow. Another contradiction can be found when Heinrici comments on the rigid nature of Soviet officers, who would not retreat on their own initiative and wound up in encirclement and as prisoners of war. Simultaneously, he himself constantly comments on the ignorance of his higher command as repeated request for retreats were turned down during the winter of 1941/1942 when his 4th Army was under constant threat of encirclement (and he himself refused to take the initiative). Finally, the reader will come across numerous instances of repetition, which might explain in part why the volume is as slim as it is since this is a somewhat abridged version of documents that most likely contained repetitive ideas, descriptions, etc. (even so I wish more entries were included, or at least those included were expanded). For instance, Heinrici continually mentions his interpreter, a former Odessa native, who is fluent in German and lost the majority of his family to the Soviet regime for various reasons. This interpreter became one of the most vicious and enthusiastic 'partisan hunters', killing/hanging Soviet partisans by the dozens throughout 1941.
While I don't want to give more away from what these pages contain, I will say this is one of the most revealing and interesting accounts I have come across from the German point of view of the war on the Eastern Front. This is without a doubt a highly recommended read that once more raises questions about Wehrmacht complicity in the Holocaust, as well as what German officers thought, knew, and tolerated from themselves and their soldiers.
Those interested mainly in combat, tactics, and operational art will be somewhat disappointed. There is little talk here of minute details about battles, attacks, defensive actions, orders, etc. This text is made up of diary entries and letters written to the General's family/wife, thus they mainly relay Heinrici's hopes, despair, and reflections on the various situations he and his corps/army found themselves in. Hurter's introduction is well written, concise, and draws the reader's attention to the more important bits of information readers will come across. Much of what you'll find here has to do with Heinrici's thoughts on the Red Army soldier, Soviet partisans, Soviet citizens in occupied territory, Jews and their treatment, as well as his descriptions of life in the occupied territories of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.
Some of the more interesting discussions and information came in the form of a diary entry on 30 April 1941, when Heinrici comments on the fact that 'it has been raining incessantly for two weeks' as he's located in Sidelce. Unfortunately there are no other comments on the weather leading up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, but this does hint at the fact that an earlier, mid-May, invasion of the USSR would have been impossible due to the extra long rainy season of spring 1941. This is something Heinrici himself readily forgets about or doesn't even consider when in later entries he talks about all the time lost due to the Balkan campaign and what difference those few weeks might have made on the road to Moscow. Another contradiction can be found when Heinrici comments on the rigid nature of Soviet officers, who would not retreat on their own initiative and wound up in encirclement and as prisoners of war. Simultaneously, he himself constantly comments on the ignorance of his higher command as repeated request for retreats were turned down during the winter of 1941/1942 when his 4th Army was under constant threat of encirclement (and he himself refused to take the initiative). Finally, the reader will come across numerous instances of repetition, which might explain in part why the volume is as slim as it is since this is a somewhat abridged version of documents that most likely contained repetitive ideas, descriptions, etc. (even so I wish more entries were included, or at least those included were expanded). For instance, Heinrici continually mentions his interpreter, a former Odessa native, who is fluent in German and lost the majority of his family to the Soviet regime for various reasons. This interpreter became one of the most vicious and enthusiastic 'partisan hunters', killing/hanging Soviet partisans by the dozens throughout 1941.
While I don't want to give more away from what these pages contain, I will say this is one of the most revealing and interesting accounts I have come across from the German point of view of the war on the Eastern Front. This is without a doubt a highly recommended read that once more raises questions about Wehrmacht complicity in the Holocaust, as well as what German officers thought, knew, and tolerated from themselves and their soldiers.
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Survivors of Stalingrad: Eyewitness Accounts from the 6th Army, 1942-1943 by Reinhold Busch
I'm not new to Second World War literature, and definitely familiar with the Eastern Front. I've read countless books and reviewed dozens if not hundreds. I've read Red Army, Wehrmacht, US Army, British, etc., memoirs, recollections, reminiscences, etc. This is by far one of the least interesting accounts I've come across. Even worse is that I can't credit the author for not encountering interesting events or people while serving on the Eastern Front because there is no author here but an editor, an historian specializing in 'health.' Reinhold Busch selected what to include in this collection and the majority is sorely lacking in substance or interest. Much here is the 'woe is me' type of reminiscence about an armed force finding itself in the depths of an enemy country, encircled and seemingly left to their own devices as Hitler and his propaganda spin the situation any way they can to avoid the truth, or simply omit any mention of it at all. For my money, there are more interesting accounts of this battle. In the end I can't say this is a collection I'd recommend.
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Israel Since the Six-Day War: Tears of Joy, Tears of Sorrow by Leslie Stein
Leslie Stein presents a synthesis of source material that highlights the evolution of the state of Israel from the Six-Day War to the present. There is a quick overview of the creation of Israel and the lead up to the Six-Day War, as well as an analysis on how and why it was a success. In many ways Stein's narrative is quite objective in that there is no restraint when it comes to failed Israeli policies. The failure of the Israeli intelligence to adequately forewarn the country on the eve of the Yom Kippur War is highlighted and detailed, with numerous personalities being singled out for harsh criticism. Additionally, the author takes Sharon and the entire Israeli response to task for the massacre of civilians at two refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, perpetrated by Phalangists with Israeli support and acquiescence.
Simultaneously, the double standards consistently utilized against Israel are also shown in regards to the United Nations. In many ways Israel was a middle ground during the Cold War between the Soviet Union's support for Arab states and the French, British, and United States response to various Soviet moves in the Middle East. This led to moments of support for Israel from France and the United States but hardly ever outright recognition of the position Middle Eastern states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, etc.) and the PLO has consistently put Israel in as they allowed numerous terrorist groups to form, attain weapons, and use their territory as staging grounds for attacks on Israeli territory against both civilian and military targets. The post-Cold War analysis is just as interesting. Stein presents numerous instances and examples of the double standards that are consistently evident when Israel is being dealt with by the likes of the UN and the world media. The constant attempts by the Israelis to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question is a one-way street in which the Israelis offer and the Palestinians refuse. Simply put, Israel in and of itself is the stumbling block to 'peace' for the Palestinians, yet in many ways Israel is the only thing keeping the peace in that area (just look at ISIS today). If you're looking for a good semi-in-depth analysis of Israel since the Six-Day War this is an excellent contribution to the field and in many ways should be required reading. There aren't any major disclosures or ground breaking discoveries, but in many ways I think casual readers of history and the Middle East will still be surprised by the complexity of the many issues we've come to view in simple Manichean terms and how thin a line Israel, her politicians and military have to walk as the world's media and judgment is constantly focused on her actions.
Simultaneously, the double standards consistently utilized against Israel are also shown in regards to the United Nations. In many ways Israel was a middle ground during the Cold War between the Soviet Union's support for Arab states and the French, British, and United States response to various Soviet moves in the Middle East. This led to moments of support for Israel from France and the United States but hardly ever outright recognition of the position Middle Eastern states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, etc.) and the PLO has consistently put Israel in as they allowed numerous terrorist groups to form, attain weapons, and use their territory as staging grounds for attacks on Israeli territory against both civilian and military targets. The post-Cold War analysis is just as interesting. Stein presents numerous instances and examples of the double standards that are consistently evident when Israel is being dealt with by the likes of the UN and the world media. The constant attempts by the Israelis to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question is a one-way street in which the Israelis offer and the Palestinians refuse. Simply put, Israel in and of itself is the stumbling block to 'peace' for the Palestinians, yet in many ways Israel is the only thing keeping the peace in that area (just look at ISIS today). If you're looking for a good semi-in-depth analysis of Israel since the Six-Day War this is an excellent contribution to the field and in many ways should be required reading. There aren't any major disclosures or ground breaking discoveries, but in many ways I think casual readers of history and the Middle East will still be surprised by the complexity of the many issues we've come to view in simple Manichean terms and how thin a line Israel, her politicians and military have to walk as the world's media and judgment is constantly focused on her actions.
