WWII and other Book Reviews

Hans Schaufler's "Panzers on the Vistula" offers readers a look at some of the retreats the 4^th Panzer Division participated in during the final few months of the Second World War on the northern section of the Eastern Front – mainly through Latvia and East Prussia. Readers can experience the chaos of this final period of the war as German losses kept mounting as a result of repeated Soviet offensive operations and German counterattacks that aimed to restore some coherence to the front but all too often proved pointless. Schaufler’s account hits many of the usual Cold War clichés about the Second World War, Eastern Front, Soviet Union, and Red Army that one would one expect from a former soldier who took part in the fighting on the Eastern Front and was regularly exposed to German propaganda. Interestingly, at the same time that the author is calling out German reports as presenting a “totally false analysis” about the fighting situation on the Eastern Front, he himself offers a skewed look at the struggle against the Red Army.

Schaufler presents the German situation in January of 1945 as disastrous and doomed while claiming the only reason for the Wehrmacht to keep fighting “was to save the innocent victims of this senseless war from the vengeance of the Red Army…” Apparently, he’s forgotten that Germany began this “senseless war.” Even though the author realizes that German defensive actions are merely prolonging the inevitable, “even the dumbest long knew the war was long,” and himself question what the correct course of action is, he nonetheless claims that the civilian population, fearing the Red Army, “all sought protection from the German troops.” This idea of German troops continuing to put up resistance to help civilians flee from the Red Army to the west – along with the idea that to surrender would be perceived as cowardly by their comrades – is a constant theme that’s repeated by the author and others from whose reminiscences and articles he quotes throughout the book. In some respects, it isn’t surprising that soldiers came up with reasons to convince themselves that they needed to keep fighting rather than simply surrender to the Red Army. The excuse that they needed to buy time for civilians fleeing the Red Army presented their ultimate actions as those of soldiers protecting future victims rather than the last defenders of a regime that began a Second World War and a genocidal campaign against the Soviet Union.

Similarly, Soviet forces are represented by a “vast superiority in numbers,” another relic of Cold War rhetoric and German propaganda. At this late point in the war German casualties are telling. One of the strengths of this book are the rare times when the author shares the desperate situation German forces found themselves in as when a battalion’s combat strength was reduced to a mere twelve men and they were responsible for a twelve-kilometer sector of the front, an impossible assignment. Another interesting incident is recounted when a self-propelled gunner discusses how Red Army troops created two fake anti-tank gun positions in order to lure him into firing and give away his position. In the midst of the author’s descriptions of Soviet propaganda urging Red Army soldiers to “Kill the Germans!” the author admits that Soviet fighting troops deserved “credit” as “the overwhelming majority of them were humane.” But there is, unfortunately, no explanation of what specific behavior constituted “humane” or “inhumane,” although the latter is easier to imagine. The final chapters of the book deal with the different fates German survivors experienced in various prisoner of war camps, including those who were interned in Sweden and eventually handed over to the Soviets. Overall, this text offers a thought-provoking look at the final months of the war but readers should be aware of the author’s biases and try to put his words and actions, along with those he quotes, into the greater context of the Second World War and the overall experiences of its participants.

Germany's initial victories, both diplomatic and military, during the late 1930s and early 1940s have given rise to a few myths about how they were accomplished. Hitler is usually given credit for his ability to persuade and cajole Western leaders into stepping back from promises made in the immediate aftermath of the First World War as Germany's borders once more expanded to the detriment of her neighbors. However, when it comes to discussions about military achievements, it's usually the commanding generals and Field Marshals that receive the laurels of victory while Hitler suffers in the corner as the lowly corporal who couldn't keep his mouth shut and listen to his generals when they told him exactly what he should do.

In 'The First Soldier," Stephen G. Fritz revisits the many key decisions made by both Hitler and his commanders and attempts to contextualize how much influence each had on the other and on the final decision-making process that was visible on the ground. For Fritz, Hitler's victories have to be accepted alongside his failures. That is, Hitler's numerous diplomatic triumphs that many of his commanders often opposed were accomplished in spite of his generals. The decision to invade Poland and France was also made in the face of many nay-sayers and it was in many respects Hitler who pushed Manstein's plan for the invasion of France to the forefront, which ended in utter humiliation for the French and a victory no German general, or Hitler himself, could have predicted. The victory over France reinforced and reenergized Germany's commanders so that by the time Hitler wanted plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union there were no longer voices of disagreement to be heard. The final major accomplishment Fritz sees fit to assign to Hitler is the decision to issue the "stand fast" order of the winter of 1941/1942, which many German commanders themselves agreed was the correct choice of action.

Fritz shows that for the majority of the war Hitler leaned on and listened to his generals or was able to convince them of his ideas. In truth, both played off each other and used each other to accomplish their respective goals. To what extent were German victories a reflection of Hitler's genius is a question that's still too difficult to answer. The decision to invade Poland was based on the idea that at worst this would be a localized conflict with a partner in the form of the Soviet Union. That plan quickly came undone and the Western Allies declared war on Germany, which Hitler was not expecting or prepared for. France's quick defeat/surrender was as much a surprise to Hitler as it was to the Allies. The outcome was a combination of numerous factors, part of which was the decision to employ Manstein's plan - another example of Hitler and his commanders working together. The invasion of the Soviet Union, however, saw both Hitler and Halder interfere in numerous decisions that eventually resulted in defeat. But, as Fritz correctly points out, the invasion was doomed to failure from the very beginning because of flawed planning and intelligence. The decisions that followed the invasion of the Soviet Union only compounded the many inherent flaws of Operation Barbarossa. There was no way to achieve victory militarily, only politically, but any attempt to reach out to Stalin or the Western Allies to ask for peace was out of the question for Hitler.

