Alexey Isaev is a well-known Russian military historian who has published a wide range of books on the Eastern Front. He's usually meticulous when it comes to documentation and utilizes a variety of Russian and German primary sources and archives to create a narrative that's full of thick-descriptions when it comes to military action on the Eastern Front.  

 Having read quite a few of his publications, this is probably one of the less exciting and interesting volumes I've come across.  The focus here is on the latter period of the war, specifically analyzing the various 'fortress cities' that were created on Hitler's orders.  This is something of a reverse to Red Army actions in 1941 when Soviet forces tried to hold on to numerous cities in the face of German advances and were eventually forced to surrender at the end of large encirclement battles like Minsk, Smolensk, and Kiev.

However, in this case, Isaev is taking on a lot of territory and doesn't have the time or space to go into enough contextual detail for readers to get a good idea of what brought the Red Army to each of these fortress cities and what their loss and eventual impact would be on both Soviet and German operations. What readers are presented with are day-by-day accounts of unit actions (from battalions to divisions and corps) with corresponding tables of unit strengths, weapons, and losses. While the tables are interesting and telling when it comes to the various casualties units experienced, they're a small piece of a larger story that seems to be missing as the concentration is almost always on just one fortress city. 

For those familiar with the Eastern Front, you will find a lot of useful information but you'll need to contextualize it yourself for a better understanding of what happened on the Eastern Front in 1944-1945. For those new to the topic, I'd say this is something you can and should skip for the moment.

Those who are interested in the Second World War and/or the Holocaust will undoubtedly have run across accounts that detail many of the mass executions that occurred on the Eastern Front or the treatment of Jews and other 'untermensch' in ghettos and concentration/labor/death camps. Something that regularly comes up in these accounts is drinking and the prevalence of alcohol. Often even Red Army memoirs will discuss their impressions of their German counterparts and comment on their 'drunken' advances (something the Germans will just as quickly mention about Soviet forces). In "Drunk on Genocide,"  Edward Westermann takes on the difficult topic of Germany's actions during the Holocaust and attempts to contextualize where alcohol and drinking fit in when it came to mass murder. 

The first chapters of the book might not be the most interesting or enlightening for the average reader as they are steeped in scholarly discussions about hypermasculinity as well as ritual and celebration. But these discussions are necessary to understand the context these men, and sometimes women, were operating in when it came to the Holocaust. Although not every chapter has alcohol and drinking at its  center, the events being described often enough featured drinking and celebration as part of the larger narrative of the Holocaust by bullets and the lived experience of those who found themselves in ghettos, concentration, and death camps. This is not a book that is easy to read, human depravity seems to have no limits and the more these men and women were exposed to torture, violence, and death that they themselves inflicted the less inhibited they became, but not because of alcohol. That was something I kept looking to find - specifically, mention of how many of these killers and torturers needed to turn to alcohol to make sense of what they were doing or to simply get through the day. But, as Westermann points out, alcohol was part and parcel of the killing process but it was an additional benefit not a way to lubricate someone's inhibitions or do away with their resistance. Only in postwar accounts did there begin to appear an attempt to explain the actions of these killers in part by the fact that they needed to be drunk to do their 'job.' Undoubtedly postwar memories of the many killing episodes became intertwined with alcoholic binge drinking and celebrations that occurred before, during, and after many of these mass murders - so why not believe that one directly influenced the other? But in this case, it was the killing that influenced a need to drink in order to celebrate not to cope, at least that was the case for the majority. As other historians and researchers have pointed out, if opposition existed to the killing process it certainly resulted in no discernible slowdown of the mass killing throughout Central and Eastern Europe as mass executions were evident until the final months and weeks of the war. While initially I was somewhat skeptical of what this volume could contribute to our understanding of the Holocaust, by the time I finished reading it I was very much impressed with the author's knowledge, research, arguments, and conclusions.

 In many ways this volume is a missed opportunity. The authors are certainly knowledgeable and have access to numerous archives to help with understanding the dynamics of the air war for Moscow, but they do not necessarily wield that knowledge in a reader-friendly way. In truth, this book could have been a third as long (216 pages of text with numerous photos, tables, and charts) and presented the same arguments with the same information with all the superfluous fluff cut out.