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After Hitler: The Last Days of the Second World War in Europe by Michael Jones
I have to admit that sometimes I ask myself, 'How much of the Second World War continues to remain mired in myths and legends?' Each time I get tired of reading monographs on this time period I find a volume that reinvigorates my interest. Michael Jones has managed to do this with every book he has put out on the war. I can confidently say that I, someone who has been reading on this period for over a decade, continue to be amazed by the information he manages to convey and unearth. While not everything that's found among these pages is original research, the narrative Jones has crafted is compelling and once more shows that even if some believe this time period has become over-saturated (every now and then I find myself among those 'some'), there are still areas that need more focus, attention, and rigorous research.
The premise of this text relies on looking at the last ten days of the war after Adolf Hitler commits suicide in his bunker. There are numerous vignettes that build a narrative based on information about events from earlier years of the war, but in one form or another they all follow the threads that Jones weaves to come back to these fateful and climactic ten days. One of the more controversial issues the author deals with is rape on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. This is a subject that has yet to be fully explored by scholars for many reasons, but slowly more pieces of the puzzle are making their way into recent monographs (two recent examples are: "The Soviet occupation of Germany" by Filip Slaveski and "What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France" by Mary Louise Roberts). My biggest issue is the broad brush that's often used to paint the entirety of the Red Army as guilty of some rather large arbitrary number of rapes in either Berlin alone or all of Germany. Jones adds to the puzzle by showing that the situation was much more complicated as, with one example, Polish forces under Red Army command perpetrated their own brand of justice on the Germans. Before the storming of Berlin the 1st Polish Army 'was forced to draw up a disciplinary ordinance to curb the wilder excesses of its soldiers' (44). Similar orders were read out to the Red Army as well, and for good reason. There were also instances when justice took the form of on the spot executions as when a Red Army colonel found an NKVD soldier guilty of rape and offered him his pistol with one bullet to end his life within a minute 'with some self respect', or else he'd finish him off as the 'coward' he was (54-55).
Throughout the text one of the main themes the author continues to stress are the choices made by the western allies and the Soviets in regards to actions on the ground, which had major consequences for each side. For instance, the promises made to the Soviets by Roosevelt and his administration in regards to Lend Lease were soon called off by Truman who attempted to utilize Lend Lease shipments as a bargaining chip, a move the Soviets were loathe to entertain. Furthermore, Montgomery's move at Lüneburg Heath was co-opted by the Dönitz government to fulfill their needs and treated as an armistice rather than an unconditional surrender, something the Soviets were angered by but allowed in lieu of being able to sign an unconditional surrender for the remainder of German troops still operating throughout Europe at a place and date of their choosing. Still, even those wishes were upset by the signing of the surrender of the German Wehrmacht at Rheims instead of Berlin, and more so by a lowly Soviet representative who was simply available, rather than Marshal Zhukov. In part the signing at Rheims was the fault of Eisenhower who was keen on ending the war as soon as possible and wanted peace yet needed to simultaneously keep in mind the wishes of his Soviet allies, who were not always as forthcoming as they should have been.
Aside from the above, some of the more interesting discussions revolved around the Prague Uprising and the role of Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army in helping the resistance fight their German occupiers until they could no longer hold out with the Red Army making its way to Prague for a liberation of their own of the last Eastern European capital still under German control. Additionally, the resistance of a Georgian Legion battalion on the Dutch Island of Texel was a complete surprise to me, as was how the Soviets treated the survivors and the memory of this incident. Overall, I can't praise the author enough for what he's done in this volume. Taking a look at the last ten days from the point of view of Soviet, American, British, German, and even Canadian eye-witness accounts brings an original look at the chaos of the final days of the Second World War. On May 8 and 9 a reprieve for many occurred as VE Day was celebrated. And soon enough the alliance that so many worked so hard to form will crumble as old issues creep up once again to create a new threat in the form of a Cold War (one whose language in many ways becomes recycled, by both sides, from the rhetoric they worked out so well during the Second World War).
There were some weaknesses that I encountered. I am disappointed in the system of 'endnotes' used here as it made tracing information more difficult than it needed to be and I believe footnotes would have been the better alternative as this is to a large extent a scholarly work. There were references to the Warsaw Uprising (August 1944) but they were somewhat inaccurate and dismissive of the Red Army and Stalin. In many ways this is a perfect example of an area that continues to wait for further scholarship as current volumes are still vague and greatly lacking when it comes to the Soviet side of things. Finally, some of the material here is gathered from various internet websites that, while overall presenting useful and interesting information, are not always accurate. Aside from these minor issues, this is a highly recommended volume and a great addition to literature on both the waning days of the Second World War and the foundations that were being set by the western allies and Soviet Union in what would become the Cold War.
Available in the states October 2015 (or from amazon.co.uk right now)
The premise of this text relies on looking at the last ten days of the war after Adolf Hitler commits suicide in his bunker. There are numerous vignettes that build a narrative based on information about events from earlier years of the war, but in one form or another they all follow the threads that Jones weaves to come back to these fateful and climactic ten days. One of the more controversial issues the author deals with is rape on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. This is a subject that has yet to be fully explored by scholars for many reasons, but slowly more pieces of the puzzle are making their way into recent monographs (two recent examples are: "The Soviet occupation of Germany" by Filip Slaveski and "What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France" by Mary Louise Roberts). My biggest issue is the broad brush that's often used to paint the entirety of the Red Army as guilty of some rather large arbitrary number of rapes in either Berlin alone or all of Germany. Jones adds to the puzzle by showing that the situation was much more complicated as, with one example, Polish forces under Red Army command perpetrated their own brand of justice on the Germans. Before the storming of Berlin the 1st Polish Army 'was forced to draw up a disciplinary ordinance to curb the wilder excesses of its soldiers' (44). Similar orders were read out to the Red Army as well, and for good reason. There were also instances when justice took the form of on the spot executions as when a Red Army colonel found an NKVD soldier guilty of rape and offered him his pistol with one bullet to end his life within a minute 'with some self respect', or else he'd finish him off as the 'coward' he was (54-55).
Throughout the text one of the main themes the author continues to stress are the choices made by the western allies and the Soviets in regards to actions on the ground, which had major consequences for each side. For instance, the promises made to the Soviets by Roosevelt and his administration in regards to Lend Lease were soon called off by Truman who attempted to utilize Lend Lease shipments as a bargaining chip, a move the Soviets were loathe to entertain. Furthermore, Montgomery's move at Lüneburg Heath was co-opted by the Dönitz government to fulfill their needs and treated as an armistice rather than an unconditional surrender, something the Soviets were angered by but allowed in lieu of being able to sign an unconditional surrender for the remainder of German troops still operating throughout Europe at a place and date of their choosing. Still, even those wishes were upset by the signing of the surrender of the German Wehrmacht at Rheims instead of Berlin, and more so by a lowly Soviet representative who was simply available, rather than Marshal Zhukov. In part the signing at Rheims was the fault of Eisenhower who was keen on ending the war as soon as possible and wanted peace yet needed to simultaneously keep in mind the wishes of his Soviet allies, who were not always as forthcoming as they should have been.
Aside from the above, some of the more interesting discussions revolved around the Prague Uprising and the role of Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army in helping the resistance fight their German occupiers until they could no longer hold out with the Red Army making its way to Prague for a liberation of their own of the last Eastern European capital still under German control. Additionally, the resistance of a Georgian Legion battalion on the Dutch Island of Texel was a complete surprise to me, as was how the Soviets treated the survivors and the memory of this incident. Overall, I can't praise the author enough for what he's done in this volume. Taking a look at the last ten days from the point of view of Soviet, American, British, German, and even Canadian eye-witness accounts brings an original look at the chaos of the final days of the Second World War. On May 8 and 9 a reprieve for many occurred as VE Day was celebrated. And soon enough the alliance that so many worked so hard to form will crumble as old issues creep up once again to create a new threat in the form of a Cold War (one whose language in many ways becomes recycled, by both sides, from the rhetoric they worked out so well during the Second World War).