As the war progressed Hitler's generals often worried about the obstacles before them and gave little thought to the greater geo-political landscape Hitler inhabited. Fritz argues convincingly that many of Hitler's decisions, up until the last days of the war, were made with political, diplomatic, military, and economic ideas in mind, whereas his generals had only need of more men, tanks, planes, and supplies to finish off the enemy standing before them. Both Hitler and his generals failed to take into account how the war they had unleashed on Europe and the world would play out strategically. Compounding their flaws on top of each other, Hitler and his commanders found themselves in a situation that few thought manageable toward victory as early as 1941. By contextualizing Hitler's decision making process, Fritz has shown first and foremost the flaws of the German commanders that surrounded Hitler. It wasn't that Hitler was unable to wage war successfully, it was that German commanders have left a legacy of memoirs that claimed that only they could. Their postwar accounts portrayed Hitler as a temperamental dilettante who refused to listen to reason, whereas in reality their flawed ideas revolving around military strategy, combined with Hitler's racist worldview, meant the Second World War was lost before it began.

There are a few different ways one can approach "Fur Volk und Fuhrer." Memoirs are usually self-serving and self-censored. Moreover, when written decades after the events in question, memories can change or be altered by encounters with others and by the influence of literature/media and contemporary events. Thus readers should take what's written on these pages with a grain of salt. However, having read dozens if not hundreds of memoirs on the Second World War, especially the Eastern Front, there's much here that I found fascinating, including Bartmann's interactions with locals (French, Soviet, and German), the animosity that existed between the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, as well as some of his descriptions of combat operations. However, there are also episodes that I would question in terms of authenticity.

Having said the above, Erwin Bartmann's memoirs read more like a number of separate and loosely connected vignettes of his time in the 1st Panzer SS Division Leibstandarte. He discusses his childhood in Berlin, the street brawls he witnessed between Communists and Nazi Brown Shirts, and Hitler's eventual seizure of power. After volunteering to serve in Hitler's Bodyguard unit, he is initially denied the chance and then receives an opportunity thanks to the timely intervention of Heinrich Himmler. After undergoing training he is deployed to the Eastern Front where he experiences most of his time in combat. The descriptions of combat against the Red Army resemble many other available German Army memoirs. The Red Army is viewed as a faceless mass full of soldiers who torture and mutilate any German (including the wounded) they can get their hands on, while the author and his comrades fight a clean war as they attempt to save Europe from the Bolshevik hordes. After an initial stint on the Eastern Front Bartmann's division is relocated to France for rest and eventually find themselves once more on the Eastern Front, first fighting in Kharkov after the encirclement of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad, and then at Kursk, where the author is wounded fighting around Prokhorovka. That wound pretty much puts him out of action for the duration of the war as he attempts to heal and then is put in charge of training machine gunners. By April 1945, Bartmann finds himself stationed close to Berlin and undertakes a meandering trip to escape the advancing Red Army with some of the recruits he's been training. He eventually finds his way over the Elbe and is caught by Western Allied forces.

In general, this is an author who looks back on the Second World War as a nostalgic time that he spent having sex with numerous women (which he discusses on multiple occasions) and forging close bonds of comradeship while fighting in the ranks of what eventually became the 1st SS Panzer Division, an elite unit with a rich history of battles throughout the Second World War. He readily believed in Hitler's cause and by the end of the book admits that if given a second chance at life he would not change any of his actions. While he acknowledges the genocidal regime that was Nazi Germany, to then admit that he would once more fight for a nation that started a World War and went on to kill millions of men, women, and children sounds like someone who has yet to learn from history or his own actions.

Hans Rehfeldt, a mortarman in the Grossdeutschland Regiment, then division, uses his wartime diaries as a foundation for this 'memoir.' Most of the text reads like diary entries but there are a few instances of foreshadowing that make it evident the author has made additions to the text. Having read quite a few WWII memoirs (mainly German and Soviet) this volume is best for those with an intimate knowledge of the Eastern Front. Many of the entries focus on mundane activities but there are also more than enough examples of the type of fighting the Wehrmacht encountered on the Eastern Front.

Rehfeldt participated in some of the most well-known and bloodiest engagements that occurred during the Soviet-German encounter. He first found himself fighting outside Tula in the winter of 1941, the city was Guderian's target and one step too far for his Panzer Group. Rehfeldt documents the fighting he experienced in the lead up to the Soviet counteroffensive in December of 1941 and the ensuing retreat in terrible winter conditions. By early 1942, the author is continually suffering from wounds sustained from frostbite and his battalion is eventually disbanded due to the heavy casualties it sustained. After recovering, Rehfeldt participates in battles on the Don and outside Rzhev as well as in the retaking of Kharkov and then the Kursk offensive.