Basically, what readers should expect to find in these pages is a list of bombing raids against Moscow and its environs as well as cities and settlements in the Moscow region. Moreover, the authors present information on the main Soviet defensive formations and their German counterparts. Instead of offering insight into the strengths and weaknesses of both sides (including equipment, training, logistics, etc.) the authors are more interested in listing claims by both sides and then immediately follow up by writing what the archives support and what they are silent about. Thus, the Soviets make numerous claims about downing a variety of German planes and the authors then discuss what German archives support in terms of planes lost for that day and in that specific region of the front. It's interesting information but can readily be confined to a few tables/charts instead of being spelled out for dozens of pages. Additionally, the authors take their time describing the numerous bombing raids made by single or a few bombers against Moscow and the resulting killed and wounded as well as damage inflicted to Moscow buildings, factories, and infrastructure. Readers will have to dig for more interesting information that discusses Soviet weaknesses (the amount of time fighters could spend in the air before having to return to base, for instance) or better understanding the impact of Lend Lease airplanes, etc. Some of that information is there but it should be more readily highlighted and better contextualized rather than offered as side commentary. Finally, the biggest weakness of this volume is a lack of footnotes/endnotes. Researchers, scholars, and historians will be hard pressed to find this volume of benefit as they will never know where specific information is coming from. This very much undermines any lasting value of this volume.

In most memoirs I am usually able to find something of value and worth. There are usually little details or facts that many might overlook but which can supplement better known popular histories and give readers or specialists a better understanding of the larger themes or topics being covered. In "Death March Through Russia" readers will be presented with a text that contains a plethora of mundane details about everyday life in the prewar period and in the postwar period. The Second World War passes by like a ghost and I found myself on more than one occasion wondering what the author actually did during the war. The real value here is in his POW experience in the Soviet Union in the postwar period and thanks to his talents and resourcefulness, he was able to find jobs that were in high demand and which often resulted in him receiving extra rations. There is something to gaining a better understanding of the POW experience but I would be hard pressed to say this text enhanced my understanding of either Germany in the prewar period, the Second World War, or what POWs went through in the postwar period in the Soviet Union.

Like most first-hand accounts of the war on the Eastern Front, readers will usually find something worthwhile in a memoir about the Second World War. "Girl with a Sniper Rifle" is no different in that regard. This slim 200 page volume contains about 50 pages dedicated to 'action' on the frontline, about 100 pages of background information from Zhukova's life at home and training at a sniper school, and the final 50 pages tackle her life after her return from the front with a fair amount of space dedicated to her reunion after thirty years with her comrades.

Overall, the story is typical for those familiar with eastern front memoirs. Zhukova was trained as a sniper and joined a rifle division toward the end of the war, participating in actions throughout Prussia and ending the war around Königsberg. She has eight confirmed kills but participated in numerous actions, including defensive fighting when her unit was encircled. So her total count is undoubtedly higher but due to the chaos of war we'll never know the true figure and in this case it's secondary to the story she sets out to tell. In general readers should take these memoirs, as with all others, with a grain of salt. Zhukova destroyed much of her letters, and with them her memories, of the war immediately after it ended and undoubtedly places, events, dates, names, etc., can become difficult to recall, which the author readily admits. Nonetheless, when put in desperate situations where life and death are on the line, those memories will make an impact on combatants and will be difficult if not impossible to forget, including their lasting effects on a person's senses (smells, sights, touch, taste, etc.). As such, while Zhukova might not have experienced years on the frontline, her few months left her with memories and experiences that help us better understand what Red Army forces experienced, survived, and what many Soviet women had to contend with in addition to the enemy during their time at the front.

I always like to think that every first-hand account is worth reading as there will inevitably be interesting scenes/scenarios/eye-witness accounts worth familiarizing oneself with. It's rare that memoirs are a hit or miss in that respect because if someone didn't have something worthwhile to say, they wouldn't sit down to write a book. In this case, readers are presented with the memoirs of a radio operator who found himself mostly confined to Army Group North's area of operations until the final year/months of the war. 