There were some weaknesses that I encountered. I am disappointed in the system of 'endnotes' used here as it made tracing information more difficult than it needed to be and I believe footnotes would have been the better alternative as this is to a large extent a scholarly work. There were references to the Warsaw Uprising (August 1944) but they were somewhat inaccurate and dismissive of the Red Army and Stalin. In many ways this is a perfect example of an area that continues to wait for further scholarship as current volumes are still vague and greatly lacking when it comes to the Soviet side of things. Finally, some of the material here is gathered from various internet websites that, while overall presenting useful and interesting information, are not always accurate. Aside from these minor issues, this is a highly recommended volume and a great addition to literature on both the waning days of the Second World War and the foundations that were being set by the western allies and Soviet Union in what would become the Cold War.
Available in the states October 2015 (or from amazon.co.uk right now)
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Hi Hitler!: How the Nazi Past is Being Normalized in Contemporary Culture by Gavriel D. Rosenfeld
"Hi Hitler" offers a fascinating look at contemporary culture and the various forms the memory of the Holocaust and Hitler have taken in today's society. The text features six chapters with the most interesting (for this reader) being the first three, which highlighted how our memory of the Second World War as the 'Good War' has continued to be challenged by various authors, discussions revolving around the 'uniqueness' of the Holocaust, and how counterfactual history is applied to the Holocaust.
In the first chapter the author traces the numerous volumes that have recently appeared challenging the well-entrenched narrative of the Second World War as being something unrepresentative of the facts. Rosenfeld himself never really comes out with his own opinion on whether the Second World War was a 'Good War' but allows the reader to view the intricacies of the debate(s) that have raged around the question, the authors who've written on the topic, the reviews their books have received, and the validity of the information presented in respective publications. Some are easy to critique and show for the shallow efforts that they are, while others raise important questions about the nature of war and how war remembrance is embraced within societies and then helps to shape their views and ideas up to the present (more than once is the connection made to our post 9-11 rhetoric). Similar themes are explored in regards to Europe (both western and eastern) in how they've treated the Second World War, especially the numerous attempts by various organizations and governments to equate the Nazi regime with that of Stalin's Soviet Union.
The second chapter was quite fascinating in that the author presents how we are constantly walking a fine line in how we view the Holocaust and its history. Should we consider it a unique event or can we normalize it? How will they change our treatment of the Holocaust and its legacy? The same somewhat applies to Hitler and the history of the Third Reich in general. Keeping these events in a cocoon limits how we view their history and memory but allowing for normalization could mean creating a discourse that's both difficult to control and justify. Some have argued that allowing for a 'globalization' of the Holocaust, creating comparisons to numerous other events in our recent history, has resulted in an awareness of how devastating some situations really are, but the Holocaust then begins to lose its uniqueness. These ideas come into play in later chapters which discuss how movies and literature discuss Hitler and how the internet has become a democratic forum for Hitler-izations of everything in the form of memes. If we treat Hitler as any other human being, how does that help us understand what took place in the Second World War and Germany? If we treat him as the embodiment of evil, do we then close ourselves off from questioning if in the future others might emulate and possibly achieve even greater heights of destruction and death?
Personally, I think the Holocaust was unique to Germany for many reasons. But that's not to say that mass murder/genocide is limited solely to Germany. Many, if not the majority, of the nation-states that exist today have acts of mass murder as part of their histories. Be it the treatment of Native Americans and African Americans in the colonies and the United States, the Belgians in the Congo, the British in India and Africa, the Soviets under Stalin, China under Mao, the Spanish and Portuguese in the 'New World' and their role in the Slave Trade, and the French during the French Revolution and the Crusades against the Cathars (in some ways the Crusades in general), these are just some examples (many others include Darfur, Cambodia, etc.) of when mass murder, wanton destruction and mayhem are a part of a nation's past but each is unique to the people they occurred to and environment they occurred in.
The third chapter takes a look at how alternate histories that have dealt with the Second World have impacted how we view the Holocaust, Hitler, and the Third Reich. While I'm somewhat resistant to 'what if' scenarios, there are times when they are quite helpful in understand the numerous strands that go into making an event possible. Thus allowing for limited questioning of how changing one or two events could impact others creates an environment where discussions can become fruitful if limited to historians or experts in the field. For instance, if someone is interested in questioning the ability of the allies to bomb concentration camps (like Auschwitz), they'd have to explore how much the allies knew, how much they believed, what their capabilities were, what possible outcomes would have resulted, etc. This allows for a greater understanding of not just the allied bombing campaign but their intelligence, beliefs, and abilities during the war. Overall, this is a fascinating look at memory and remembrance of the Holocaust and Hitler and the impact the Second World War continues to generate on our society today.
In the first chapter the author traces the numerous volumes that have recently appeared challenging the well-entrenched narrative of the Second World War as being something unrepresentative of the facts. Rosenfeld himself never really comes out with his own opinion on whether the Second World War was a 'Good War' but allows the reader to view the intricacies of the debate(s) that have raged around the question, the authors who've written on the topic, the reviews their books have received, and the validity of the information presented in respective publications. Some are easy to critique and show for the shallow efforts that they are, while others raise important questions about the nature of war and how war remembrance is embraced within societies and then helps to shape their views and ideas up to the present (more than once is the connection made to our post 9-11 rhetoric). Similar themes are explored in regards to Europe (both western and eastern) in how they've treated the Second World War, especially the numerous attempts by various organizations and governments to equate the Nazi regime with that of Stalin's Soviet Union.
The second chapter was quite fascinating in that the author presents how we are constantly walking a fine line in how we view the Holocaust and its history. Should we consider it a unique event or can we normalize it? How will they change our treatment of the Holocaust and its legacy? The same somewhat applies to Hitler and the history of the Third Reich in general. Keeping these events in a cocoon limits how we view their history and memory but allowing for normalization could mean creating a discourse that's both difficult to control and justify. Some have argued that allowing for a 'globalization' of the Holocaust, creating comparisons to numerous other events in our recent history, has resulted in an awareness of how devastating some situations really are, but the Holocaust then begins to lose its uniqueness. These ideas come into play in later chapters which discuss how movies and literature discuss Hitler and how the internet has become a democratic forum for Hitler-izations of everything in the form of memes. If we treat Hitler as any other human being, how does that help us understand what took place in the Second World War and Germany? If we treat him as the embodiment of evil, do we then close ourselves off from questioning if in the future others might emulate and possibly achieve even greater heights of destruction and death?
Personally, I think the Holocaust was unique to Germany for many reasons. But that's not to say that mass murder/genocide is limited solely to Germany. Many, if not the majority, of the nation-states that exist today have acts of mass murder as part of their histories. Be it the treatment of Native Americans and African Americans in the colonies and the United States, the Belgians in the Congo, the British in India and Africa, the Soviets under Stalin, China under Mao, the Spanish and Portuguese in the 'New World' and their role in the Slave Trade, and the French during the French Revolution and the Crusades against the Cathars (in some ways the Crusades in general), these are just some examples (many others include Darfur, Cambodia, etc.) of when mass murder, wanton destruction and mayhem are a part of a nation's past but each is unique to the people they occurred to and environment they occurred in.
The third chapter takes a look at how alternate histories that have dealt with the Second World have impacted how we view the Holocaust, Hitler, and the Third Reich. While I'm somewhat resistant to 'what if' scenarios, there are times when they are quite helpful in understand the numerous strands that go into making an event possible. Thus allowing for limited questioning of how changing one or two events could impact others creates an environment where discussions can become fruitful if limited to historians or experts in the field. For instance, if someone is interested in questioning the ability of the allies to bomb concentration camps (like Auschwitz), they'd have to explore how much the allies knew, how much they believed, what their capabilities were, what possible outcomes would have resulted, etc. This allows for a greater understanding of not just the allied bombing campaign but their intelligence, beliefs, and abilities during the war. Overall, this is a fascinating look at memory and remembrance of the Holocaust and Hitler and the impact the Second World War continues to generate on our society today.