There is no lack of action, and some of the included maps created by Rehfeldt himself will help readers understand some of the situations he found himself in. The photos (dozens of them) included are also a nice addition. Where the book suffers is from a lack of maps that would help track the progress and movements of the author's battalion/regiment/division. Without these maps much of the actions the author is involved in become hard to track or contextualize. An additional weakness is a lack of self-reflection, something many memoirs contain but which authors undoubtedly don't have time for when keeping a diary at the front and when they constantly find themselves in the midst of battle. Otherwise, this is a fairly detailed and informative account of a soldier who found himself on the Eastern Front.

"Soviet Cavalry Operations During the Second World War" is self-explanatory in terms of what this volume offers readers. Without a doubt the Red Army employed cavalry formations to a larger degree than any other combatant throughout the Second World War. Considering the size and geography of the Eastern Front, the Soviets were presented with a variety of favorable opportunities to utilize their cavalry formations since the first days of the war. John Harrel has done a commendable job in putting together a readable synthesis of many of these operations, showing both the reasons for their successes and failures, and providing a brief analysis of their impact on Germany's ability to wage war and how the Red Army was able to utilize the forces and strengths at their disposal after suffering horrendous losses throughout the first few years of the war. From initially using cavalry divisions and corps as raiding forces in German rear areas, to the creation of cavalry-mechanized groups that became essential in breakthrough and exploitation operations, the Red Army's cavalry arm deserves our attention and respect considering how much they were able to accomplish under the circumstances they found themselves facing.

While there is much to laud about this effort, there are numerous weaknesses present throughout the volume as well. This is partly understandable as the author does not speak Russian, is unfamiliar with Soviet/Russian sources, and had to consistently rely on older literature or recently translated volumes. As a result, much of the material here is rehashed from other secondary sources. Furthermore, because the author is not an historian, there is a lack of context offered with respect to some of the literature (author bias, readily evident when it comes to Soviet/German memoirs) and battles/engagements. As well, there is at times not enough analysis provided at the end of chapters about what the larger take-away from the events just described should be for the reader. Finally, the greatest weakness of the volume are the numerous spelling errors throughout, the publisher should have proofread this volume as constant mistakes and misspellings take much away from the reading experience.

Although there are many memoirs detailing the German experience in the Second World War, few are written by tankers who served in Tiger Battalions. Tiger I and II tanks were produced in limited numbers but they consistently made their presence felt on the battlefield and memoir literature from both the Eastern and Western Fronts attest to that fact. Thus, 'Panzer Ace' is a welcome addition to German memoir literature, although it comes with a few caveats (as most memoirs do). Richard Freiherr von Rosen began his service on a Pz III and was wounded soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. After recovering, he joined the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion, which initially fielded Tiger tanks and by the end of the war included King Tigers as well. He participated in the Battle of Kursk, a few Western Front operations after D-Day, and finished the war once again on the Eastern Front, fighting in and around Hungary with Tiger and King Tiger tanks as a company commander.

The strengths of these memoirs are in the day-to-day actions the author describes. Fighting as a tanker meant daily actions needed to be taken to keep the tanks running by the crew and that involved a lot of effort, especially on the Eastern Front. For example, Pz III air-cooled engines meant the dust from Soviet roads were a regular problem and tanks required constant repairs and maintenance, while heavy German tanks were constantly becoming stuck in mud, breaking bridges, and needed to be loaded onto trains so as to conserve their engines and fuel on a regular basis. Additionally, as a company commander the author was in charge of dozens of men and his platoons and company was regularly detached from and attached to various units serving in the role of a fire brigade to put our fires at various parts of the frontline. Finally, while the author has much praise for his tankers, he is not above criticizing poor German command decisions, especially in the latter part of the war, or praising Red Army forces, also in the latter part of the war. While Tiger tanks were a fearsome opponent, by the close of the war they were facing formidable Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery that regularly took a toll on the author's unit and German tanks in general.

While the strengths are many, there are also quite a few weaknesses. The author saw some fighting but he was wounded five times and that means he missed a large portion of the fighting on both fronts. The volume is large but about half the pages consist of photos of tanks and the author's comrades from the various units he served in. They are all interesting, especially those made as part of a propaganda reel, but the size of the volume is somewhat deceptive. Finally, although the author claims he was unaware of the genocidal nature of Hitler's war on the Eastern Front, or the evolution of the Holocaust in general throughout Europe, he has few qualms about participating in the Second World War, killing allied troops, or helping German forces wage war in general. Overall, the author comes across as someone proud of his service in the name of the Third Reich but regrets that Hitler's name is attached to that time period.

This volume is a perfect example of how you should not write a book. The author is not a trained historian and, like many other Russians that have taken an interest in the Second World War, he's happy to go digging through memoirs, secondary literature, and published primary source collections (sometimes even visiting the archives themselves) and put everything he has discovered on paper. The end result is page after page of reference material, tables, charts, photos, and limited biographies of mentioned officers/commanders that should have been put into an appendix or two. Not doing so takes away from the reading experience and bogs down readers in needless details which the author should be synthesizing and contextualizing into a cohesive narrative.