This is a good introduction to a variety of topics, ranging from Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Rokossovsky's wartime career, to the evolution of the Red Army throughout the Second World War, and some of the key battles and clashes on the Eastern Front. The book features numerous photos of Rokossovsky and the battlefields he found himself on as well as useful maps to put the larger context of the campaigns being described in front of readers. However, that being said, this could have been an invaluable source if the author utilized citations throughout. As it stands, the bibliography is limited and the citations are too few to make this a useful resource for any scholar/historian/independent researcher. While first-hand accounts (both Soviet and German) are footnoted, any and all other information (battle statistics, breakdowns of unit strengths and/or losses, etc.) is not. This drastically reduces the utility of this volume and it's an absolute shame because some of the information is critically important if readers want to understand why Rokossovsky's forces enjoyed success and experienced failure at various points in the war. That being said, for those interested in the Eastern Front and Soviet commanders, this is a good starting point.

 Sadly this book is a waste of time and effort. Undoubtedly there are myths and legends when it comes to the Eastern Front and any of them have been addressed and continue to be researched and discussed by academics and scholars (from Stalingrad to Kursk, from the Cult of Martyrs to the Stalin cult). Sokolov is a well-known name when it comes to the Soviet experience in WWII and, unfortunately, for all the wrong reasons. He's light on sources and heavy on counterfactuals, tenuous extrapolations, and broad generalizations. Trying to not only take on the history of the Soviet experience in WWII but, more so, the myths and legends surrounding it, you will be unable to do them justice in the 300 or so pages of text Sokolov has produced. At best he's scratching the surface in some areas and, at worst, he's reinforcing and creating his own myths along the way. This volume is very much not recommended and to be avoided.

Overall, this volume is an interesting mix of well-known information and some new, original research coming mainly from first person accounts from both the German and Soviet side. The first half of the volume is devoted to the larger history of the Eastern Front up through the German approach to Stalingrad and the beginning of the fighting for the city. Some of the fiercest fighting took place in mid-September for the center of Stalingrad and that included the German 71st Infantry Division and the Red Army's 13th Guards Rifle Division. The author has access to regimental commanders' memoirs from both units and offers an in-depth look at their thinking, planning, and experiences against each other's force. It's commendable that so much attention is being paid to the actions of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, but it does take away from the actions of other units. It's partly understandable as the focus is supposed to be on Pavlov's house, at the center of the city, which was controlled by men of the 13th Guards, but readers should keep in mind there were numerous other units operating in and around Stalingrad that are omitted from this narrative. While this volume is entitled "The Lighthouse of Stalingrad" there is really not enough attention on Pavlov's house, out of 19 chapters, perhaps 2-3 at most deal in some detail about what happened, but the majority of the book goes over well-known information.

Some odd errors are evident as when the author claims the Red Army possessed 'fewer than two thousand operated vehicles in the western theater' when speaking of 'Soviet armor in 1941.' Although there were fewer than 2,000 T-34s and KV tanks, there were over ten thousand tanks in the western military districts, from the border to Moscow. In fact, the author later mentions that 'twenty thousand tanks' were destroyed as the Germans approached the outskirts of Moscow. While most authors writing on the Soviet-German theater use 'rifle' to designate Red Army forces and 'infantry' for German, the author intermixed them at times and we end up reading about Paulus's 'rifle battalions.'

Having said the above, for those interested and unfamiliar with Stalingrad, this isn't a bad volume to start with. If you've read Michael Jones "Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed" this is written in a similar style, a lot of first-person recollections along with some higher-level strategic and operational commentary. But does this volume change our understanding of the Battle of Stalingrad?  No. Does it offer some new and interesting information about Pavlov's house?  Sure, but that could have been done in a journal article rather than an entire volume.

Numerous volumes have been published on the Battle of Kursk and yet there are still numerous myths and legends associated with this clash of men, armor, and planes in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front. In this slim volume (less than 200 pages) German historian Roman Toeppel has tried to demolish some of those myths and offer a more nuanced understanding of this battle. My guess is that this is an updated Master's Thesis that the author worked on two decades ago. In either case, it's a welcome addition to any library devoted to the Eastern Front.

Toeppel utilizes sources from the German and Soviet side although undoubtedly most of the attention is on the German side. Readers should keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive history of the Battle of Kursk, rather, it is a selective study of the lead up to the various battles in the summer of 1943 which include the defensive and offensive phases of the Kursk battle from the Soviet side and Operation Citadel and the follow up defensive operations for the Germans. Going through the planning phase, the author goes to some lengths to show that it was less so Adolf Hitler making all the decisions but rather he was working on concert with his commanders and high command to figure out what the possibilities for the spring/summer season might be on the Eastern Front. Due to various circumstances the decision was eventually taken to delay any type of serious action until early July. 