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When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995-2010 by Tony Judt, Jennifer Homans
Tony Judt is a name Europeanists (historians of Europe) regularly encounter. "Postwar" has almost become a standard text in many ways. As with many historians in their own right, Judt has opinions on many issues, events, and personalities (whether they are part of his main concentration or not) and shares them with aplomb, for the most part. This collection of book reviews, essays, and a few personal tracts written after the deaths of three well-known and respected historians are an interesting foray into the life of Judt, his ideas and the stances he took on a variety of contemporary topics. The book is split into five parts. The first is entitled '1989: Our Age'; 'Israel, the Holocaust, and the Jews'; '9/11 and the New World Order'; 'The Way We Live Now'; and 'In the Long Run We Are All Dead.' These titles are mainly self-explanatory but personally I found one review and one lecture to be the stand outs.
The review of Norman Davies's 'Europe: A History' is absolutely phenomenal. This is a hack of an historian who has received undeserved praise for reasons that I cannot even begin to fathom and yet his shoddy work is some of the worst drivel I've seen published in the past few decades. Judt takes him to task for the mediocrity he is and the numerous mistakes, omissions, and worthless excuses for arguments he makes (his more recent 'No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945' is no better). As well, 'What is Living and What is Dead in Social Democracy?' was a lecture Judt gave at New York University in 2009 that deals with issues we've recently witnessed revolving around debates about economics, private vs. public, the role of government, etc. Judt is very much of the opinion that what was done in the wake of the First and Second World Wars throughout Europe and America has slowly been undone since the Thatcher-Reagan era and has caused numerous problems for our society today, which will only continue to get worse. One argument discussed how corrupt and inefficient publicly run municipalities/works fail to improve when sold to private entities as these sales include large commissions for banks and are a result of selling at a loss. Additionally they are only approved when these private institutions are assured that in the case of their own failure the tax-payers will bare the burden while the private sector continues to reap any and all rewards. The numerous safety nets created by governments come at a price, one that we as a society should be happy to pay and to see that others take up a similar cause when we are in need and suffering. But in a society reared on 'An Army of One' that kind of mentality falls on deaf ears as 'crony capitalism' and 'greed' have created an imagine in people's minds where the government can do nothing right and corporations are people too. While these were the most interested pieces, I also found his stance on the issue of where this country was going after 9/11, the usefulness of the UN, and the use of torture worth reading as well.
While the above are some of the more interesting and poignant pieces offered, there are some weaknesses, at least in my opinion. The sections on Israel are rife with contempt for Israeli policies, whether deserved or not, but wholly omit the responsibilities of the other side in this equation. Judt makes it seem as if Israel has consistently held all the cards in the situation it has found itself in without any agency being given to the Palestinians or their various representatives, nor is any mention made of the numerous states that surround Israel and the role they have played when it comes to both Israeli security and the evolution of terrorism. Although this collection is entitled 'When The Facts Change' it seems that some facts do not change for Judt when it comes to Israel. Finally, much of the information presented is fascinating and one begins to crave more, but foot/endnotes are few (partly explained by the fact that these were, again, book reviews, essays and lectures). Even so, considering there was an editor to this collection, a greater number of citations could have resulted in a better resources for those interested in some of the topics discussed.
The review of Norman Davies's 'Europe: A History' is absolutely phenomenal. This is a hack of an historian who has received undeserved praise for reasons that I cannot even begin to fathom and yet his shoddy work is some of the worst drivel I've seen published in the past few decades. Judt takes him to task for the mediocrity he is and the numerous mistakes, omissions, and worthless excuses for arguments he makes (his more recent 'No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945' is no better). As well, 'What is Living and What is Dead in Social Democracy?' was a lecture Judt gave at New York University in 2009 that deals with issues we've recently witnessed revolving around debates about economics, private vs. public, the role of government, etc. Judt is very much of the opinion that what was done in the wake of the First and Second World Wars throughout Europe and America has slowly been undone since the Thatcher-Reagan era and has caused numerous problems for our society today, which will only continue to get worse. One argument discussed how corrupt and inefficient publicly run municipalities/works fail to improve when sold to private entities as these sales include large commissions for banks and are a result of selling at a loss. Additionally they are only approved when these private institutions are assured that in the case of their own failure the tax-payers will bare the burden while the private sector continues to reap any and all rewards. The numerous safety nets created by governments come at a price, one that we as a society should be happy to pay and to see that others take up a similar cause when we are in need and suffering. But in a society reared on 'An Army of One' that kind of mentality falls on deaf ears as 'crony capitalism' and 'greed' have created an imagine in people's minds where the government can do nothing right and corporations are people too. While these were the most interested pieces, I also found his stance on the issue of where this country was going after 9/11, the usefulness of the UN, and the use of torture worth reading as well.
While the above are some of the more interesting and poignant pieces offered, there are some weaknesses, at least in my opinion. The sections on Israel are rife with contempt for Israeli policies, whether deserved or not, but wholly omit the responsibilities of the other side in this equation. Judt makes it seem as if Israel has consistently held all the cards in the situation it has found itself in without any agency being given to the Palestinians or their various representatives, nor is any mention made of the numerous states that surround Israel and the role they have played when it comes to both Israeli security and the evolution of terrorism. Although this collection is entitled 'When The Facts Change' it seems that some facts do not change for Judt when it comes to Israel. Finally, much of the information presented is fascinating and one begins to crave more, but foot/endnotes are few (partly explained by the fact that these were, again, book reviews, essays and lectures). Even so, considering there was an editor to this collection, a greater number of citations could have resulted in a better resources for those interested in some of the topics discussed.
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Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary by Aleksei Isaev, Maksim Kolomiets, Stuart Britton (Translator)
"Tomb of the Panzwerwaffe" covers the actions of the last large-scale German offensive on the Eastern Front from January through March of 1945. The majority of this work is concentrated on the Soviet point of view but simultaneously there are reports, figures, and information that details the German side as well. Isaev and Kolomiets have put out multiple volumes on the Second World War in Russia and this collaborative effort is a great addition to any library on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. There is not much here in terms of eye-witness accounts as this is an operation and tactical account of the German attack to initially break through into besieged Budapest and then launch an attack against the Soviets around the area of Lake Balaton. The authors are critical of both sides and their actions when the need arises. Some archival information provided reveals the lack of readiness on the part of various Red Army formations but simultaneously there is also evident the high quality of actions undertaken by some units when the need appeared. Soviet forces had been through much and their knowledge and abilities can be seen in detail throughout these operations, whether creating anti-tank kill zones or utilizing dummy positions in order to steer German tanks into tank ambushes. One of the points the authors stress is the importance throughout these battles of anti-tank self-propelled artillery and artillery formations in general, it was their presence (in regiment, brigade, and division size) that stabilized much of the front with Red Army tank forces playing a secondary role, to a large extent.
While Kolomiets usually deals with a specific type of publication (photo heavy, oversized, and usually focuses on accounts of various battles or periods of the war) Isaev for the most part sticks to operational and strategic narratives in at times rather thick volumes. I'm not a big fan of numerous photos of knocked out or abandoned tanks, but in the case of this book they served a very important purpose. The Soviets marked each knocked out or abandoned tank, self-propelled gun, and half-track with markings and numbered them during this period. This makes it possible to track the damage inflicted on the Wehrmacht in operations around Lake Balaton and compare the knocked out and abandoned equipment left on the field of battle with the numbers claimed by both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in after-action reports. While the Red Army claimed some 324 tanks and self-propelled guns burned out with another 332 knocked out, as well as 120 half-tracks burned and 97 knocked out, the German claims were for 42 tanks and 1 halftrack listed as irrecoverably lost, with another 396 tanks and self-propelled guns and 228 halftracks in for short and long term repairs. Yet the pictures provided show a high number of at least 355, with most showing destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns (279 in total), thus the truth appears to be somewhere in the middle of Soviet claims and German reported figures. More so, there is also the question of the Germans listing armored vehicles in 'short term' and 'long term' repair, categories which initially mean at least a month out of service, if not more, and indefinitely (respectively). Additionally, categories can change over time, meaning a tank listed as in for short term repair can then be switched to long term and finally written off altogether. I will mention that the only real weakness I found here is the limited endnotes and the limited bibliography provided. Otherwise, this was a very interesting account of the final months of the war on the Eastern Front.