This volume that should have taken up no more than 100 pages of text to describe the condition of the Soviet Air Force located in the Baltics followed by another 200 or so pages of reports, observations, combat accounts, biographies, and photographs/maps. Readers will have to do a lot of hunting to find the various gems that this text contains and, to be honest, it isn't always worth it. This is, at best, a missed opportunity, and, at worst, a waste of time for those without a solid background on the Soviet Union and the Second World War.

Alexey Isaev is a well-known author/researcher among Russians and I'm glad to see that more of his work is being translated into English. For those who might be asking the question, do we really need another book on Stalingrad? The answer is a hesitant...yes. Much of the information that readers will find here is not available anywhere else in Western literature. For that reason alone, this is in many ways a needed addition to the history of one of the most consequential battles on the Eastern Front.

Isaev's work is a dense operational history akin to what David Glantz usually puts out, except Isaev relies more heavily on Soviet/Russian archival information which means he's able to give more detail at a lower level (regiments and battalions) than what Glantz usually covers (divisions and corps). Having as much detailed information as is presented here continually helps put the various phases of the Sixth Army's advance on and into Stalingrad, and Soviet attempts to stem the German offensive, into a better and more critical context. This is in part a result of Isaev utilizing German and Western source material as well as Russian. The pictures he paints on the approaches to Stalingrad is that of Soviet forces operating at a consistent disadvantage due to a lack in artillery, experience in combined arms operations, and relatively newly created units and trained formations and recruits who could not match up to their German counterparts. The end result featured Wehrmacht forces constantly encountering new Soviet formations (in part a rehashing of 1941) that slowly bleed German divisions. Continued operations in urban combat only worsened German positions in and around the city.

While Isaev tries to address some of the 'myths' and 'legends' that have accumulated over time, that information is less interesting than the overall narrative of how this battle unfolded and the desperation of the engagements that continuously took place. Regiments that were to number over a thousand men were regularly reduced to a few hundred or dozen within a matter of days. Unfortunately, there is not much eye-witness testimony about the fighting, which would have added a lot of value to this volume, but what Isaev has done is showcase the chaotic and complicated nature not just of the fighting that happened in the city, but on its approaches and on its flanks as well.

Minor weaknesses in the volume include typos and at times a lack of citations. Overall though, compared to many other Russian volumes, Isaev does cite his sources, which is a tremendous help for researchers and academics. A very much recommended volume if you can deal with dense operational histories from the Eastern Front.

In numerous ways 1941 continues to remain an enigma for historians and World War II experts. Authors like David Glantz and, more recently, David Stahel, have employed archival collections previously underutilized, or at times never consulted, to create a more nuanced narrative of Germany's plans and eventual invasion of the Soviet Union and Stalin and the Red Army's response, or lack thereof. Both authors offer illuminating commentary and add something to the canon of literature on the conflict that engulfed the Eastern Front as two dictators poured all of their resources, sooner or later, onto the field of battle. Glantz revolutionized how the Red Army has been portrayed over the past few decades, giving a face and name to a previously faceless mass that appeared as a cast of supporting characters in a German dominated narrative of the fighting on the Eastern Front, while Stahel has made readers question German planning and achievements, putting into a new light the numerous obstacles that existed for German forces before the first soldier even set foot on Soviet soil. "The First Day on the Eastern Front," unlike the works of the previously mentioned historians, adds little to nothing to our understanding of the war on the Eastern Front. Much of the territory covered has been previously written about and there are no new insights, ideas, or revelations about the German-Soviet conflict. For those interested in a rehashing of already available information, including citations from David Irving and Paul Carell, a Holocaust denier and a German propagandist, you'll find it here. The author has simply assembled a large collection of unit histories, memoirs/recollections that touch on the June 22, 1941, some biographical sketches of the main commanding officers from both sides, and added a minimum of context with no real exploration for why any of this information is important or how it alters our understanding of what happened during the invasion. Sorry to say that those familiar with the Easter Front will find nothing new or original in these pages.

Niklas Zetterling has written a few volumes on the Second World War and most, if not all, of them rely on some type of combat effectiveness analysis. Whether it's looking at the Battle of Kursk or the allies fighting in Normandy, the author consistently relies on the numbers to do the talking. Such an analysis can be a very helpful companion to the other literature that is available on these popular and important topics. In the case of "Normandy 1944," Zetterling makes it a point to address some of the myths that have been built up over time with respect to the allied war effort and the German performance in France. Allied air superiority, while acknowledged by both sides as impactful on the war overall, Zetterling argues had a limited impact on German forces overall but did impede the movement of troops and materials due to damage inflicted on the French railways. Similarly, allied manpower and material superiority was very much evident within a matter of weeks if not days compared to their German counterparts. In fact, the allies overall enjoyed a better force ratio against German forces in France than the Soviets did against Army Group Center during Operation Bagration. When tackling these topics, Zetterling relies on German archival documentation and makes a compelling case for a need to rely on primary source material rather than simply trust secondary source literature, even if written by acclaimed historians, scholars, or journalists. However, a reliance on numbers, figures, and statistics, can also make one miss the forest for the trees. In one instance, when discussing combat effectiveness, Zetterling asserts the Germans continually performed better than the allies, both on the defense and the offensive. As one example, he uses the Battle of Kursk, where the Germans were on the offensive and sustained fewer casualties than the Soviets, who were on the defensive (thus invalidating the usual idea that the defender will take fewer casualties than the attacker). What Zetterling fails to mention is that the Soviet defense consisted of numerous counterattacks throughout the 'defensive' phase of the battle, hence the meeting engagement at Prokhorovka. While such a minor issue can be overlooked, it does point to the inherent limits of these type of studies, which rely on dry numbers and statistics and can at times fail to take into account extenuating circumstances or the greater context of the event(s) in question. Consequently, as the author states, this is a starting point for a better understanding of the Normandy campaign and a worthwhile contribution to WWII literature. However, while it's filled with interesting information that in some ways recasts our understanding of the allied invasion of France, more research remains to be done for a fuller understanding of the events in question.