There are numerous chapters devoted to the actual battles and operations that took place in the summer and although the author tries to address some of the most contested subjects (tank/material and human losses) he is not always successful, at least in my opinion. I have yet to see, in any work devoted to the Battle of Kursk, a worthwhile breakdown of German tanks that were knocked out and destroyed, including how many were repaired and reentered service, etc. Most likely these type of details are impossible to ascertain today with the amount of lost files and documents, but without those details a full understanding of what happened during the summer months of 1943 will be impossible.

I was somewhat surprised to see limited mention of Valeriy Zamulin's work but later in the volume Toeppel discusses why he distrusts some of the information/claims that he encountered in Zamulin's work and he might very well have a point. This only increases our need for additional studies of these summer 1943 campaigns. However, at the same time, Toeppel gives a lot of credence to another Russian author, Boris Sokolov, who has often made questionable claims when it comes to Soviet losses and has corrected himself on numerous occasions. Having read both Zamulin and Sokolov, I would approach the latter with a lot more caution than the former. 

Nonetheless, this is a worthwhile supplement to the various in-depth studies of the Battle of Kursk that are available today and the author raises important questions about how we should evaluate and collectively remember the series of offensive and defensive operations that took place in the summer of 1943, which undoubtedly set the stage for what happened throughout the rest of the war.

I was very much looking forward to this volume but the approach is somewhat limited and the end result leaves something to be desired. Richard Harrison has produced some excellent monographs in the form of 'The Russian Way of War' and 'Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II.' The former included a well-researched and in-depth exploration of the evolution of Russian/Soviet strategy and the latter focused in on one of the more important Soviet military theorists from the 1920s and 1930s. This present volume, which purports to look at the 'High Commands' created during and after the Second World War is simply not in the same league. 

The author readily admits the source base is limited and as a result so is his analysis and the larger ideas he can extrapolate from the primary and secondary sources at his disposal. As a result, much of the attention when it is focused on the Second World War is a rehashing of activities from 1941 and 1942 often based on Soviet era sources. Although there are some worthwhile insights, it's next to impossible to tell what the importance of these 'high commands' was and if they weren't that important, then why devote an entire volume to them? Those familiar with the Eastern Front or the Soviet war experience might find some interesting commentary but be prepared to slog through a lot of pages for those golden nuggets. Whereas the author's previous volumes I would argue are valuable contributions to the larger discussion of Soviet military theory and the Soviet Second World War experience, this volume, unfortunately, falls short.

This is a slim volume that tries to offer some nuance and additional perspective with respect to Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine. The author doesn't necessarily break new ground but he highlights some of the most important issues that Putin continuously referred to and brought up in international gatherings and discussions that were seemingly ignored or not taken seriously. In this respect, there is not much new or original material as discussions revolve around the expansion of NATO, promises supposedly made and never kept by the West, the US unilaterally leaving various treaties revolving around anti-ballistic missiles, medium range surface-to-surface missiles, conducting training experiences on Russia's borders, and continually arming Ukraine to the tune of billions in the post-Maidan period. A lot of agency is taken away from Putin which is not necessarily a bad thing as it shows how NATO and the US are not without fault for the invasion of Ukraine, but this is a primer at best and needs to be read with a wide variety of literature that not only focuses on the international/security issues Putin and Russia have been dealing with but also internal issues that undoubtedly have had an impact on both, and vice versa. It's important to keep in mind that Putin's actions were not made in a vacuum and by better understanding his positions and thoughts, we will better understand how this war began and, just maybe, what needs to happen for it to end.

There are quite a few sniper accounts from the Second World War when it comes to the Eastern Front. From the Red Army we have both men and women who served as snipers during the war and both have been interviewed or have left behind memoirs of their time on the frontlines. From Lyudmila Pavlichenko to Vasily Zaitsev, Soviet snipers had a significant impact on how the war was fought and its legacy as their exploits have become the basis for numerous war films. "Voice of Russian Snipers" consists of over a dozen accounts, ranging from half a dozen pages to about 50 in one instance, from both men and women about their actions on the front as snipers. 