While Kolomiets usually deals with a specific type of publication (photo heavy, oversized, and usually focuses on accounts of various battles or periods of the war) Isaev for the most part sticks to operational and strategic narratives in at times rather thick volumes. I'm not a big fan of numerous photos of knocked out or abandoned tanks, but in the case of this book they served a very important purpose. The Soviets marked each knocked out or abandoned tank, self-propelled gun, and half-track with markings and numbered them during this period. This makes it possible to track the damage inflicted on the Wehrmacht in operations around Lake Balaton and compare the knocked out and abandoned equipment left on the field of battle with the numbers claimed by both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in after-action reports. While the Red Army claimed some 324 tanks and self-propelled guns burned out with another 332 knocked out, as well as 120 half-tracks burned and 97 knocked out, the German claims were for 42 tanks and 1 halftrack listed as irrecoverably lost, with another 396 tanks and self-propelled guns and 228 halftracks in for short and long term repairs. Yet the pictures provided show a high number of at least 355, with most showing destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns (279 in total), thus the truth appears to be somewhere in the middle of Soviet claims and German reported figures. More so, there is also the question of the Germans listing armored vehicles in 'short term' and 'long term' repair, categories which initially mean at least a month out of service, if not more, and indefinitely (respectively). Additionally, categories can change over time, meaning a tank listed as in for short term repair can then be switched to long term and finally written off altogether. I will mention that the only real weakness I found here is the limited endnotes and the limited bibliography provided. Otherwise, this was a very interesting account of the final months of the war on the Eastern Front.
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The Battle for Moscow by David Stahel
David Stahel's latest work, 'The Battle for Moscow', is somewhat removed from his previous volumes on this topic. This is his fourth book and it becomes evident that what was clearly visible on a majority of pages in his first three texts is missing from much of this latest effort. That is, there is a significant lack of tactical and operation descriptions of battles. At least one amazon reviewer has already commented on how disappointed they were to discover this. Yet, in this supposed 'weakness' lies the strength of Stahel's argument(s). The Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941 was a vaunted fighting force that managed to defeat and conquer most of Europe. The ensuing invasion of the Soviet Union showcased, on the surface, the Wehrmacht's military prowess operationally and on a tactical level as numerous encirclements and victories were achieved. Stahel outlines them all quite well (mainly in regards to Army Groups Center and South) in his previous volumes. That is, the Red Army lost hundreds of thousands in the encirclements at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, and finally at Viazma/Briansk. Yet, the narrative that concentrates on the victorious outcomes of those encirclements misses the forest for the trees.
Thus, 'The Battle for Moscow' is a somewhat different creature than Stahel's previous works because it highlights again and again the slow progress of the German Army in the latter half of Operation Typhoon throughout November and early December of 1941. There are no major battles, encirclements, or defeats of the Red Army because German forces were incapable of launching significant operations to achieve those defeats, and when a major city was taken, Rostov by Army Group South, it eventually had to be evacuated due to Red Army pressure and German inability to hold it. Stahel thus forces the reader to assume the physical and psychological state of the German Army through the numerous diaries, letters, memoirs, and battle reports that he quotes from. The exhaustion of German troops was palpable one very page as they became bogged down in the mud of early November while hoping for a sudden freeze to create conditions for an eventual lunge toward Moscow. And when that freeze did come it brought with it new obstacles that while facilitating one last push toward the Soviet capital also meant a whole new level of exhaustion, misery, disease and madness for countless soldiers.
Additionally, on more than one occasion Stahel draws the reader's attention to the genocidal nature of the war that Hitler unleashed against the Soviet Union and the complicity of the Wehrmacht in the numerous stages of the Holocaust and the deaths of millions of Soviet prisoners of war. One simply cannot discuss Operation Barbarossa or Typhoon without highlighting the numerous difficulties the Germans faced in the rear from Soviet partisans and how they treated the civilian population as the cold set in and they needed both clothing and dwellings to keep warm, which often meant stealing from the local population and displacing it to fend for themselves while appropriating their living quarters.
Finally, much of Stahel's concentration rests on the German commanders and their actions throughout November. Unlike many self-serving post-war memoirs, archival documentation from this period shows that generals like Bock, Guderian, Kluge, etc., had a choice in how they handled their troops and assignments. None were forced to go on the offensive, the majority of those decisions they took for themselves based on a variety of factors until their forces were simply beyond the means of, in some cases, even picking up their weapons. No German general was dismissed at this point (those dismissals would come after the Soviet counter-offensive commenced) and yet being on the frontline, knowing the situation their soldiers were facing, they continued to ignore the exhaustion of their troops, the limits of their mobility (lack of trucks, tanks, planes, etc.) and forced their depleted formations onto the offensive again and again. What was the end goal? Moscow was never supposed to be captured, but encirclement was no longer an option as the targets were far too distant for what the Wehrmacht could hope to accomplish in November or December. Thus, Stahel emphasizes the disconnect that existed between the goals of German commanders and the reality of what their forces could accomplish, with the final result being a situation that soon found exhausted and depleted German troops retreating in the face of a well-developed and planned Soviet counter-offensive.
Thus, 'The Battle for Moscow' is a somewhat different creature than Stahel's previous works because it highlights again and again the slow progress of the German Army in the latter half of Operation Typhoon throughout November and early December of 1941. There are no major battles, encirclements, or defeats of the Red Army because German forces were incapable of launching significant operations to achieve those defeats, and when a major city was taken, Rostov by Army Group South, it eventually had to be evacuated due to Red Army pressure and German inability to hold it. Stahel thus forces the reader to assume the physical and psychological state of the German Army through the numerous diaries, letters, memoirs, and battle reports that he quotes from. The exhaustion of German troops was palpable one very page as they became bogged down in the mud of early November while hoping for a sudden freeze to create conditions for an eventual lunge toward Moscow. And when that freeze did come it brought with it new obstacles that while facilitating one last push toward the Soviet capital also meant a whole new level of exhaustion, misery, disease and madness for countless soldiers.
Additionally, on more than one occasion Stahel draws the reader's attention to the genocidal nature of the war that Hitler unleashed against the Soviet Union and the complicity of the Wehrmacht in the numerous stages of the Holocaust and the deaths of millions of Soviet prisoners of war. One simply cannot discuss Operation Barbarossa or Typhoon without highlighting the numerous difficulties the Germans faced in the rear from Soviet partisans and how they treated the civilian population as the cold set in and they needed both clothing and dwellings to keep warm, which often meant stealing from the local population and displacing it to fend for themselves while appropriating their living quarters.
Finally, much of Stahel's concentration rests on the German commanders and their actions throughout November. Unlike many self-serving post-war memoirs, archival documentation from this period shows that generals like Bock, Guderian, Kluge, etc., had a choice in how they handled their troops and assignments. None were forced to go on the offensive, the majority of those decisions they took for themselves based on a variety of factors until their forces were simply beyond the means of, in some cases, even picking up their weapons. No German general was dismissed at this point (those dismissals would come after the Soviet counter-offensive commenced) and yet being on the frontline, knowing the situation their soldiers were facing, they continued to ignore the exhaustion of their troops, the limits of their mobility (lack of trucks, tanks, planes, etc.) and forced their depleted formations onto the offensive again and again. What was the end goal? Moscow was never supposed to be captured, but encirclement was no longer an option as the targets were far too distant for what the Wehrmacht could hope to accomplish in November or December. Thus, Stahel emphasizes the disconnect that existed between the goals of German commanders and the reality of what their forces could accomplish, with the final result being a situation that soon found exhausted and depleted German troops retreating in the face of a well-developed and planned Soviet counter-offensive.
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The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution by Dominic Lieven
This topic, in many respects, is my bread and butter. I'm a student of Soviet/Russian history and while I specialize in the Second World War, I've also done a fair amount of research on the First World War, including the lead up to the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1914. I had high hopes for a new treatment of the outbreak of the war from the Russian perspective, but Dominic Lieven promised much and delivered little, in my opinion. The subtitle, 'WWI & The Road to Revolution' is somewhat misleading. The lead up to the outbreak of the war takes up 312 of this 368 page tome. How can you fit in WWI and the Road to Revolution in some 50 pages?