I'm glad to see this book being reprinted as it's probably one of the better memoirs written about the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Having read hundreds of histories about the war on the Eastern Front and dozens of memoirs from both sides, Dr. Heinrich Haape offers an original look at the German advance into the Soviet Union through the eyes of a medical doctor - one who was not above taking up a weapon and engaging the enemy in combat. This memoir was written in the 1950s, which means the author was not far removed from the events he's describing. Some of the exchanges and descriptions are quite detailed, so I'm sure there's some literary flair, but the majority of the text reads true enough to the events on the ground as we've come to know them.

The strength of the volume is undoubtedly some of the candidate conversations the author has with his comrades and reflections on German leadership and generalship. The battles the author participated in are also well described and really bring to life the hardships suffered by soldiers on a regular basis, especially since you're hearing about it from a doctor who has insights into the various ailments that we rarely hear about.

However, readers should also approach these memoirs understanding the time they were written in as well as the context. As with most German memoirs about actions on the Eastern Front, there is limited, if any, mention of the genocidal campaign that was being waged at the same time in the rear against the local population. There are some hints about what was happening but the author does not explore those issues in any type of meaningful way, as if what happened in the rear had no impact on the frontlines. Similarly, Soviet forces are too often faceless hordes. Although Haape does discuss the various prisoners of war he took under his direction to help with both German and Soviet wounded and some of the interactions he had with the locals, the focus, understandably, is on the German war experience. This is an understandable deficiency and one that many memoirs share, but it's important to keep in mind when understanding the value of these memoirs.

Operation Bagration was one of the Red Army's most successful offensive operations during the Second World War. Germany's Army Group Center was devastated as Red Army forces created one encirclement after another and advanced as far as the gates of Warsaw from the beginning of the offensive on June 22 through late July, in many ways this advance matched Germany's initial invasion of the Soviet Union.

Claus Neuber, part of Army Group Center, was caught up in the Minsk encirclement and managed to escape. He initially made his way to the west with a group of soldiers until they were surrounded and taken prisoner. After escaping with a comrade, Neuber eventually made it to German lines and served out the rest of the war on the Western Front, where he was taken prisoner by US forces.

Those who expect a look at the military aspects of Operation Bagration from the German point of view will not find much here. The vast majority of these reminiscences discuss the author's travels behind enemy lines as he tries to find the new frontline, which continues to move forward as Soviet forces speed their way as far west as possible. In many ways this travelogue is reduced to a day-by-day account of how the author hid in the forest or, if lucky, barns, and asked for food from random farms/locals he encountered along the way. The fact that so many were able to help him impressed him but hardly made him rethink the reason he was located on the Eastern Front fighting a losing war. There is no introspection or discussion of the German war experience, the genocidal nature of the war on the Eastern Front, the abilities of the Red Army of 1944, which is making rather large strides and taking tens of thousands of prisoners, or a discussion of the German Army's complicity in the holocaust, etc. Rather, what we have here is a soldier caught in an encirclement trying to make his way to his comrades. The biggest value this volume has is showing what kind of obstacles stood in the way of those who tried to get back to their own frontlines in the wake of Operation Bagration, and how much help locals were able to offer random Wehrmacht soldiers, which raises additional questions, but that's about it.

This is a volume that doesn't necessarily fit any particular category. It isn't a biography, it isn't a traditional historical monograph, nor is it a scholarly treatment of any one subject/topic/theme. Rather, this appears to be an author interested in the Second World War, Germany, aviation, and the Luftwaffe. Mix those topics together, insert some 'popular history,' and you get 'Black Tulip.' The author touches on subjects ranging from the Hitler Youth, the Luftwaffe, the place of aviation in 1930s society (mainly Germany and the Soviet Union), German POWs in the Soviet Union, reintegration into German society for POWs in the postwar period, and some of the myths that have developed over time when it comes to German victim-hood and the Wehrmacht. Placing Hartmann in the midst of all these events/developments, interspersed with the author's proclivity for relying on literary flair, leaves the reader with little in the way of contextual analysis or anything beyond a superficial reading of any of the aforementioned topics. Moreover, the bibliography is limited as is the space each of these rather significant topics have devoted to them, not to mention a total lack of original research and in a few instances references to works by John Moiser, an English professor with an inability to grasp how to research or write history. The bottom line is that if you're interested in any of the above mentioned topics, including Hartmann, there are numerous books devoted to each that will provide much more value for your time and money than this volume. If you want a limited and 'popular' look at something that has to do with the Second World War, German fighter pilots, and Germany, then this is the book for you.