Having read numerous accounts/memoirs by snipers, this volume will stand out as one of the most memorable and forthcoming in its descriptions of what these men and women experienced in the midst of battle. A few things to note is that very few of these veterans began the war in 1941, most joined later in 1943 or 1944. Most were wounded on multiple occasions and returned to their units or joined reserve formations. The training some underwent lasted for months while others were fast-tracked and sent to the front. Often snipers were not correctly utilized by their units or commanders because of a lack of bodies, and at times they served as mortar-men, riflemen, scouts, or sub-machine gunners. The chaos of the front is readily visible in these accounts and many of the episodes related are quite telling of the situations soldiers found themselves regularly facing. This volume is well worth your time and deserves a place in any eastern front library.

While I'm always of the opinion that every primary source account has in it something of value, it's rare that a memoir or diary leaves a lasting impression on me after having read so many. There are still those that I recall more so than others and "Blood, Dust and Snow" will now join their ranks. Coming in at over 400 pages (including a few dozen photos) and mostly concentrating on the initial German invasion of the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa, as well as Operation Typhoon, the ensuing Soviet counterattack, and the 1942 Stalingrad relief attempt, Friedrich Sander's diaries are a window into the personal thoughts and emotions of a German tanker caught up in the war on the Eastern Front.

Although there is undoubtedly some self-censorship, the author is readily candid with himself on a wide variety of topics. There is quite a bit of front line action and with the author having so recently lived through the events in question there is less risk of him misremembering his personal experiences. At times the nature of a soldier in the midst of battle produces a rather myopic take on events and they become somewhat hard to follow, but that is, after all, rather reflective of the battlefield and the chaos of war. There are also numerous mundane entries where little to nothing happens but the author is attune to his surroundings and constantly has something to say or recall or complain about. Each is another little window into the everyday life of a German soldier in a panzer division on the Eastern Front in the midst of a genocidal campaign. 

What is telling in its omission is a lack of commentary on the evolution of the Holocaust, whether in Germany, Europe, or the East. There is mention of Jews (usually in a derogatory way), the author also has some harsh words for the Russian/Soviet population (although that is somewhat fluid depending on the time period and at times the person in question), and there is undoubtedly an evolution to his thinking about these topics/themes and others that readers can witness themselves, which in effect is why although this is a lengthy volume it is worth the time investment. Personally, I think the author simply did not much care about Jews and what did not concern his immediate needs/desires rarely received mention. Furthermore, being on the front lines with limited time in the rear meant what was happening there, whether atrocities against Jews or local partisans, was rarely witnessed - and when it was merited limited mention/commentary. 

The diary entries end in 1943 and that's unfortunate. We know the author survived the war, but it would have been interesting to know the rest of his wartime and even postwar experiences and how his thoughts about the war and his time at the front might have changed. Nonetheless, this is without a doubt one of the more raw and honest accounts of the war on the Eastern Front and definitely highly recommended.

 In 'Invasion On!' Stephen Rusiecki offers a look at how wartime media (specifically radio and newspapers) were able to come together to help craft a memorable and myth-laden narrative of the Allied invasion of Normandy, which became known simply as D-Day.  The basic elements the author concentrates on are the limitations under which radio and newspapers operated within, and their concentration on four specific myths (the significance of the invasion, the religions undertones of the "Great Crusade', the emphasis on the leadership of British and US commanders, and the highlighting of the heroic nature of the G.I. who made his way across the ocean to help liberate a subjugated Europe from Nazi tyranny.  One chapter is devoted to each of these myths but the author often belabors the point and often there's repetition or excessive detail.  Additionally, while the author makes frequent mention of the omission of Black Americans in the myths revolving around D-Day, there is little to no mention of any other minority group. The final chapter tackles the legacy of these myths as they have been regularly recycled in presidential addresses since Ronald Reagan's visit to Europe in 1984 (the author also discusses Bush Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama, and Trump's speeches). The larger argument is that the collective memory around D-Day was formulated in the lead up to the invasion and during its first few days because of how well the media apparatus worked in cooperation with government needs, desires, and censorship. The lasting influence of that relationship between the media and government is the continuation of the myth surrounding D-Day to the present.