The author's motives are understandable. There is a distinct lack of literature that concentrates on Russia on the eve and throughout the First World War when compared to the Western Allies or the Axis in Central Europe. Yet the war was begun because of what happened in Eastern Europe and the failure of the Entente to dictate a viable peace at the end of the war meant an environment that would create conditions for the outbreak of a Second World War, that much deadlier than the first. Thus, a concentration on Russia, who saw itself as a protector of the Balkan Slavs, is understandable and welcome. But this effort by Lieven leaves much to be desired. I'm fine with reading both popular history accounts or dry factual volumes that are minefields of little known information. While Lieven aims to be the latter, his writing style featuring thick descriptions of mundane events and minutia just put me to sleep. More so, the treatment of Russia and Russian figures takes center stage to the point where so many personalities are introduced that one simply loses all hope in trying to keep track of who is doing what, believes in what, and whether it matters how much influence they wield if they simply die off before 1914 even comes around. Putting so much onus on Russia and her "important decision makers" means many in the west are left out or are overlooked. Thus in some ways other nations are either reaction to Russian decisions/actions or are making them possible but their own agency seems to be absent. I wish I could say there are better alternatives out there for those seeking much of the information presented here but, again, there is a distinct lack of these studies where Russia is concerned. If you're able to get through this dense diplomatic history of Russia on the eve of war, I can only commend you.
The author's motives are understandable. There is a distinct lack of literature that concentrates on Russia on the eve and throughout the First World War when compared to the Western Allies or the Axis in Central Europe. Yet the war was begun because of what happened in Eastern Europe and the failure of the Entente to dictate a viable peace at the end of the war meant an environment that would create conditions for the outbreak of a Second World War, that much deadlier than the first. Thus, a concentration on Russia, who saw itself as a protector of the Balkan Slavs, is understandable and welcome. But this effort by Lieven leaves much to be desired. I'm fine with reading both popular history accounts or dry factual volumes that are minefields of little known information. While Lieven aims to be the latter, his writing style featuring thick descriptions of mundane events and minutia just put me to sleep. More so, the treatment of Russia and Russian figures takes center stage to the point where so many personalities are introduced that one simply loses all hope in trying to keep track of who is doing what, believes in what, and whether it matters how much influence they wield if they simply die off before 1914 even comes around. Putting so much onus on Russia and her "important decision makers" means many in the west are left out or are overlooked. Thus in some ways other nations are either reaction to Russian decisions/actions or are making them possible but their own agency seems to be absent. I wish I could say there are better alternatives out there for those seeking much of the information presented here but, again, there is a distinct lack of these studies where Russia is concerned. If you're able to get through this dense diplomatic history of Russia on the eve of war, I can only commend you.
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Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich by Jochen Hellbeck
Jochen Hellbeck's "Stalingrad" is a testament to how much we still don't know about the Eastern Front over 70 years after the war has ended. Within the Soviet Union a historical commission was created to chronicle the struggles of the Red Army and the Soviet Union during the war years, to create a history that well enough encompassed the courageous actions of men and women in the face of an enemy that few others were able to withstand, less so achieve victories against. Unfortunately, while much information was gathered by the historians of this commission, little of this rich material ever saw the light of day. Hellbeck, however, was given the ability and funding to be able to take numerous interviews from survivors of the Stalingrad battle and weave a compelling narrative about the endurance of the Red Army and the fighting for the city that bore Stalin's name. In many ways Stalingrad became a turning point in the war against Nazi Germany and while initially numerous Soviet publications appeared on the battle, including memoirs, readers must keep in mind (and many already know) that much of that literature was tainted by Soviet propaganda, rhetoric, and adhered to the whims of Soviet censors. Those histories and memoirs that appeared in the post-Soviet period are recollections that without doubt have been influenced by time (not to say that they should be dismissed, but simply treated with an understanding of their weaknesses and limitations). Thus, a work that encompasses written interviews with survivors of the battle mere days or weeks after the fact offer many advantages for those interested in this period and these events. Of course these accounts are tinged with ideology and Socialist cliches, but they are also rather candid about topics like German prisoners of war, cowardly behavior by some Red Army commanders, commissars and soldiers, as well Hellbeck offers a large number of endnotes that help guide the reader through many of the actions, units, and locations that are mentioned and also helps to showcase where readers can find discrepancies in accounts by the likes of Chuikov and Rodimtsev. Without a doubt this is a fascinating look at the Red Army and its struggle against the Germans at Stalingrad, the fierce nature of the fighting comes through these interviews on a regular basis and some of the descriptions of the courage and loyalty shown by Red Army troops are truly inspiring. This is a needed addition to Eastern Front literature and I can only hope that this rich archive is further explored and utilized by historians in the near future.
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Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning by Timothy Snyder
Timothy Snyder’s “Black Earth” offers a mixed bag for readers. Those familiar with the topic will undoubtedly find themselves making notes in the margins of practically every other page, while those new to the subject will be awed by what, at best, can be classified as historical “sound bites” or factoids. As such I have to admit that in places this book is very readable, much more so than your usual historical monograph on these topics. Snyder is a historian of Poland and it shows well enough as at the heart of “Black Earth” is not so much the Holocaust as is Poland. The problem is that putting Poland on a pedestal as Snyder so often does leaves a bad aftertaste. Although Poland participated in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (using the same ideas of self-determination that both Germany and the Soviet Union utilized during the Second World War) and had similar plans to the Germans in the mid-to-late 1930s in removing Jews from Polish territory, according to Snyder it wasn’t so bad. Polish citizens and institutions helped train Jewish Zionists to fight in Palestine against the British so that they could pave the way for a Jewish state and rid Poland, and, by extension, Europe, of its Jews sooner rather than later. The party in power in Poland in 1938 “announced its preference for the emigration of about 90 percent of Poland’s Jews” (59). But it’s not a big deal, as, according to Snyder, the leader of the party was married to a Jew. The real difference between the two, for Snyder, is that Germany eventually aimed for the “destruction” of states where Jews lived whereas Poland wanted to create a new state in the Middle East for Jews. But such a “sound bite” seemingly puts ideology as it would develop in Germany above everything else, the numerous exceptions made by Hitler in regards to decisions dealing with Jews and occupied territories, etc.
In more than one instance Snyder also seems to be working backwards, with hindsight in mind to make his arguments hold water. For instance, in discussing the creation of the first concentration camps in Germany he claims that “the concentration camps were training grounds for the more general SS mission beyond Germany: the destruction of states by racial institutions” (42). But such a claim means that Hitler knew exactly how the Second World War would unfold before it even began. Snyder also claims German plans for resettling Jews in Madagascar were equivalent to the “Final Solution” (76). Further examples of using hindsight would be Snyder’s discussion of Stalin wanting to “seize” the opportunity to destroy the Polish state, leaving out any discussion of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s, the more than two weeks spent by the Soviet Union after Germany invaded Poland in seeing how the western allies would react, or the threats made to the Soviet Union by Germany in regards to what they’d do with territories within the Soviet “sphere of influence” if the Red Army did not invade.
On numerous occasions Snyder shows a lack of knowledge or understanding for the Soviet position in either the 1930s or throughout the Second World War. Whether it’s Stalin “waiting for an alliance with Hitler,” for which no evidence is presented, or discussing the crisis over Czechoslovakia where he posits that the Soviet offer of help to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany would, in the end, have turned into some type of “truce with Germany that allowed it to take territory from Poland without having to engage the Germans” (92). I was not aware that “fantastical what if scenarios” were now the norm for historians. Snyder also makes the familiar claim that Soviet foreign minister Litvinov, a Jew, was dismissed and Molotov assumed his position just in time to make the non-aggression pact with Germany. Recent research by Geoffrey Roberts on Molotov suggests that the move had less to do with Litvinov being a Jew than his inability to make a coalition with the western allies work and Stalin wanted someone new to make a foreign policy move that would last.
Similar to a lack of any understanding in Soviet foreign policy is Snyder’s take on Hitler’s foreign policy. The claim is made that “Hitler was consciously provoking a European war, and would have taken it in whatever form it came.” (93) Is this why Hitler consistently said he would avoid conflict if the allies did anything to initiate a war when he remilitarized the Rhineland or when the Anschluss of Austria occurred? Is this the same Hitler who was surprised when Britain and France declared war over Poland? Worse was the statement that “Hitler understood the minutia of war; indeed he grasped its details far better than any other head of state and better than most of his generals.” (241) Once again, the sound bites are running the asylum. No real evidence or further explanations are offered for either that make sense.