Eric Lee's "Night of the Bayonets" attempts to cover the uprising on Texel Island by a battalion from the Georgian Legion. In April 1945 some 800 Georgians turned on the Germans, massacred several hundred in the night with knives and bayonets, and went on to continue resisting German attacks and searches until the end of May, by which time some 228 men were able to survive.

The first time I came across any references to this incident was in Michael Jones's "After Hitler." I was fascinated to learn that such an incident occurred and more so that many of these men were not punished like many others who were handed over by the Western Allies to the Soviet Union at the end of the war. Why some or all of them were able to escape severe punishment that many others who served in the Wehrmacht suffered is still a question without an adequate answer.

"Night of the Bayonets" is a slim volume and most of it does not directly deal with the revolt. Lee does a good job with the source material available to him, but it's limited. He touches on the history of Georgia, its relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, the role of the Communist Party, Operation Barbarossa, treatment of Soviet POWs, the Georgian Battalion's relations with the Dutch on Texel, and numerous other topics to help set the stage for what would happen in April and May of 1945. But he devotes limited space to each of these topics as is evidenced by the rather small source base. The uprising itself is covered in about 40 pages.

One of the strengths, however, is that Lee correctly directs the reader's attention to the contested memories that resulted from this event. German, Dutch, and Georgian memories all differ in terms of what happened, who was responsible for the many deaths of civilians that became inevitable once the Germans began to fight the Georgians, and why the uprising began in the first place. Each participant has altered, for their own needs, what happened, how they want to represent themselves, their actions, and those of their comrades, complicating an already complex set of facts. But, that's a perfect example of the continuing reverberations of the Second World War.

All in all, this is an interesting book but one that really serves as an introduction to a little-known event on a little Dutch Island.

This is the second half of the author's diary/memoirs, covering actions in the latter part of WWII as the Wehrmacht retreated from occupied Soviet territory, through Hungary, the Baltic states, and into Prussia. Much of these entries follow the same pattern as those in the first volume, there's plenty of action, a lot of mundane information, and every now and then some insightful commentary on the Wehrmacht, the Eastern Front, and Nazi Germany.

True to form for a soldier serving in a vaunted German Army formation, the author consistently praises German actions on the field of battle and belittles his Red Army counterparts. German troops inevitably outperform their Soviet counterparts on the field of battle but inevitably need to retreat. Red Army troops are the usual 'faceless mass' and there is little discussion of atrocities or the ongoing holocaust, although at one point reference is made to the execution of prisoners of war. As the diary unfolds, the chaos of the battlefield, unplanned retreats, and mentions of anticipated 'wonder' weapons are regularly described and discussed.

Readers that pay particular attention to these entries will notice the constant attention to enemy mortar and artillery fire. This is partly understandable as the author was a mortarman, but it also shows that many of the casualties his unit sustained came from the consistent pressure Soviet forces put on German troops with their artillery and mortars, something that's often left out of memoirs that deal with higher level officers/generals, but is front and center here. Additionally, one of the more interesting aspects of this volume are the many photos of propaganda leaflets by both the Soviets and Germans, trying to entice the other to surrender. Although they are not fully translated, those with images are worth studying for they do and don't say.

Overall, these aren't the 'best' memoirs I've read when it comes to the Eastern Front, but as with practically every other primary source account, there's always something interesting to be found in these pages that enhances our understanding of the war on the Eastern Front.

Valeriy Zamulin has made a name for himself in his histories relating to the Battle of Kursk in both Russian and now English. His work, although devoted to just this one crucial battle on the Eastern Front, offers a taste of what is often missing from both general and specific studies when it comes to the Eastern Front. He is able to utilize archival information in both the US and Russia related, respectively, to German and Soviet units, and offer an in-depth discussion that contextualizes and offers a critical analysis of actions undertaken by both sides. Usually historians are limited to just one set of documents and, for westerners, Russian ministry of defense archives are almost always off-limits. So Zamulin's contributions are very much welcome, but more so, they are a lens into discussions rarely found even in Soviet/Russian publications.

This specific text deals with, as the subtitle makes clear, controversial and neglected aspects of the Battle of Kursk. Personally, the most interesting chapter was the first, which dealt with the historiography of the battle during the Soviet period and into the post-Soviet period. Detailing how Soviet historians, official histories, and veteran high-ranking officers attempted to both describe the battle and their roles in it is just as, if not more interesting, than chapters detailing the battle itself. The Battle of Kursk proved a contested engagement where reputations were made and sustained but also gave voice to numerous myths that continue to haunt the pages of histories up to the present. Zamulin details much of that process and traces where some of these myths began and how they were sustained. Although the writing itself is not the most engaging or readable, in part due to Zamulin's prose, but the information is worth its weight in gold.