Without a doubt this is a timely and needed volume that looks at the intersection of US history and fascism.  Numerous experts in a variety of fields offer a collection of chapters that explore American history and question to what extent we can lean on the framework of fascism to explain both events during the early twentieth-century as well as the recent Trump administration.  Some of the chapters offering theories and ideas in development, others lean on established work and positions, and some discuss more original research that helps readers, academics, and policy experts think about the possibilities open to them when it comes to leaning on comparisons to fascism and how to address growing right-wing animosity, rhetoric, and violence.  Personally, I found myself in agreement with the idea of 'fascism' as a mobile, moving target that is in part influenced by the time and place in question. The US will never find itself in a similar situation to Italy, Germany, Spain, or Japan in the inter-war period, yet all experienced a level of fascism. So it will be impossible to point to exact parallels and know when we are staring in the proverbial face of US fascism. However, looking at the US and our current political environment means appreciating both how historical US racism influenced the rise of German fascism and vice versa. As a transcontinental phenomenon, fascism should not be viewed in isolation but always contextualized and historicized with room left for taking into account future development based on transmitted ideas and the influence of successful policies. Thus there is certainly room for calling reactionary, right-wing policies fascistic, and personalities fascists, even if they do not perfectly line up with what happened in 1930s and 1940s Germany. They are an evolution that has built on previous authoritarian, racist rhetoric and actions and are abusing and subverting our current democratic system with the aim of turning it into something that will certainly taste the same, even if the recipe is different from what we know as 'fascism.'

Bryan Mark Rigg's "Japan's Holocaust" is a bit of a conundrum. This is a historian who initially wrote about "Hitler's Jewish Soldiers" and has recently seemingly altered his interests, focus, and research toward the Pacific Theater of Operations. There's no doubt that he's gone through a large amount of primary and secondary source material in putting this volume together (over 1500 footnotes) but the structure/organization, central argument(s), and polemical detours often take away from what could have possibly been an excellent single volume look at Japan's war effort against the various civilian populations that fell under their occupation.

In effect, Rigg has a few agendas he is routinely pushing throughout this monograph. First is that the atomic bombs should have been used and this is in response to the fact that, second, the Japanese were perpetrating their own version of the 'Holocaust' throughout their occupied territories. This is somewhat simplistic and reductionist but, giving the author the benefit of the doubt, readers will be presented with a history of Japan and Japanese war crimes that encompass over 300 pages. The narrative is not necessarily based on a chronology of Japanese actions in the Pacific and it's more that the chapters are broken up thematically, so there is a fair amount of repetition when it comes to Japanese crimes and the author's condemnation.

Unfortunately, when reducing the history of the Pacific Theater of Operations to just Japanese war crimes this volume begins to read like a voyeuristic look at the basest acts humanity is capable of, ranging from mass rape, to mass suicide, cannibalism, and grotesque torture of human bodies before and after death. When just reading through Iris Chang's "Rape of Nanking" is a soul-crushing task, this book multiples that to the Nth degree. Every page is a new horror and every chapter reaches another level of depravity and debauchery. This is a volume that cannot but haunt readers and while I can appreciate wanting your audience to understand what occupied populations and prisoners of war endured, I'm not sure that an encyclopedic discussion (akin to "The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry," which chronicles the Holocaust on Soviet territory from primary sources) will accomplish much without the required academic commentary.

Which brings us to one of the significant weaknesses, in my opinion, of this work. There is simply not enough context for the amount of information presented. Going through the crimes of a perpetrator on the scale of Japan from the late 1920s through 1945 is simply not enough. While Rigg's does offer some contextual discussion about why Japanese soldiers and officers might have ignored orders, rules of war, and insisted on allowing wanton destruction, rape, and murder more often than not it is generally applied rather than based on specific situations or events and that can become problematic all too quickly.

Finally, while it is undoubtedly true that Germany has done a better job of reconciling with its past than Japan, Rigg's is either unaware or chooses to ignore the numerous obstacles that were put in the way of that reconciliation throughout the Cold War period, nor does he comment on the myth of the Wehrmacht with Clean Hands, which was only addressed in the 1990s and not without criticism. While there is much to admire in how Germany today approaches its past, that should not obscure the resistance many put up to recognizing the crimes of the Third Reich when it comes to the Holocaust and its occupation policies throughout Eastern and Western Europe.

In the end, this is a book I would only recommend to those already familiar with the Second World War and the Pacific Theater, otherwise, the author's polemical style and at times subjective commentary limits the utility of this work.