When it comes to the Holocaust itself I am somewhat ambivalent about Snyder’s claims. Some of the arguments presented are comical: “people in Poland tended to hate those from whom they stole because they had stolen from them” (109). Sure. But at other times the analysis seems to go deeper and provide an interesting take on events that have been covered in so much detail already. One of the most important arguments for Snyder is his idea that the Holocaust was, in part, the creation of both the “east” and the “west” meeting in an area that was without coherent rule or institutional policies (143). That area is within the territories that were “doubly occupied” (he uses that phrase a lot) in what his previous book called the “Bloodlands.” In some ways it seems self-evident that when you introduce violence and anarchy, little if anything is off-limits. Thus I cannot say this is a revelation when it comes to the evolution of the Holocaust, more so because today more than ever many researchers are looking toward local collaboration and accomplices to the Holocaust. In many ways I would agree that the Holocaust would have been impossible to achieve without the numerous variables inherent in both the rise of Nazism within Germany after the Great Depression and the Treaty of Versailles, as well as its evolution on the Eastern Front, starting with the Einzatsgruppen and reserve police battalions leading the way for locals to help perpetrate the “Holocaust by Bullets” and eventually leading to gas vans, death camps and death marches.
Snyder’s look at the perpetrators themselves also offers a look at research on collaborators that’s already been done. Often it was the same men (and perhaps women) that offered their services to the institution or government in power and readily switched sides when those in power altered. Thus those who served the Soviets readily served the Nazis and then once more the Soviets. They worked within the German military and police institutions and did the same under the Soviets. They killed Polish or German “spies” under the auspices of the NKVD or Soviet partisans and Jews just as readily under the Nazis. The latter parts of this text offer a look at what happened to Jews in other states with the argument that those who deemed Jews “citizens” and where state institutions continued to exist, there the majority of Jews survived the war or at least had a better chance to survive the war. Finally, the second to last chapter looks at those who risked their lives to help Jews, mainly Poles (surprise!). There is no doubt that tens of thousands risked their lives to save Jews, and, in part, Poles make up the majority of those among the “Righteous” because there were so many Jews in Poland and because of the numerous connections and networks that intertwined both Poles and Jews. Neither takes away from the selfless actions of the many men and women that chose to go above and beyond what was expected and saved thousands of Jews throughout the war years (and not just in Poland). Snyder also provides numerous examples of diplomats throughout Europe (from countries like China, Japan, etc.,) doing their utmost in trying to get visas and passports for Jews to get them to safety. As they are the faces of state institutions, this once more supports Snyder’s larger argument(s).
In the end Snyder’s “Black Earth” is a nice popular history with the needed sound bites to make the general reader shake their head in agreement without actually understanding many of the intricacies at work. The topics Snyder covers, and forgets to cover, have volumes already written on them that offer much more in-depth analysis. But, unfortunately, they are not as well written or as accessible to the general public, for whom Snyder is writing.
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Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky: The Red Army's Gentleman Commander by Boris Sokolov (Author), Stuart Britton (Translator)
Boris Sokolov’s biography of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky is a noble effort to document the life and history of one of the most accomplished Soviet commanders to come out of the Second World War. The subtitle, “The Red Army’s Gentleman Commander,” serves multiple purposes as it immediately highlights that other Red Army commanders were “ungentlemanly” and it allows Sokolov to pontificate somewhat on a subject he covers in numerous publications – the true losses the Red Army suffered were much higher than those presented in published works. In general Sokolov’s biography walks a less than fine line between academic study and a polemical work. He takes a few too many literary licenses when he goes off on tangents here and there that have no place in a historical work but in a general sense this biography is still full of valuable information.
Sokolov discusses Rokossovsky’s history and youth in the first few chapters and covers his exploits in the Revolutionary/Civil War period. The most interesting parts of the book are those that cover Rokossovsky’s actions during the Second World War, or the Great Patriotic War. In part this is not the fault of Sokolov as there is little enough information available on Rokossovsky from his youth (Rokossovsky wanted to write about the Civil War but never had a chance). The majority of Rokossovsky’s major campaigns are covered by the author: his actions in 1941 and clashes with Zhukov, the Moscow Counteroffensive and his thoughts about what was done correctly and incorrectly, the operations around Stalingrad and Rokossovsky’s role in the destruction of the German Sixth Army, operation Kursk, operation Bagration, the Home Army’s Warsaw Uprising, and the final battles for Germany. Before continuing I will say that one of the weaknesses of this volume is that while there are many quotes (more so than western readers might be used to) and the author utilizes a range of archival documentation and published archival collections there is a distinct lack of endnotes/footnotes (something the original volume undoubtedly suffers from as well). Sokolov is in no way making this information up, as I have some of the collections he uses and can verify the information he presents in a few cases, but the problem remains in that this volume becomes problematic as a source. Furthermore, some of the source material is dated, unfortunately alternatives were/are hard to find.
Coming back to the text itself, the more interesting chapters were those on the Warsaw Uprising and the final battles/actions of the Red Army in Germany. Here is where Sokolov presents a wide variety of interesting and pertinent material but at the same time goes off on tangents and at times simply makes up statistics. The Warsaw Uprising is presented well enough with a lot of information provided from a number of eye witnesses (both Polish and Soviet) but primary source material is a bit sparse for the conclusions he makes. We know that Soviet forces suffered losses trying to reach Warsaw, with the 2nd Tank Army losing close to 1,000 tanks and having to be taken off the line. Similar attempts to by the 1stPolish Army resulted in losses for a variety of reasons but Sokolov insists on pointing toward Stalin as the cause. Even though orders were given to take Warsaw that’s not good enough, for Sokolov armies needed to be moved over to Rokossovsky’s front, supplies diverted, other operations cancelled and postponed, all to help the Poles in Warsaw. From an ethical standpoint, yes, everything should have been done to aid the Warsaw Uprising. Unfortunately reality dictated otherwise, the Poles were in an unenviable position and acted in their own best interests then relied on Stalin’s apparent good graces and that of the Red Army to support them in taking the capital of Poland to use as a bargaining chip against Stalin. They were asking for quite a bit from a man and armed forces they held in high contempt.
Finally, the chapter on the Red Army’s actions in Germany at the end of the war there are two arguments Sokolov expands on. First is the issue of losses in the battle of Berlin. He argues against the provided figure of 81,116 irrecoverable losses because in that figure are included losses for the two Polish armies that participated in the battle for the city. Irrecoverable losses for both armies were 2,825. Sokolov cites an “official” report from the Polish Defense Ministry that lists killed and missing in action as 11,000, almost four times as large a figure. What he does then is argue that since this figure is a quarter of the number presented by the Russians then all other losses during the Berlin operation should be multiplied by four. He utilizes the same argument in other places and I’m simply unconvinced. I appreciate coming across new information and presenting it (I appreciate it more if it includes a citation) but an extrapolation based on limited evidence is unacceptable for a historian or an academic publication. A similar argument is utilized when discussing the Red Army’s progress through Germany and Eastern Europe in terms of atrocities and rapes. There’s no doubt that Red Army soldiers, as well as soldiers from national contingents serving within the Red Army (Poles among them), committed atrocities against the Germans, including wholesale plunder, murder, and rape. Similar actions were committed when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the allies invaded Western Europe, or the Japanese invaded China. But to paint an entire armed forces with such a broad brush is unacceptable, at least in my opinion. In terms of degrees it might very well be that the Red Army’s occupation proved that much more detrimental than that of the allies, unfortunately qualifying some of the actions of Red Army soldiers will prove impossible. What Sokolov does well enough is present a variety of eye witness accounts to some of the actions that happened on the ground, but he offers little to nothing as explanation for why these criminal actions happened. Recently Filip Slaveski, in his “The Soviet Occupation of Germany,” offered an enlightening look at the Soviet occupation of Germany including the crimes committed. Sokolov aimed for emotions, Slaveski offers that and an attempt to explain what happened along with why.