The same can be said for the numerous chapters that make up this volume. They include a discussion of the preemptive artillery bombardment and its impact on German forces, what intelligence Soviet units acquired on the eve of the offensive from deserters, why did Rokossovsky's Central Front have a seemingly easier time stopping German forces than Vatutin's Voronezh Front, and a critical look at some Soviet units and their commanders to try to explain the numerous difficulties they encountered 'behind the curtain.' These and the other chapters offer western readers a look at aspects of the Eastern Front that are rarely examined in popular histories or even operational studies as historians and scholars simply do not have the access to the archival material that Zamulin does. He is able to critically analyze both sides and offer worthwhile commentary that helps explain the situation both German and Soviet units found themselves in, including their strengths and weaknesses, and is happy to dispel myths and legends whenever he runs across them. This is a highly recommended volume for all of those interested in the Battle of Kursk or the Eastern Front in general.

This slim volume covers the history of a Wehrmacht veteran who served in the 132nd Infantry Division. However, the actual author of this volume is the veteran's son, Arno Sauer, yet there is no delineation between where the author's thoughts and ideas can be separated from that of his father. Although written as a memoir, a few of the chapters have discussions of events that no soldier would have known were happening because of their all-too-understandable myopic view of the battlefield in front of them and their immediate surroundings. Discussions of other army groups, the Battle of the Atlantic, etc., are all made from hindsight and it's difficult to know what the author's father actually thought about these larger events during the war itself rather than looking back on those events. Moreover, no sources are presented for the larger history being offered to readers. For this reason this volume is not very useful for scholars but for those who are casual readers of the Second World War interested in another memoir about the Eastern Front, this isn't a bad choice.

There are some minor mistakes throughout as when the author writes the 132nd Infantry Division was in Army Group Center yet operating in the Crimea, but in other parts of the book he correctly mentions Army Group South and later Army Group North as the division was transferred there after the defeat of the Red Army at Sevastopol.

Much of what is related here rings authentic and true. The author discusses interactions with locals on the Eastern Front, cases of rape by both the Wehrmacht and Red Army, the inevitable disappearance of Jews from his hometown, the propaganda of Ilia Ehrenburg, and the usual suicidal charges by Red Army soldiers, which in essence are difficult to believe and might show a confluence of individual memory and collective memory. How much of a threat could apparently drunk, unarmed soldiers present? Is this really the enemy the vaunted Wehrmacht lost a war to?

Finally, the author somewhat plays up the victimhood of the German people, his comrades, family, and himself. While he somewhat mentions the holocaust there is little credence given to the idea that this was something for which responsibility should be assigned to those beyond Hitler and his inner circle. He removes agency from himself and those around him as if they were mere automatons fulfilling orders and unable to do anything to oppose those in power. This is undoubtedly an expression of German victimhood once more coming to the forefront, which is not unexpected. According to the author the German people hardly wanted war. And yet they unleashed a war of annihilation anyway and killed millions in the process. Somehow the two don't add up.

Herbert Maeger's "Lost Honour, Betrayed Loyalty" documents his experiences as a soldier in what would become the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division. I have little question about the authenticity of the account but there is still the question of whether the author was forced into volunteering for the Waffen SS or if he did so out of his own volition and then needed an excuse at the end of the war. Taking the author at his word, he found himself in a poor position and, after being threatened, he decided to volunteer and ended up in the service of the vaunted Waffen SS.

Maeger spent the majority of the war with the 1st SS Division on the Eastern Front and Italy. After being wounded he was able to take medical courses and eventually served in the 36th Waffen SS Division, commanded by Oskar Dirlewanger, a rather infamous unit made up of criminals which was often utilized in anti-partisan operations. Finally, the last section of these memoirs ring quite authentic with the author attempting his best to outrun the Red Army and break out to the west in the chaotic final days of the Third Reich.

While Maeger spent some time on the frontlines, most of the time he was involved in rear area operations as a driver and then working with the wounded in the rear. Those eager for frontline action will get some of that here, but more often this is a memoir of someone doing their best to survive and live to see the next day or, at best, the end of the war. What is interesting, if, again, we take the author at his word, is that the Waffen SS seems to have begun taking in 'volunteers' as early as 1941. These were not necessarily model Aryan Germans and it isn't that only the 'foreign' Waffen SS divisions that accepted these volunteers, some, or even many, could be found in the more 'famous' formations.

Throughout the memoirs the usual mention is made of German's shooting POWs out of hand but the author wants to make clear that he believes these were isolated incidents and not indicative of what we today know as a regular policy among both the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht in general. There is also an interesting incident recounted about a German officer admitting the Euthenasia campaign that was waged against the mentally handicapped, which the author and a few other SS soldiers opposed (verbally). With respect to the Holocaust, however, there is little to no mention and, on the contrary, the author plays up his positive interactions with civilians in Soviet territory and curses the leadership of the Third Reich for 'betraying' its soldiers and starting a war they were unprepared for.

There is no question that these memoirs are self-serving and undoubtedly contain a grain of self-censorship, but we can say that about any memoir. There's much here of value to those interested in the Eastern Front, the Waffen SS, and the Second World War in general.

"Churchill and Stalin" offers a limited but enlightening look at the relationship between the leaders of the British Empire and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The initial 70 pages outline in broad strokes the progress of their relationship, from the eve of the war, through the German invasion of Poland and France, and the eventual invasion of the Soviet Union. Equal weight is given to the words and actions of not only Churchill and Stalin, but also Roosevelt and numerous personalities that made an appearance and impact (Eden, Molotov, etc.). The initial chapters are followed by document collections that give further depth to the relationship that developed between these two men.