As much as I appreciate Sokolov’s efforts, there are quite a few weaknesses here that make this far from a definitive study of either Rokossovsky’s life or his actions within the confines of the Second World War. In part this is a result of many archives still being closed off to research within the Russian Federation but I would also argue that Russian academic standards are still somewhat lacking when compared to their Western equivalents. Furthermore, while there are some excellent historians within Russia they are still working within a state that continues to view its present as a reflection of past accomplishments and shies away from attempts to take a closer look at its history for fear that a crack in the foundation will unravel a collection of myths better kept under a Potemkin village façade.
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The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin by Steven Lee Myers
"The New Tsar" is a good account of Putin's "Rise" and "Reign." Steven Lee Myers is a journalist and in many ways it shows throughout the text that what you're reading are almost extended journalistic pieces of famous events/personalities that made headlines in their time rather than in-depth historical coverage. Some of the topics covered in one or two chapters (Beslan, Kursk, Chechnia, Yukos affair, etc.) have entire volumes dedicated to them by historians and scholars that often do more justice to them than the space provided for here. Nonetheless, what Myers does well is congest a lot of information into a readable account, pretty much what journalists are paid to do. The majority of the text leans from unbiased to somewhat biased (against Russia/Putin), not that one can fault Myers, Putin and his time in office have witnessed numerous disasters, mysterious deaths, wars, the jailing of prominent members of Russian society, etc.
A more subjective approach, however, I think would have been helpful for western readers to gain a sense of where Putin and the many Russians who support him are coming from - even if their arguments are often laced with familiar propaganda. There is a lot to learn here for those somewhat familiar with the Russia of the post-Soviet period, those totally unfamiliar might get lost among the many names, places, and events that Myers goes over with, at times, the briefest of descriptions. Personally, I've long suspected that Putin's Russia is less so guided by ideology than by Geo-politics and economics, which often come into direct conflict with European and American organizations that appear to Russia as encroaching on her "spheres of influence."
Russia often appears to be the epitome of crony capitalism, the revolving door that we're so familiar with in the US (between corporations and political positions) is a given in Putin's administration, except it's more brazen than in the west. Embezzling, fraud, tax evasion, etc., are all prevalent within the Russian economy, but its fallout is usually much easier to spot than in the US where our economy and GDP dwarf Russia to enough of a degree that billions can be siphoned off and usually forgotten about within a matter of months if not weeks. It's as if Russia has taken the worst aspects of capitalism that exist in the US and around the world and applied them to the 10th degree. While some of Putin's early reforms helped raise the average Russian's economic situation in terms of buying power and savings, what has happened after that initial term in the early 2000s has been a policy of attempting to strengthen the state to the detriment of any and all "democratic" institutions that might have existed. This enriching of friends and focusing power within the hands of a "loyal entourage" means Putin becomes that much more frightened of what will happen once he's out of office. What he undid after Yeltsin stepped down is undoubtedly in the back of his mind and his losing power seems an impossibility in the near future as his popularity continues permeate much of the Russian population.
A more subjective approach, however, I think would have been helpful for western readers to gain a sense of where Putin and the many Russians who support him are coming from - even if their arguments are often laced with familiar propaganda. There is a lot to learn here for those somewhat familiar with the Russia of the post-Soviet period, those totally unfamiliar might get lost among the many names, places, and events that Myers goes over with, at times, the briefest of descriptions. Personally, I've long suspected that Putin's Russia is less so guided by ideology than by Geo-politics and economics, which often come into direct conflict with European and American organizations that appear to Russia as encroaching on her "spheres of influence."
Russia often appears to be the epitome of crony capitalism, the revolving door that we're so familiar with in the US (between corporations and political positions) is a given in Putin's administration, except it's more brazen than in the west. Embezzling, fraud, tax evasion, etc., are all prevalent within the Russian economy, but its fallout is usually much easier to spot than in the US where our economy and GDP dwarf Russia to enough of a degree that billions can be siphoned off and usually forgotten about within a matter of months if not weeks. It's as if Russia has taken the worst aspects of capitalism that exist in the US and around the world and applied them to the 10th degree. While some of Putin's early reforms helped raise the average Russian's economic situation in terms of buying power and savings, what has happened after that initial term in the early 2000s has been a policy of attempting to strengthen the state to the detriment of any and all "democratic" institutions that might have existed. This enriching of friends and focusing power within the hands of a "loyal entourage" means Putin becomes that much more frightened of what will happen once he's out of office. What he undid after Yeltsin stepped down is undoubtedly in the back of his mind and his losing power seems an impossibility in the near future as his popularity continues permeate much of the Russian population.
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The Battle of Moscow 1941-1942: The Red Army's Defensive Operations and Counter-offensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction Translated and Edited by Richard W. Harrison
The Soviet General Staff's study "The Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942" is in some ways essential reading. For those familiar with David Glantz's operational histories, much of this study reads similarly. There is no real narrative for the German side and the Stalinist narrative of the war that was crafted during the war itself is very much evident throughout the pages of this text. That is really, for this reader, the most important aspect of this volume. This is a glimpse into a historical document that shows what was allowed to be said and written about during Stalin's time in power, even in a confidential General Staff Study, and what had to go unmentioned.
There are some frank admissions made throughout in regards to Red Army weaknesses, both for the rank-and-file and in terms of commanding officers, which would undoubtedly be absent from any literature that was released on the war during Stalin's lifetime for the general public. But, for the most part, what you have here are pages of descriptions of defensive operations in the lead up to the Red Army's Moscow Counteroffensive, usually described under the umbrella term "active defense," and the ensuing counterattacks along the Moscow direction by a few fronts and the armies under their command. Attention is also paid to logistics, party work among soldiers, and some of the heroic acts performed by Red Army soldiers. Stalin's name is featured here more than any other, as would be expected in some respects, with the likes of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Dovator, Belov, and a few others making a rare appearance.
There are numerous tables offered for the sake of reference and some of them are quite eye opening, especially when it comes to the number of troops in divisions. There are a few mentions of the losses sustained by Red Army forces but numerous instances of German losses, which are undoubtedly inflated. Whether they were inflated by the authors of the study or the primary reports they were based off of is a separate question. Finally, I have often believed that Red Army forces operating on the Moscow direction were capable of inflicting a greater defeat on the Wehrmacht that what actually occurred in the winter of 1941/1942. In part I am still of that mindset but, in reading this volume and following the numerous maps and information included, I am also more aware of the difficulties Red Army forces encountered and the limits they were up against. In some ways this is a very important work but one that speaks more to its limits as a document created under Stalin than an analysis of the Battle of Moscow.
There are some frank admissions made throughout in regards to Red Army weaknesses, both for the rank-and-file and in terms of commanding officers, which would undoubtedly be absent from any literature that was released on the war during Stalin's lifetime for the general public. But, for the most part, what you have here are pages of descriptions of defensive operations in the lead up to the Red Army's Moscow Counteroffensive, usually described under the umbrella term "active defense," and the ensuing counterattacks along the Moscow direction by a few fronts and the armies under their command. Attention is also paid to logistics, party work among soldiers, and some of the heroic acts performed by Red Army soldiers. Stalin's name is featured here more than any other, as would be expected in some respects, with the likes of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Dovator, Belov, and a few others making a rare appearance.
There are numerous tables offered for the sake of reference and some of them are quite eye opening, especially when it comes to the number of troops in divisions. There are a few mentions of the losses sustained by Red Army forces but numerous instances of German losses, which are undoubtedly inflated. Whether they were inflated by the authors of the study or the primary reports they were based off of is a separate question. Finally, I have often believed that Red Army forces operating on the Moscow direction were capable of inflicting a greater defeat on the Wehrmacht that what actually occurred in the winter of 1941/1942. In part I am still of that mindset but, in reading this volume and following the numerous maps and information included, I am also more aware of the difficulties Red Army forces encountered and the limits they were up against. In some ways this is a very important work but one that speaks more to its limits as a document created under Stalin than an analysis of the Battle of Moscow.
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