It's difficult to judge what their specific thoughts were at the moment without recalling in hindsight what eventually took place in the latter period of the war and in the immediate postwar period. However, if readers are able to contextualize the events that preceded the various meetings in London, Moscow, the US, and the eventual large gatherings in Tehran, etc., they'll be impressed by the sheer amount of topics covered and the details that were touched on and thought about. Consistent requests, telling omissions, plans for the future, etc., are all worth paying attention to while keeping in mind how the war was unfolding and where the attention and focus was at any specific time. Soviet desperation and requests for assistance are front and center in 1941 and 1942 as Churchill makes promises only to renege on them a few weeks or months later, at times due to circumstances out of his control. One of the major points the authors make is that making promises came easily for Churchill, keeping them was the real issue. For Stalin it was the opposite, it was difficult for him (similar to Molotov) to make a final statement about anything without diving into numerous details and questions that delegations were often unable to fully answer to their satisfaction. Britain was happy to enlist Soviet aid in the fight against Hitler, but the Soviets questioned whether that happiness was based on their suffering as they retreated in the face of continued German advances or whether Churchill genuinely wanted to join forces, help supply the Soviet war effort and, sooner rather than later, open a second front to take the pressure off the Red Army.

We take for granted how difficult wartime diplomacy can be, especially when the outcome is not yet foreseeable. In these pages readers can begin to get a good idea of what thoughts plagued these two men as they tried their best to create some type of alliance and 'friendship' while planning for the postwar period.

As the years pass there are fewer and fewer veterans and survivors we can turn to in order to better understand the lived experience of the Second World War. In "I Somehow Survived" readers are presented with a few recent interviews of soldiers and civilians who experienced different parts of Germany's war throughout Europe - from the Eastern Front, to Italy, and Norway. As with all recollections/interviews and ego documents, there are strengths and weaknesses to this volume. Being decades removed from the time period means there are undoubtedly gaps in their memories and knowledge of the war but some kept diaries and others related experiences that have stayed with them since the war. The first account, describing the war on the Eastern Front, is the longest and the veteran being interviewed is quite open about the type of war Germany waged and the suffering inflicted on the civilian population, more than once he references 'hordes' when describing the Red Army - undoubtedly a leftover from the Third Reich's lexicon. Other accounts relay the death and destruction associated with partisan warfare (be it on the Eastern Front or the Western Front), and at least one describes the rather long and convoluted route he had to take to avoid being taken prisoner at the end of the war. While there is nothing groundbreaking in these interviews/recollections, they nonetheless add to our knowledge of the war and help better contextualize the various experiences soldiers and civilians encountered depending on where in Europe they found themselves - not all theaters were the same but Germans could be found in them all.

Panzers on the Vistula: Retreat and Rout in East Prussia 1945 by Hans Schaufler

The First Soldier: Hitler as Military Leader by Stephen G. Fritz

Fur Volk und Fuhrer: The Memoir of a Veteran of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler by Erwin Bartmann

Mortar Gunner on the Eastern Front: The Memoir of Dr. Hans Rehfeldt. Volume 1: From Moscow Winter Offensive to Operation Zitadelle by Hans Heinz Rehfeldt

Soviet Cavalry Operations During the Second World War: and the Genesis of the Operational Manoeuvre Group by John S. Harrel

Panzer Ace: The Memoirs of an Iron Cross Panzer Commander from Barbarossa to Normandy by Richard Freiherr von Rosen

Air Battles over the Baltic 1941: The Air War on 22 June 1941 - The Battle for Stalin's Baltic Region by Mikhail Timin (Author), Kevin Bridge (Editor)

Stalingrad: City on Fire by Alexey Isaev and Richard W Harrison

The First Day on the Eastern Front: Germany Invades the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941 by Craig W.H. Luther

Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness by Niklas Zetterling

Moscow Tram Stop: A Doctor's Experiences with the German Spearhead in Russia by Heinrich Haape

Marching from Defeat: Surviving the Collapse of the German Army in the Soviet Union by Claus Neuber

Black Tulip: The Life and Myth of Erich Hartmann, the World's Top Fighter Ace by Erik Schmidt

Night of the Bayonets: The Texel Uprising and Hitler's Revenge, April - May 1945 by Eric Lee

Mortar Gunner on the Eastern Front, Volume II: Russia, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Battle for East Prussia: The Memoir of Dr. hans Heinz Rehfeldt

The Battle of Kursk: Controversial and Neglected Aspects by Valeriy Zamulin, Translated by Stuard Britton

In the Hell of the Eastern Front: The Fate of a Young Soldier During the Fighting in Russia in WW2 by Arno Sauer

Lost Honour, Betrayed Loyalty: The Memoir of a Waffen-SS Soldier on the Eastern Front by Herbert Maeger

Churchill and Stalin: Comrades-in-Arms during the Second World War by Martin Folly, Geoffrey Roberts, and Oleg Alexandrovich Rzheshevsky

I Somehow Survived: Eyewitness Accounts from World War II by Klaus G Förg